Before us is a consolidation of G.R. Nos. 125303 and 126937, both petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the annulment of a Decision1 [Record, pp. 707-729.] and Resolution2 [Annex "B" of Petition in G.R. No. 126937, Rollo, p. 42.] dated March 28, 1996 and May 29, 1996, respectively, of the public respondent in NLRC NCR 00-02-01024-92.

The facts are:

Petitioner AURELIO FUERTE was originally employed by private respondent REYNALDO’S MARKETING CORPORATION on August 11, 1981 as a muffler specialist, receiving P45.00 per day. When he was appointed supervisor in 1988, his compensation was increased to P122.00 a day, augmented by a weekly supervisor’s allowance of P600.00. On the other hand, DANILO LEONARDO was hired by private respondent on March 4, 1988 as an auto-aircon mechanic at a salary rate of P35.00 per day. His pay was increased to P90.00 a day when he attained regular status six months later. From such time until he was allegedly terminated, he claims to have also received a monthly allowance equal to P2,500.00 as his share in the profits of the auto-aircon division.

FUERTE alleges that on January 3, 1992, he was instructed to report at private respondent’s main office where he was informed by the company’s personnel manager that he would be transferred to its Sucat plant due to his failure to meet his sales quota, and for that reason, his supervisor’s allowance would be withdrawn. For a short time, FUERTE reported for work at the Sucat plant; however, he protested his transfer, subsequently filing a complaint for illegal termination.

On his part, LEONARDO alleges that on April 22, 1991, private respondent was approached by the same personnel manager who informed him that his services were no longer needed. He, too, filed a complaint for illegal termination.

The case was heard by Labor Arbiter Jesus N. Rodriguez, Jr. On December 15, 1994, Labor Arbiter Emerson C. Tumanon, to whom the case was subsequently assigned, rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The dispositive portion of the arbiter’s decision3 [Record, pp. 531-545.] states:

On appeal, the respondent Commission modified the aforesaid decision as follows:

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration4 [Record, pp. 732-735.] on April 30, 1996, which the Commission denied in its Resolution dated May 29, 1996.

On July 1, 1996, LEONARDO, represented by the Public Attorney’s Office, filed G.R. No. 125303, a special civil action for certiorari assailing the Commission’s decision and resolution. However, on November 15, 1996, FUERTE, again joined by LEONARDO, filed G.R. No. 126937, a similar action praying for the annulment of the same decision and resolution.

On October 7, 1997, private respondent filed its Comment5 [Rollo of G.R. No. 125303, pp. 73-77.] to the petition in G.R. No. 125303. On April 2, 1997, it filed its Comment6 [Rollo of G.R. No. 126937, pp.166-168.] to the petition in G.R. No. 126937 with a motion to drop petitioner LEONARDO and consolidate G.R. No. 126937 with G.R. No. 125303. We granted private respondent’s motion in our Resolution dated June 16, 1997.7 [Rollo of G.R. No. 126937, pp. 176-a to 176-b.]

The petition in G. R. No. 1269378 [Petition, Rollo, pp.8-9.] raises the following issues:

Private respondent contends that it never terminated petitioners’ services. In FUERTE’s case, private respondent claims that the latter was demoted pursuant to a company policy intended to foster competition among its employees. Under this scheme, private respondent’s employees are required to comply with a monthly sales quota. Should a supervisor such as FUERTE fail to meet his quota for a certain number of consecutive months, he will be demoted, whereupon his supervisor’s allowance will be withdrawn and be given to the individual who takes his place. When the employee concerned succeeds in meeting the quota again, he is re-appointed supervisor and his allowance is restored.9 [Exhibit 6, Record, pp. 17-22. TSN, January 25, 1994, pp. 5-23.]

With regard to LEONARDO, private respondent likewise insists that it never severed the former’s employment. On the contrary, the company claims that it was LEONARDO who abandoned his post following an investigation wherein he was asked to explain an incident of alleged "sideline" work which occurred on April 22, 1991. It would appear that late in the evening of the day in question, the driver of a red Corolla arrived at the shop looking for LEONARDO. The driver said that, as prearranged, he was to pick up LEONARDO who would perform a private service on the vehicle. When reports of the "sideline" work reached management, it confronted LEONARDO and asked for an explanation. According to private respondent, LEONARDO gave contradictory excuses, eventually claiming that the unauthorized service was for an aunt. When pressed to present his aunt, it was then that LEONARDO stopped reporting for work, filing his complaint for illegal dismissal some ten months after his alleged termination.

