This is an appeal from the decision1 [Per Judge Mauricio M. Rivera.] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Antipolo, Rizal, finding accused-appellant Antonio de la Tongga guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity, as well as the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages plus the costs of suit.

The information against accused-appellant alleged -2 [Rollo, p. 4.]

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon trial on the merits proceeded.

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely, Maxima Bace, Jesus Crisanto, Danilo Veneracion, and Macario Semera. On the other hand, the defense presented accused-appellant and his sister Lydia Dula as its witnesses.

The prosecution evidence shows that, on January 7, 1990, Jesus Crisanto, Danilo Veneracion and the victim Peter Bace went to the house of Paulino Reyes in Sapang Buli, Cainta, Rizal to attend a birthday party of one of the latter’s children. Jesus Crisanto and Peter Bace arrived in Paulino’s house at around 1 p.m. They were followed by Danilo Veneracion. While the group were having drinks outside the house, accused-appellant Antonio de la Tongga and two companions arrived. Crisanto offered them drinks. A few minutes after that, the group noticed that Peter Bace and accused-appellant were having an argument inside Paulino’s house, about a meter away from where they were drinking. Crisanto testified that they could not understand why the two were having an altercation. The host tried to pacify them and was apparently able to do so because accused-appellant and the victim later shook hands.

Accused-appellant stayed for a short while and then left at past 2 p.m. Bace, Crisanto, and Veneracion stayed behind. Then between 3 p.m. and 4 p.m., they decided to go home but not before they had consumed several bottles of beer and a bottle of rhum (Tanduay "lapad").3 [TSN (Jesus Crisanto), pp. 4-8, 13-16 and 22-23, May 31, 1994; TSN (Danilo Veneracion) p. 3, Aug. 16, 1994.] Paulino Reyes accompanied them, suggesting that they take another route, because accused-appellant, a known tough guy ("siga-siga") in the neighborhood, might be waiting for them along the way. The group walked until they reached Villarica Subdivision where they boarded a tricycle going to St. Joseph Subdivision.

Crisanto sat on the right side of the tricycle, while the victim sat beside him. On the other hand, Veneracion took the seat inside the vehicle with Paulino Reyes sitting behind the driver.4 [Id., pp. 9-10 and 29; Id., pp. 5-6 and 12-14.] As the tricycle was about to stop at St. Joseph Subdivision, accused-appellant appeared and suddenly stabbed the victim while the latter was still inside the tricycle. At the time, Crisanto was less than a meter away and saw the incident, while Veneracion saw accused-appellant when the latter was running away. Reyes and Veneracion, followed by Crisanto, immediately alighted from the said vehicle. The three then returned to the vehicle and rushed the victim to the hospital, but he was dead on arrival.5 [Id., pp. 9-12, 19-21, 24 and 29; Id., p. 14-15.]

Macario Semera, the tricycle driver, recalled that at around 4:45 p.m. on January 7, 1990, four men boarded his tricycle and asked to be taken to St. Joseph Subdivision. When they reached St. Joseph Subdivision, a commotion arose inside his vehicle. Suddenly, all his passengers ran away leaving one bloodied person slumped on the seat of the tricycle.6 [TSN (Macario Semera), pp. 5-7, Dec. 27, 1995.]

Dr. Alberto Reyes of the National Bureau of Investigation testified on the fact and cause of death of the victim. He said that the victim sustained one (1) stab wound on the chest just above the heart which caused his immediate death. He added that a bolo could have been the weapon used by the assailant when he attacked the victim who was seated at the time.7 [TSN (Dr. Alberto Reyes), pp. 6-8, 10, and 12-13, Dec. 26, 1994.] The wound sustained by the victim was more described as follows:8 [Records, p.]7; Exh. B.]

Wound, stab, 4.0 cm. long, linear in shape, edges clean cut, oriented downwards and slightly laterally, with sharp infero-lateral and contused supero-medial extremities, directed backwards, downwards and laterally, involving the skin and underlying soft tissues, penetrating the pericardial sac and the right ventricle of the heart, with an approximate depth of 17.0 cm.

Finally, the widow, Maxima Bace, testified that she incurred more than P20,000.00 for the funeral and hospital expenses of her husband.9 [TSN (Maxima Bace), pp. 6-7, April 12, 1994.]

Accused–appellant denied he killed Peter Bace. He claimed that at past 1 p.m. on January 7, 1990, he was going to his sister’s (Lydia Dula’s) house in Sapang Buli, Cainta, Rizal to ask his nephew to accompany him to Bulacan when he noticed several men outside his sister’s house drinking. As he tried to pass by the group, one of them stopped him and offered him a drink which he refused. Embarrassed, the man who offered him a drink got angry and pushed him. When accused-appellant’s sister saw that her brother was having an altercation with the group, she took him away. Lydia added that she accompanied accused-appellant when he boarded a jeep in Celilu Compound. Accused-appellant said he arrived home twenty minutes later and did not return to his sister’s place anymore. He added that he was arrested in December 1993 when he was in Marikina.10 [TSN (Antonio dela Tongga), pp. 3-8, 10-14 and 17, July 18, 1995; TSN (Lydia Dula) pp. 3-4 and 6, Sept. 7, 1995.]

On February 4, 1998, the lower court rendered its decision, finding accused-appellant Antonio de la Tongga guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:11 [Records, pp. 21-22.]

