A criminal proceeding, as a rule, may be suspended upon a showing that a prejudicial question determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused is the very issue to be decided in a civil case pending in another tribunal. However, such suspension cannot be allowed if it is apparent that the civil action was filed as an afterthought for the purpose of delaying the ongoing criminal action. This exception applies especially in cases in which the trial court trying the criminal action has authority to decide such issue, and the civil action was instituted merely to delay the criminal proceeding and thereby multiply suits and vex the court system with unnecessary cases. Procedural rules should be construed to promote substantial justice, not to frustrate or delay its delivery.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 [Rollo, pp. 11-26.] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking a reversal of the May 10, 1999 Decision2 [Rollo, pp. 31-35.] of the Court of Appeals3 [Seventeenth Division, composed of J. Eugenio S. Labitoria, Division chairman and ponente; and JJ Marina L. Buzon and Renato C. Dacudao, members, both concurring.] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 49701. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

The February 27, 1998 Order5 [Written by Judge Fernando V. Gorospe Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which was set aside by the CA disposed as follows:

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals as follows:

The Court of Appeals explained that "a prejudicial question is a question which arise[s] in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal."8 [Assailed Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 34, citing People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357.] And based on the above definition, it ruled that the requisites for the existence of a prejudicial question were present in the case at bar. Should the ownership of the share in question be decided in favor of Luis Co, there would be no basis for the charge of estafa against him. The CA added that respondent’s belated filing of the civil case did not detract from the correctness of his cause, since a motion for suspension of a criminal action based on the pendency of a prejudicial action may be filed at any time before the prosecution rests.

Hence, this Petition.9 [The case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 22, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of Respondent’s Memorandum, signed by Attys. Marius P. Corpus and Ephraim B. Cortez. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Attys. Raul T. Vasquez and Brigida Conception H. Romualdez, was filed earlier.]

Petitioner attributes to the CA the following errors:

In the main, the Court will resolve the propriety of the suspension of the criminal proceedings based on the alleged prejudicial question.

The Petition is meritorious.

Echoing the appellate court’s position, respondent maintains that the issue of ownership of the Manila Polo Club share, which was raised in the civil action, constitutes a prejudicial question warranting the suspension of the criminal case for estafa. He argues that his guilt or innocence may be determined only after the issue of ownership has been resolved. He further contends that the prejudicial question was seasonably raised because the Rules provide that it may be made "at any time before the prosecution rests."

Prejudicial questions are regulated by Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

True, the Motion to Suspend the criminal case on the ground that a prejudicial question existed was raised "before the prosecution rest[ed]."11 [Section 6, Rule 111, Rules of Court.] However, the peculiar circumstances of this case clearly show that it was merely a ploy to delay the resolution of the criminal case and vex the already overloaded court system with an unnecessary case.

The criminal action for estafa had been lodged with the Office of the City Prosecutor on March 13, 1997. Yet, respondent filed the civil case only eight months later, on November 18, 1997. Indeed, as early as 1994, a written demand had already been served on him to return the said share.12 [Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 14-15; rollo, pp. 149-150.] He did not contest petitioner’s claim; in fact, he filed the present civil action several months after the institution of the criminal charge. Verily, it is apparent that the civil action was instituted only as an afterthought to delay the proceedings in the criminal case.

The dilatory character of the strategy of respondent is apparent from the fact that he could have raised the issue of ownership in the criminal case. He himself admits that the issue of ownership may be raised in the estafa case.

Yet, he resorts to subterfuge, arguing:

This argument is bereft of merit. We find no sufficient reason why the trial court hearing the criminal case cannot resolve the question of ownership. Significantly, the civil action for recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal action.14 [Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court.] Hence, respondent may invoke all defenses pertaining to his civil liability in the criminal action. In fact, there is no law or rule prohibiting him from airing exhaustively the question of ownership. After all, the trial court has jurisdiction to hear the said defense. The rules of evidence and procedure for the recovery of civil liabilities are the same in both criminal and civil cases.15 [See Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the New Civil Code, 1987 ed., Vol. I, p. 157.]

Equally unmeritorious is respondent’s theory that the trial court trying the criminal case would be bound by the Membership Certificate, which was registered in his name and would thus be "conclusive evidence of his ownership."16 [Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 7; rollo, p. 160.]

If the trial court would indeed consider the Certificate as conclusive proof of his ownership, then such ruling would in fact be favorable to him and give him no reason to file the civil suit. It would be up to petitioner, then, to disprove during the criminal proceedings his alleged ownership.

In any event, the issue of ownership is not a necessary element of estafa, as held by the Court in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, which we quote:

Furthermore, to allow respondent’s stance is to open the floodgates, as it were, to similar dilatory tactics. In this light, we reiterate hereunder our earlier pronouncement:

The foregoing principle applies with equal force in this case. Indeed, the rules of procedure, including the rule on prejudicial questions, were conceived to afford parties an expeditious and just disposition of cases. This Court will not countenance their misuse and abuse to frustrate or delay the delivery of justice.19 [Cf. Cusi-Hernandez v. Diaz, GR No. 140436, July 18, 2000.] In this light, the civil action may in fact give rise to the evils of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ordered to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 97-734 with all deliberate dispatch. No costs.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Purisima, J., no part.