Insofar as the action taken against FUERTE is concerned, private respondent’s justification is well-illustrated in the record. He was unable to meet his quota for five months in 1991, from July to November of that year.10 [Exhibit 4, Record, p. 15.] Yet he insists that it could not possibly be so. He argues that he must have met his quota considering that he received his supervisor’s allowance for the period aforesaid. The Commission, however, negated this view, finding the alleged inconsistency to be adequately explained in the record. We quite agree. As found by the Commission, placing special emphasis on the reasoning of the labor arbiter -

FUERTE nonetheless decries his transfer as being violative of his security of tenure, the clear implication being that he was constructively dismissed. We have held that an employer acts well within its rights in transferring an employee as it sees fit provided that there is no demotion in rank or diminution in pay.11 [Asis v. National Labor Relations Commission, 252 SCRA 379, 384 (1996)] The two circumstances are deemed badges of bad faith, and thus constitutive of constructive dismissal. In this regard, constructive dismissal is defined in the following manner:

Yet here, the transfer was undertaken beyond the parameters as aforesaid. The instinctive conclusion would be that his transfer is actually a constructive dismissal, but oddly, private respondent never denies that it was really demoting FUERTE for cause. It should be borne in mind, however, that the right to demote an employee also falls within the category of management prerogatives.13 [See Rubberworld (Phil.), Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 175 SCRA 450, 456 (1989)]

This arrangement appears to us to be an allowable exercise of company rights. An employer is entitled to impose productivity standards for its workers, and in fact, non-compliance may be visited with a penalty even more severe than demotion. Thus,

Neither can we say that FUERTE’s actions are indicative of abandonment. To constitute such a ground for dismissal, there must be (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt acts, to sever the employer-employee relationship.15 [Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 285 SCRA 297, 308 (1998); Pure Blue Industries, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 271 SCRA 259, 264 (1997)] We have accordingly held that the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, as in this case, is inconsistent with a charge of abandonment.16 [Trendline Employees Association-Southern Philippines Federation of Labor v. National Labor Relations Commission, 272 SCRA 172, 177 (1997); Bontia v. National Labor Relations Commission, 255 SCRA 167, 177 (1996); Jackson Building Condominium Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 246 SCRA 329, 332 (1995)]

There remains a question regarding the manner of demotion. In Jarcia Machine Shop and Auto Supply, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,17 [266 SCRA 97, 109-110 (1997)] we ruled that:

After reviewing the record, we are sufficiently persuaded that private respondent had offered substantial proof of compliance with this procedural requisite.18 [TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 34; TSN, November 15, 1993, pp. 10-15.]

Accordingly, given that FUERTE may not be deemed to have abandoned his job, and neither was he constructively dismissed by private respondent, the Commission did not err in ordering his reinstatement but without backwages. In a case where the employee’s failure to work was occasioned neither by his abandonment nor by a termination, the burden of economic loss is not rightfully shifted to the employer; each party must bear his own loss.19 [Chong Guan Trading v. National Labor Relations Commission, 172 SCRA 831, 843-844 (1989)]

Neither do we discern any grave abuse of discretion in the Commission’s ruling dismissing LEONARDO’s complaint. On this score, the public respondent found that:

LEONARDO protests that he was never accorded due process. This begs the question, for he was never terminated;20 [TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 49.] he only became the subject of an investigation in which he was apparently loath to participate. As testified to by Merlin P. Orallo, the personnel manager, he was given a memorandum21 [Exhibit 3, Record, p. 274.] asking him to explain the incident in question, but he refused to receive it.22 [TSN, July 15, 1993, p. 52.] In an analogous instance, we held that an employee’s refusal to sign the minutes of an investigation cannot negate the fact that he was accorded due process.23 [Pizza Hut/Progressive Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 252 SCRA 531, 536 (1996)] So should it be here. We find no reason to disturb the Commission’s ruling that LEONARDO had abandoned his position, the instant case being a petition for certiorari where questions of fact are not entertained.24 [Premiere Development Bank v. National Labor Relations Commission, 293 SCRA 49, 60 (1998); Suarez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 293 SCRA 496, 502 (1998)] Whether a worker has abandoned his employment is essentially a question of fact.25 [General Textile, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 243 SCRA 232, 235 (1995)] We reiterate that it is not for us "to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses, nor substitute the findings of fact of an administrative tribunal which has gained expertise in its special field."26 [Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 288 SCRA 585, (1998)]

In concluding, we feel that it will not be amiss to point out that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is intended to rectify errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. As we held in Philippine Advertising Counselors, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,27 [263 SCRA 395, 400-401 (1996)]

The well-settled rule confines the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in the review of decisions of the NLRC under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court only to the issue of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner. An abuse of discretion does not necessarily follow just because there is a reversal by the NLRC of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Neither does the mere variance in the evidentiary assessment of the NLRC and that of the Labor Arbiter would, as a matter of course, so warrant another full review of the facts. The NLRC’s decision, so long as it is not bereft of support from the records, deserves respect from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari in G.R. Nos. 125303 and 126937 are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The Decision dated March 28, 1998 together with the Resolution dated May 29, 1996 of public respondent is AFFIRMED in toto. No pronouncement as to costs.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.