WHICH COURT should resolve the motion to quash search warrant in a case where the court that issued it is not the court with which the case is filed as a consequence of the service of the warrant?

On 30 July 1996 the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presiding over Branch 23, issued Search Warrant No. 96-5051 [Search Warrant No. 96-505 was issued by Executive Judge William M. Bayhon of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.] upon application of the Presidential Task Force on Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence (PTFIC). The warrant authorized a search of the house of petitioner William A. Garaygay located in Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, a place outside the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. Thereafter the PTFIC through its Regional Task Group conducted a raid on the house of petitioner resulting in the seizure of several items of firearms, explosives, ammunition and other prohibited paraphernalia.

On 7 August 1996 an Information for violation of PD 18662 [Codifying the laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing In, Acquisition or Disposition, of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for certain Violations Thereof and for Relevant Purposes. ] was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City3 [The case was raffled to RTC-Br. 54, Lapu-Lapu City. ] against petitioner who upon being arraigned pleaded not guilty.

Subsequently, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence dated 26 September 1996 on the ground that the search warrant was issued in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 19,4 [Referring to amended Guidelines and Procedure on Applications for Search Warrants for Illegal Possession of firearms and other serious crimes filed in Metro Manila court and other courts with multiple salas dated 4 August 1987.] and that it was a general warrant.

On the other hand, the prosecution argued that the motion to quash should have been filed with the RTC of Manila which issued the warrant. But petitioner reminded the trial court of People v. Bans5 [G. R. No. 104147, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA 48.] where we ruled -

Treating the argument of the prosecution as a prejudicial question, the trial court resolved the same ahead of the merits of petitioner's motion to quash and held -

On 17 January 1997 the trial court thus denied petitioner’s motion to quash and ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to set the case for pre-trial conference.7 [Decision penned by Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez, RTC-Br. 54, Lapu-Lapu City; Rollo, p. 40.]

Petitioner questioned the denial of his motion to quash in a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. In its assailed Decision of 18 May 1998 the appellate court dismissed the petition and on 11 September 1998 rejected likewise his motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals explained -

For resolution now before this Court are these issues: (a) whether the trial court of Lapu-Lapu City where the criminal case was filed is clothed with authority to resolve the Motion to Quash Search Warrant . . . ; and, (b) whether the search warrant issued by the RTC of Manila is valid.

Aside from invoking People v. Bans anew, petitioner cites Nolasco v. Paño9 [G. R. No. 69803, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 152.] which was quoted in Bans -

Assuming that the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City is not vested with authority to resolve the issue of the validity of the search warrant, petitioner now submits to this Court the issue for resolution. He argues that a search warrant to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched. In the present case, the search warrant merely stated, among others, that "William Garaygay a.k.a. William Flores/Willy Ybañez of Brgy. Marigondon, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu x x x x" When the shanty where he was then sleeping was searched by the authorities they found one (1) 9mm Glock pistol duly licensed in his name. Thereafter, he was dragged to an abandoned building about ten (10) to fifteen (15) meters away. It was in that abandoned building where the authorities allegedly found the firearms, explosives, ammunition and other paraphernalia alluded to in the Information. Petitioner next argues that the search in his shanty and in the abandoned building was made by elements of the PTFIC without any witness, in violation of Sec. 7, Rule 126, of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides that "[n]o search of house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or, in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality." Petitioner submits that, necessarily, all the items confiscated by the authorities on the basis of the invalid search warrant should be excluded in the criminal case for being "fruits of the poisonous tree."

In 1967, in Pagkalinawan v. Gomez,10 [No. L-22585, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1275.] we ruled that relief from a search warrant claimed to be invalid should be sought in the court that issued it. We emphasized that any other view would be subversive of a doctrine that has been steadfastly adhered to, the main purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other's lawful orders. This doctrine was reiterated in Templo v. de la Cruz11 [Nos. L-37393-94, 23 October 1974, 60 SCRA 295.] where the accused likewise questioned the validity of the search warrant before a court of concurrent jurisdiction, different from the court which issued the warrant. Subsequently however, in Nolasco v. Paño, we declared that "the pendency of the Search Warrant Case and of the Subversive Documents Case before two (2) different courts is not conducive to an orderly administration of justice. It should be advisable that, whenever a Search Warrant has been issued by one Court or Branch and a criminal prosecution is initiated in another Court or Branch as a result of the service of the Search Warrant, the Search Warrant Case should be consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The later criminal case is more substantial than the Search Warrant proceeding, and the Presiding Judge in the criminal case should have the right to act on petitions to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained."

People v. Bans substantially restated the doctrine in Nolasco v. Paño, i. e., when a search warrant is issued by one court, if the criminal case by virtue of the warrant is raffled off to a branch other than the one which issued the warrant, all incidents relating to the validity of the warrant should be consolidated with the branch trying the criminal case. We explained further therein the underlying reason for the rule –

People v. Woolcock upon which the trial court and the Court of Appeals heavily relied, appeared to have reverted to Templo v. de la Cruz when this Court said that "the remedy for questioning the validity of a search warrant can be sought in the court that issued it, not in the sala of another judge of concurrent jurisdiction." At any rate, the latest jurisprudence on the matter is People v. Court of Appeals12 [G. R. No. 126379, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 400.] where, as in the present case, the second of five (5) "policy guidelines" laid down in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals was interpreted. The subject guideline, cited in the reasoning of the trial court, concerns possible conflicts in the exercise of jurisdiction where the criminal case is pending in one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in the criminal case. We clarified the principle in People v. Court of Appeals thus -

Conformably therewith, we hold that petitioner's Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence was properly filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City.

The second issue raised by petitioner involves factual matters which should be properly addressed to the trial court. No compelling reason exists for this Court to impinge on a matter more appropriately within the province of the trial court.13 [People v. Caras, G. R. No. 112731, 18 July 1994, 234 SCRA 199.]

WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals which sustained the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City in denying petitioner's Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence, as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration thereof is SET ASIDE. Instead, we rule that the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City has jurisdiction to resolve the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and To Exclude Illegally Seized Evidence; accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-Lapu City, particularly Branch 54 thereof, or whichever branch the case may be properly assigned therein, is directed to conduct its proceedings thereon with deliberate dispatch taking into account the time already lost. No costs.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.