Before us is the appeal interposed by accused-appellant Rolando Flores y San Miguel from the decision1 [Rollo, pp. 32-45.] dated February 16, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 75, in Criminal Case No. 4425-V-94 finding him and co-accused Isabelo Ragundiaz y Auregue guilty of acting in conspiracy with one another in killing BILLY CAJUBAN on July 9, 1994. The appeal of accused-appellant Isabelo Ragundiaz y Auregue was dismissed in a Resolution2 [Rollo, p. 67.] of the Court dated October 22, 1997 which became final and executory on December 4, 1997 and recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.3 [Rollo, p. 68.]

The Amended Information4 [Records, p. 8.] filed on July 27, 1994 by State Prosecutor Esteban A. Molon, Jr. before Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, charged Isabelo Ragundiaz y Auregue and Rolando Flores y San Miguel, both detained, and John Doe, Peter Doe, and Jack Doe, all at large, of the crime of murder committed as follows:

When arraigned, both accused entered separate pleas of not guilty. Thereafter, upon motion filed by the accused and hearing conducted thereon by the trial court, an order5 [Records, p. 35.] dated November 9, 1994 was issued granting bail to both accused in the amount of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos in cash each which was later reduced to a cash bond of P20,000.00 each. Only accused Isabelo A. Ragundiaz posted a cash bond of P20,000.00 and was provisionally discharged from police custody. Accused-appellant Rolando Flores remained detained at the Valenzuela Municipal Jail.

During the trial, the prosecution presented seven (7) witnesses, namely: Alberto Castillo, Lito Salinas, Lina Cajuban, Ludivino Lagat, SPO1 Josefino Canary, Jr., Honorato A. Flores, and SPO1 Arnold Alabastro, while the defense had as witnesses accused Isabelo Ragundiaz, his common-law wife Rachelle Ragundiaz and accused Rolando Flores.

The trial court summed up the evidence adduced by the parties, and stated its findings as follows:

x x x x x x x x x

On February 16, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Accused Rolando Flores and accused Isabelo Ragundiaz filed separate notices of appeal, the former on February 20, 19968 [Records, p. 116.] and the latter on March 5, 19969 [Records, pp. 117-118.]. As stated earlier, the appeal of accused Isabelo Ragundiaz was dismissed by the Court for jumping bail pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, the judgment against Isabelo Ragundiaz finding him guilty of murder is now final.

In his appeal brief, accused-appellant Rolando Flores raises the following assignment of errors10 [Rollo, p. 79.]:

Appellant avers that only two of the prosecution witnesses provided the court with circumstantial evidence which were used as basis in rendering a judgment of conviction against the accused. These two witnesses, Alberto Castillo and Lito Salinas, testified only on matters which transpired before and after the killing and as such, there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of victim Billy Cajuban. Thus, it is the contention of accused-appellant Flores that the testimonies of these two witnesses do not constitute circumstantial evidence sufficient to establish the guilt of accused Rolando Flores beyond reasonable doubt.

As previously stated, the court a quo convicted accused-appellant Flores as co-principal of the crime of murder for the killing of Billy Cajuban. The conviction was based purely on circumstantial evidence because there was no eyewitness to the actual killing of the victim. Thus, the core issue in the instant appeal is whether or not the circumstantial evidence linking accused-appellant to the killing is sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.11 [Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court; People vs. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118; People vs. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124; People vs. Bato, 284 SCRA 223; People vs. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94; People vs. Rivera, 295 SCRA 99.] The corollary rule is that the circumstances proven must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person;12 [People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565; People vs. Paguntalan, 242 SCRA 753; People vs. Danao, 253 SCRA 146; People vs. Gargar, 300 SCRA 542.] i.e. the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with any other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.13 [People vs. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37; People vs. Dulatre, Jr. 248 SCRA 107; People vs. Ragon, 282 SCRA 90; People vs. Maluenda, 288 SCRA 225.]

Based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court appreciated the following two pieces of circumstantial evidence in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder:

These two circumstances, coupled with the fact that the dead body of the victim Billy Cajuban was found at around 2:00 A.M. of that same day, were deemed sufficient by the trial court to convict the accused-appellant of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

Verily, these circumstances cited by the trial court in justifying the conviction of the accused-appellant satisfies the first two requisites for judgments of conviction based on circumstantial evidence. There was more than one circumstance and these circumstances were duly proven by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Alberto Castillo and Lito Salinas. We are not prepared to say however that the combination of these circumstances is sufficient to convict accused-appellant as co-principal for the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt.

The principals in the commission of a crime are (1) those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those who directly force or induce others to commit it; and (3) those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it could not have been accomplished.14 [People vs. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474.] As such, in order to convict accused-appellant as principal in the crime of murder, the prosecution must prove specific acts done by him which fall under any of the abovementioned acts.

