Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 [Penned by Associate Justice Fidel P. Purisima (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Asaali S. Isnani and Corona Ibay-Somera.] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38380 affirming the Omnibus Order2 [Annex "G", issued by Judge Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. Assisting Branch 74 of the Regional Trial Court of Cainta, Rizal, Rollo, p. 82.] of the lower court dismissing petitioner’s second Amended Complaint for insufficiency of cause of action.

Respondent spouses Epifanio and Cecilia Alano retained the legal services of petitioner Atty. Zaida Ruby S. Alberto to represent them before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in an action to recover real properties, money and other assets that may pertain to them by virtue of their stockholdings in the Natalia Realty, Inc. Both parties formalized their conformity in a retainer agreement3 [Annex "A", Rollo, p. 37.] the salient feature of which is for respondent-spouses to pay petitioner on a contingent basis the following: a) the equivalent in kind of ten percent (10%) of whatever real estate may be awarded, and b) the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).

In accordance with said Agreement, petitioner filed on behalf of respondent-spouses SEC Case No. 3054, an action for liquidation, accounting and damages against Eugenio S. Baltao and five other persons of Natalia Realty, Inc., and appeared at the hearings thereof.

On January 3, 1989, petitioner learned that respondent-spouses moved to dismiss SEC Case No. 3054 which motion was confirmed in a manifestation by Baltao and Natalia Realty, Inc. It appeared that during the pendency of the case, the opposing parties reached a settlement without consulting petitioner. Petitioner only learned of the settlement on January 16, 1989 when she received a copy of a SEC order giving Baltao and Natalia Realty, Inc. three days to comment on respondent-spouses’ motion to dismiss on account of said settlement. In effect, Baltao and Natalia Realty, Inc. joined respondent-spouses in their motion to dismiss on account of a satisfactory settlement having been reached between them in said SEC case. Accordingly, the said case was dismissed on January 19, 1989.

When confronted, respondent-spouses admitted that a settlement had indeed been reached and that they expected to receive 35 hectares of land. Petitioner demanded the payment of the fees stipulated in their retainer agreement, however, respondent-spouses refused to pay despite repeated demands.

Petitioner was thus constrained to file a Complaint for collection of sum of money with damages4 [Docketed as Civil Case No. 57023.] against respondent-spouses. The Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 151 rendered a decision on November 17, 1989 in favor of petitioner the dispositive portion of which reads:

In a subsequent Order, the lower court declared that the attorney’s fees awarded in the above-cited decision constitute a lien on the properties subject of the case and ordered the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Marikina Branch, to annotate said lien on the covering certificates of title and their derivatives. When the above-cited decision became final and executory, petitioner caused the issuance of a writ of execution. However, per Sheriff’s Return,5 [Annex "B-1", Rollo, p. 48.] only P3,500.00 of personal properties of respondent-spouses were levied.

Apparently, Natalia Realty, Inc. had sold to private respondent Yolanda Alano, respondent-spouses’ daughter, 230,090 square meters or a little over 23 hectares out of the 32.4 hectares given to them as settlement of the SEC case.6 [Annex "C-1", Rollo, p. 58.] The sale was executed on December 28, 1988 or six days before respondent-spouses moved to dismiss the SEC case on January 3, 1989. This discovery prompted petitioner to file a complaint, and thereafter, a second Amended Complaint7 [Docketed as Civil Case No. 90-1798.] to declare the deed of sale null and void ab initio on the ground that the transfer of the subject parcels of land to Yolanda Alano was simulated. Petitioner likewise caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the transfer certificates of title.

The trial court, in an Omnibus Order,8 [Issued by Judge Juan Q. Enriquez Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Assisting Branch 74 of Cainta, Rizal, Annex "G", Rollo, p. 82.] dismissed petitioner’s Complaint for insufficiency of cause of action. As a matter of course, the annotations of the notice of lis pendens as well as the attorney’s lien on the transfer certificates of title were cancelled.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the complaint as well as the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and the annotation of attorney’s lien. In affirming the lower court’s Omnibus Order dismissing the Second Amended Complaint for insufficiency of cause of action, the Court of Appeals held thus:

Hence, this petition. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred:

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that she "had no legal right or personality to assail the deed of sale between Natalia Realty, Inc. and Yolanda P. Alano"10 [Petition, Rollo, p. 10.] as she was a stranger to the contract sought to be annulled, hence without sufficient cause of action.