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant argues that-

First. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the assailant, because it was not shown that Crisanto and Veneracion actually saw accused-appellant stab the victim. This is not true. Crisanto testified:12 [TSN, pp. 9-12, May 31, 1994.]

On cross-examination, Crisanto said:13 [Id., pp. 20-22, 24-25.]

Although Crisanto was a friend of the victim and took part in the incident between the accused-appellant and the victim, his testimony, as the trial court found, is reliable and credible. The general rule is that the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of the witnesses are to be given weight and a high degree of respect by appellate courts. Crisanto’s testimony was corroborated by Veneracion. The latter testified that he was inside the tricycle with the victim when the latter was stabbed. He admitted that he did not see accused-appellant until the latter was running away. However, knowing accused-appellant and having just seen him that afternoon, Veneracion could not have been mistaken as to the identity of accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant further contends that it is doubtful whether these witnesses actually recognized the assailant, because they were drunk. This contention is likewise untenable. Crisanto admitted he was drunk, but the defense failed to establish that he and Veneracion were so drunk that they were completely deprived of their sense of perception. It has not been shown that it was impossible for them to know what was happening.14 [See People v. Empleo, 266 SCRA 454 (1993)] To the contrary, these witnesses gave detailed accounts of how the incident happened, and their testimonies were corroborated by the tricycle driver Macario Semera. As the trial court observed:15 [Decision, p. 8.]

There is no reason to doubt the testimony of the prosecution’s witness particularly Jesus Crisanto and Danilo Veneracion, they positively identified the accused as the assailant it appearing that the incident happened at around 4:45 p.m. before the afternoon shade turn to dusk and the said witnesses were just (TSN, July 31, 1994, p. 25) beside the victim when the latter was stabbed to death by the assailant who was one meter away from the former.

Second. The claim of accused-appellant that he went home after his altercation with the group and that he did not go back to his sister’s house is a mere alibi which cannot prevail over the testimonies of Crisanto and Veneracion identifying him as the assailant. The defense of alibi may sometimes be considered exculpatory, as when the guilt of the accused is not established beyond cavil. However, for such defense to succeed, it must be shown not only that the accused was at some other place at the time of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.16 [See People v. Maloloy-on, 189 SCRA 251 (1990); People v. Suitos, 220 SCRA 419 (1993); People v. Manimtim, 120 SCRA 324 (1983)] Otherwise, as we have stressed time and again, the defense of alibi must always be received with caution. It should be proved by probable evidence which reasonably satisfies the court of the truth of such defense.17 [People v. Gonzaga, 77 SCRA 140 (1977)] In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the place where the crime occurred. As the trial court ruled:18 [Decision, pp. 6-7.]

Third. Accused-appellant questions the trial court’s finding that there was treachery in the killing of Peter Bace. Accused-appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he deliberately or consciously adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself. He further asserts that the victim had sufficient opportunity to defend himself because he had been forewarned by Paulino Reyes that accused-appellant might ambush him on the way.

This contention is untenable. Treachery was shown by the testimony of Crisanto, to wit:19 [TSN (Jesus Crisanto), pp. 21, 26-27, May 31, 1994.]

The fact that the victim had been forewarned by Reyes against possible attack does not negate the presence of treachery. What is important is that the victim was attacked even before he and his companions could get out of the tricycle. The mode of attack ensured the commission of the crime without risk to accused-appellant. As Crisanto said, accused-appellant suddenly appeared and stabbed the victim while they were still inside the tricycle. We said in one case:20 [People v. Capoquian, 236 SCRA 655 (1994)]

For this reason, we find accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery. However, we find that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. There is no direct evidence to prove that accused-appellant planned the killing and that he clung to his decision to commit the crime despite the lapse of sufficient time from his determination to its commission.

As this Court held in one case:21 [People v. Manzano, 58 SCRA 250 (1974)]

Such proof is lacking in this case. The mere fact that accused-appellant left Paulino’s house at past 2 p.m. and sought the group at around 4:45 p.m. to kill the victim does not necessarily mean that there was evident premeditation. The evidence does not show the time when he decided to commit the crime and that he clung to his determination to kill the deceased.22 [People v. Danque, 228 SCRA 83 (1993)]

Fourth. Accused-appellant questions the award of actual damages by the trial court in the amount of P30,000.00 because, other than the testimony of the victim’s wife, Maxima Bace, that she spent this amount for hospital and funeral expenses, no documentary evidence was presented by the prosecution to support this claim. We agree with this contention. To recover actual damages, it is necessary to prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, on the basis of competent proof and the best evidence obtainable by the injured party.23 [See People v. Degoma, 209 SCRA 266 (1992)] In this case, there was no such proof to sustain the trial court’s award of actual damages.

In lieu of actual damages, accused-appellant should pay the heirs of the deceased the amount of P15,000.00 as temperate damages. Art. 2224 of the Civil Code provides that temperate damages "may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."24 [People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 119380, August 19, 1999; People v. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158 (1998)]

In addition, consistent with the prevailing doctrine, the heirs of the victim are entitled to the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 considering the mental anguish suffered by them on account of the victim’s death.25 [People v. Francisco, G.R. No. 121682, April 12, 2000; People v. Suplito, G.R. No. 104944, September 16, 1999; People v. Panida, 310 SCRA 66 (1999); People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689 (1997)]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Antipolo, Rizal is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages in the amount of P30,000.00 is deleted and, in lieu thereof, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim temperate damages in the amount of P15,000.00, and P50,000.00 as moral damages, in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court as indemnity, and the costs of suit.

Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), on leave.