From the evidence presented by the prosecution, it is apparent that accused-appellant Rolando Flores was not involved in and had no participation in the verbal jousting and physical altercation between co-accused Isabelo Ragundiaz and Billy Cajuban that took place in the early morning of July 9, 1994. The pertinent portions of the testimony of witness Alberto Castillo on this point are reproduced hereunder as follows:

XXX XXX XXX

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XXX XXX XXX

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XXX XXX XXX

From, this testimony, it is clear that accused-appellant Flores was a mere bystander when the altercation between accused Ragundiaz and Billy Cajuban was taking place. Likewise, it was accused Isabelo Ragundiaz and not accused Rolando Flores who boxed Billy Cajuban on the face, poked a gun at him and dragged the victim to the El Salvador taxi. As such, from Castillo’s testimony, it cannot be inferred that accused-appellant took a direct part in the execution of the crime or that he forced or induced others to commit it. The only participation of accused-appellant Flores was that he allegedly helped in dragging the victim to the taxicab and that he allegedly drove the taxicab away from the basketball court. These acts however have not been shown to be indispensable to the commission of the crime so as to consider him as a principal by indispensable cooperation.

With respect to the second piece of circumstantial evidence allegedly linking accused-appellant Flores to the killing, we note that witness Lito Salinas only testified that he saw accused-appellant, in the company of Ragundiaz and three others, arrive at the Skyblue Beerhouse at 3:30 A.M. of that same day. They arrived on board an El Salvador Taxi and accused-appellant Rolando Flores was sporting a blood-stained shirt. However, he also saw that accused-appellant Flores had a wound on his left hand thumb. Witness Salinas did not see the actual killing of Billy Cajuban nor did he witness any act of accused-appellant Flores done in furtherance of the crime.

Thus, the evidence adduced by the prosecution points only to accused Isabelo Ragundiaz as the principal in the murder of Billy Cajuban. Ragundiaz was seen by a witness as having a fight with the victim and that he was in the possession of a gun. Moreover, as testified by witness Rachelle Ragundiaz, the common-law wife of accused Isabelo Ragundiaz, it was Ragundiaz who had a probable motive to kill Billy Cajuban. She testified that prior to the incident, accused Ragundiaz had a misunderstanding with Billy Cajuban as the latter was suspected of stealing Ragundiaz’s wristwatch a week earlier16 [T.S.N., August 21, 1995, pp. 15-17.]. This case of theft was the subject of a complaint17 [Exhibit "4" for the Defense.] which she had earlier filed with the Barangay authorities on July 4, 1994 and which caused a confrontation between the victim and Ragundiaz before the Barangay Captain of 3rd Avenue, Caloocan City.

In contrast, the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant Flores was likewise a principal to the killing of Billy Cajuban. The acts performed by accused-appellant are not, by themselves, indispensable to the killing of Billy Cajuban. As aforesaid, to be considered as a principal by indispensable cooperation, there must be direct participation in the criminal design by another act without which the crime could not have been committed. We note that the prosecution failed to establish that the accused-appellant’s acts were of such importance that the crime would not have been committed without him or that he participated in the actual killing. As such, the acts of accused-appellant only raise the suspicion that he was somehow involved in the killing of Billy Cajuban. These circumstances however do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that he is guilty as co-principal in the perpetration of the crime.

Similarly, the circumstantial evidence that accused-appellant Flores, who was sporting a bloody t-shirt, together with accused Ragundiaz, and two other unidentified companions, arrived at the Sky Blue Beerhouse at 3:30 A.M. of July 9, 1994, does not conclusively indicate that accused-appellant actively participated in the commission of the crime. It must be noted that the witness also testified that accused-appellant had a wound on the thumb of his left hand and as such, the blood on the t-shirt may have come from the said wound. This circumstance however does not in any way shed light on the actual degree of his participation in the killing.

Finally, accused-appellant Flores did not have any motive to kill Billy Cajuban. While we are aware that the motive of the accused in a criminal case is generally held to be immaterial, not being an element of the crime, motive becomes important when, as in this case, the evidence on the commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive.18 [People vs. Cayetano, 223 SCRA 770.]

At best, therefore, the evidence before us merely shows that accused-appellant Flores was somehow involved in the commission of the crime. However, the evidence does not clarify the actual degree of his participation in the killing of Billy Cajuban.