This contention is impressed with merit. In Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,11 [268 SCRA 727 (1997)] this Court held:

The sufficiency of petitioner’s cause of action in the second Amended Complaint is readily apparent. A right in her favor was created by virtue of the retainer agreement executed between her and respondent-spouses. This right was confirmed and upheld by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig when it ruled in favor of petitioner in Civil Case No. 57023 for collection of sum of money and damages.12 [See Note 4.] Correspondingly, respondent-spouses had the obligation to honor and not to violate the provisions of the retainer agreement it entered into with petitioner. Unfortunately, respondent-spouses breached their obligation under the retainer agreement when they refused and failed to pay petitioner’s attorney’s fees in accordance with their agreement. Worse, when petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution, she discovered to her dismay that respondent-spouses had no more leviable properties except a few personal properties amounting to only P3,500.00. In fact, by making it appear that it was Natalia Realty, Inc. which sold respondent-spouses’ 23 hectares to respondent Yolanda P. Alano, petitioner not only had a cause of action against respondent-spouses but likewise against Yolanda P. Alano. Clearly, all these instances which were alleged and enumerated in the second Amended Complaint constitute a sufficient cause of action on the part of petitioner.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals should not have been too rigid in applying the rule that in resolving a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, only the averments in the complaint and no other are to be consulted. The rule admits of exceptions.

First: All documents attached to a complaint, the due execution and genuineness of which are not denied under oath by the defendant, must be considered as part of the complaint without need of introducing evidence thereon.13 [City of Cebu v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 175 (1996)]

Attached to the second Amended Complaint is the Deed of Sale the due execution and genuineness of which were never denied by respondents. While admittedly, petitioner is not a party to the Deed of Sale, nevertheless, she anchors her right upon the allegation that her share in the 35 hectares of land awarded to respondent-spouses was prejudiced by the simulated sale to Yolanda P. Alano. The allegation that the Deed of Sale was simulated does not have to be proved at the outset as it could be done during the trial on the merits of the case.

Second: Other pleadings submitted by the parties, in addition to the complaint, may be considered in deciding whether the complaint should be dismissed for lack of cause of action.14 [Id., p. 178.]

In City of Cebu v. Court of Appeals15 [Supra.] this Court held thus -

In the instant case, aside from the original and the amended complaint, the lower court had every opportunity to study the merits of the case by examining the other pleadings submitted by the parties such as the Motion for Cancellation of the Notices of Lis Pendens and Attorney’s Lien, Answer to Interrogatories of Plaintiff, Opposition to Motion for Cancellation of the Notices of Lis Pendens and Attorney’s Lien, Answer with Counterclaim, Answer with Counterclaim and Special/Affirmative Defenses, Reply to Special/Affirmative Defenses and Answer to Counterclaim of Defendant Spouses Epifanio and Cecilia Alano, Answer of Defendant Natalia Realty, Inc., Answer to Counterclaim of Defendant Natalia Realty, Inc., Interrogatories to Defendant Natalia Realty, Inc., Amended Answer with Counterclaim to Defendant Yolanda P. Alano and Opposition to Admit Amended Answer for Yolanda P. Alano.

It is only logical for the lower court to consider all these pleadings in determining whether there was a sufficient cause of action as the order of dismissal is summary in nature.16 [Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Garcia, 143 SCRA 178 (1986)] So long as those attached pleadings are procedurally responsive to the complaint, then they may be considered in evaluating the sufficiency of the cause of action in the complaint. In addition, since the dismissal of a complaint by virtue of a motion to dismiss for failure to state or for insufficiency of cause of action would be tantamount to a summary judgment, the lower court should at least have considered the attached documents and pleadings as a matter of due process. Strictly limiting the evaluation of the merits of the complaint to its averments or allegations would be too constricting an interpretation of the rule. It must be remembered that the complaint itself is accompanied by documentary evidence attached as annexes. The responsive pleadings, in addition, though not attachments to the complaint, clarify its merits since they are already part of the records of the case and should therefore be considered.

What this Court finds unusual is the timing of the sale and the reason why the share of the respondent-spouses as part of the settlement they had with Natalia Realty, Inc. had to be sold to their daughter Yolanda P. Alano by the said corporation. These questions immediately manifested themselves from a reading of the two documents attached to the second Amended Complaint. The retainer agreement provided, thus:

The above agreement resulted in the filing of SEC Case No. 3054, for liquidation, accounting and damages, with preliminary injunction against Eugenio S. Baltao and five others of the Natalia Realty, Inc.

Apparently, on December 28, 1988, or six days before respondent-spouses filed their motion to dismiss the SEC case on January 3, 1989, a deed of sale was already executed between Natalia Realty, Inc. and respondent-spouses’ daughter Yolanda Alano. In said deed, Natalia Realty, Inc. sold 23 hectares, out of the total 32.4 hectares awarded to the Alano spouses, to Yolanda Alano for P500,000.00.

We cannot comprehend why 23 hectares awarded to the Alano spouses as their rightful share by virtue of their stockholdings in Natalia Realty, Inc. were sold to their daughter. The SEC case was precisely initiated by the Alano spouses to recover their rightful share in said company. In fact, a close perusal of the pleadings attached to the records of the case, particularly the Answer to Interrogatories of Plaintiff, would reveal that there are not enough parcels of land to satisfy petitioner’s attorney’s fees. In the Answer to the Interrogatories of Plaintiff, it was disclosed that the remaining 12 hectares of land out of the 35 hectares awarded to respondent-spouses were already ceded to Atty. Antonio Raquiza, respondent-spouses’ former lawyer. This only strengthens and lends credence to the suspicion that respondent-spouses intended to defraud petitioner of her attorney’s fees and that the Deed of Sale was indeed simulated.

In any case, this Court has held that where "the allegations in the complaint are ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain but, nevertheless, a cause of action can, in any manner, be made out therefrom, and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in any aspect of the facts or any combination of the facts alleged, if they were to be proved, then the motion to dismiss should be denied."17 [Sumulong, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 232 SCRA 372 as cited in City of Cebu v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 175 (1996)] In other words, a complaint should not be dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action unless it appears clearly from the face of the complaint that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be proved within the facts alleged therein.18 [Ibid.] A reading of said complaint plus the attached documents and pleadings show that petitioner is entitled to relief.

With regard to the second assigned error, petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the grounds that it is not necessary for the protection of petitioner’s rights and that the complaint is not an action affecting title and possession of real property.

Petitioner maintains that the annotation of the notice of lis pendens is necessary to protect her claim inasmuch as -

Petitioner further argues that based on Section 14, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court and Section 76 of the Property Registration Decree, "the whole point of the action initiated by that complaint was and is to vindicate petitioner’s right to an undivided portion of the lands subject of the questioned sale, of which she had been deprived by the fraudulent machinations of private respondents." Such is a real action affecting title or possession of real property in which a notice of lis pendens is proper and justified.

Petitioner’s argument is well-taken. The notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular real property is in litigation, and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property.19 [Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 298 (1997)]

In Viewmaster Construction Corporation v. Reynaldo Y. Maulit and Edgardo Castro,20 [G.R. No. 136283, February 29, 2000 citing Magdalena Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 184 SCRA 325 (1990)] this Court did not confine the availability of lis pendens only to cases involving the title to or possession of real property when it held that:

Granting that petitioner’s action is not, actually, one directly affecting title to or possession of real property, still, in the Viewmaster case, the perception of this Court is that the rule of lis pendens likewise pertained to the following:

In this case, petitioner claimed an interest or right in the property specifically subject of the alleged simulated sale. In fact, the object of the complaint is not only to enforce a lien or encumbrance against the subject property but to enforce a valid claim as clearly shown in the prayer.

Verily, petitioner’s prayer in her second Amended Complaint is more than adequate to justify the registration of a notice of lis pendens when it prayed for the following reliefs:

The above-cited prayer in the second Amended Complaint shows that it directly affects the title to or possession of said real properties. It is specific enough as it refers to a portion covered by the above-mentioned Transfer Certificates of Title covering 23,609 square meters of the subject real property. The Notice of Lis Pendens is necessary to protect petitioner’s right especially since respondents allegedly intended to defraud petitioner as shown by the sale under suspicious circumstances of the respondent-spouses’ settlement share of subject property by Natalia Realty, Inc. to the former’s daughter, respondent Yolanda P. Alano.

Plainly, the lower court’s and the Court of Appeals’ misapplication of the rule on lis pendens will leave petitioner’s claim unprotected. As this Court has stated in the Viewmaster case:

In Ginete v. Court of Appeals,21 [296 SCRA 38 (1998) citing Obut v. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 546 (1976) as cited in Republic v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 453 (1978)] this Court held that [w]hat should guide judicial action is the principle that a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. In the same case, this Court emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Decision dated August 19, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 38380 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, which is ordered to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 90-1798. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal and the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Marikina Branch are directed to maintain the annotation of lis pendens in the certificates of title to the properties subject of said case until final judgment therein. No costs.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.