To justify its conviction of accused-appellant as a principal to the crime, the trial court appreciated the existence of an alleged conspiracy between him and Isabelo Ragundiaz without stating however, how it came to such a conclusion. At this point, It is well to recall here the rule established by this Court to the effect that conspiracy must be shown to exist, by direct or circumstantial evidence, as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.19 [People vs. Vicente, May 21, 1969.] Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it or if at the time of the commission of the offense, the offenders have the same criminal purpose and were united in its execution. Therefore, in order to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance of the conspiracy.20 [People vs. de Roxas, 241 SCRA 369.] The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the conspiracy.21 [People vs. Tami, 244 SCRA 1; People vs. De Roxas, 241 SCRA 369.]

In the light of these legal principles, the Court finds that proof beyond reasonable doubt has not been established as to the existence of conspiracy between Isabelo Ragundiaz and accused-appellant Rolando Flores. While direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy as it may be shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common design among the accused to commit the offense charged, the evidence to prove the same must be positive and convincing considering that conspiracy is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal fold.22 [People vs. Madali, 188 SCRA 69; People vs. Tingson, 47 SCRA 243.]

In the instant case, there was no adequate proof presented that accused-appellant Rolando Flores conspired with the other accused to commit the crime of murder. The evidence merely points out that he helped in dragging the victim to a taxicab and that he was the one who drove the said taxicab. These acts of accused-appellant show some degree of participation on the part of the accused-appellant on the criminal design of Isabelo Ragundiaz but it is now well-settled that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a common design.23 [People vs. Elefano, 125 SCRA 702; People vs. Vicente, 28 SCRA 247; People vs. Ibanez, 77 Phil. 664.] And independent of these acts of accused-appellant, there appears to be no proof adduced by the prosecution that he was motivated by the same criminal design entertained by his co-accused Isabelo Ragundiaz. Likewise, the fact that accused-appellant was seen later that day in the company of Isabelo Ragundiaz and three other persons is not sufficient indication that the former conspired with the latter in killing Billy Cajuban as conspiracy transcends mere companionship.24 [People vs. Padrones, 189 SCRA 496.]

As such, the prosecution failed to present evidence sufficient to establish accused-appellant’s conspiracy with the evil designs of co-accused Isabelo Ragundiaz. Neither was it established that the accused-appellant’s acts were of such importance that the crime would not have been committed without him or that he participated in the actual killing. However, the actions of accused-appellant as proven by the evidence do not totally clear him from any criminal liability for the death of Billy Cajuban.

We have previously held that the liability of one whose participation in a crime was limited to driving for the killers25 [People vs. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465], or one who himself tied the victim’s hands and joined armed men in taking the victim to the hills26 [People vs. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71.], is only that of an accomplice. The rationale for these rulings is that where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused acted as principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability, that of a mere accomplice.27 [People vs. Corbes, supra; People vs. Sotto, 255 SCRA 344; People vs. Bongo, 55 SCRA 547; People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158; People vs. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514.]

In the instant case, the trial court erred in holding accused-appellant equally liable with his co-accused Isabelo Ragundiaz. Accused-appellant’s conspiracy with the criminal design of Ragundiaz was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Neither has it been shown that the acts committed by accused-appellant were indispensable to the commission of the crime. Thus, the lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, which creates the doubt whether he has acted as a principal or as an accomplice, impels this Court to resolve the question as to his liability in his favor by holding that he is guilty of the minor form of responsibility.28 [People vs. de Vera, G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999; People vs. Riveral 10 SCRA 462.] Accordingly, accused-appellant Rolando Flores should be convicted as an accomplice to the murder of Billy Cajuban.

As an accomplice, Rolando Flores should be imposed the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony.29 [Art. 52, Revised Penal Code.] The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty one degree lower is reclusion temporal and there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant Rolando Flores should therefore be meted out the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.30 [People vs. Magno, G.R. No. 134535, January 19, 2000.]

We sustain the trial court’s grant of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, which may be awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. We likewise affirm the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. We reduce however, the award of actual and compensatory damages from P70,000.00 to P11,500.00 as it is only the latter amount which was properly supported by receipts.31 [Exhibits "G", "H", and "J".] As an accomplice, accused-appellant is solidarily liable with Isabelo Ragundiaz for one-half of the said amount, or P55,750.00, and is subsidiarily liable for the rest in case the latter is found insolvent.32 [Articles 109 and 110, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Sotto, 255 SCRA 344; People vs. Barbosa, 86 SCRA 217.]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-appellant Rolando Flores is hereby found guilty as an accomplice to the murder of Billy Cajuban. He is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is likewise held solidarily liable with co-accused Isabelo Ragundiaz for one-half of the amounts of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P11,500.00 as actual damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages or a total amount of P55,750.00 and he is held subsidiarily liable for the other half, in case of the latter’s insolvency.

Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., Abroad, On Official Business.