ROSENDO MENDEZ (ROSENDO) was found guilty by the Regional Trial Court (Branch 81), Romblon, Romblon, of raping his 16-year-old stepdaughter. The supreme penalty of death was imposed upon him. His case is now before this Court on automatic review.

The Information upon which he was arraigned reads:

On July 9, 1997, ROSENDO pleaded not guilty to the charge embodied in the above-quoted Information. Trial then ensued wherein the prosecution presented as its witnesses the victim, VIRGINITA MENDEZ (VIRGINITA), an elementary school teacher, Milagros Thornton, and the municipal health physician of Romblon, Romblon, Dr. Victorio Benedicto, and adduced in evidence Exhibits "A" to "C" and their sub-markings. The defense for its part presented another daughter of the accused, Marian Mendez (Marian) and the accused, ROSENDO, as witnesses and offered no documentary evidence.

ROSENDO denied the charge against him and countered that VIRGINITA was not his true daughter having been conceived and born before he married her mother.2 [TSN, November 25, 1997, p. 14.] He testified that on December 11, 1996, he slept in one bed together with his daughter named Marian and VIRGINITA;3 [Ibid., p. 16.] that their sleeping arrangement is that Marian was in between him and VIRGINITA;4 [Ibid.] and that he did not rape VIRGINITA on December 11, 1996.5 [Ibid., p. 19.] The testimony of Marian, ROSENDO‘s other daughter and half-sister of VIRGINITA, supported the claim of ROSENDO that no rape occurred on that fateful night of December 11, 1996. Marian testified that on December 11, 1996, she together with VIRGINITA and ROSENDO slept in one bed;6 [Ibid., p. 4.] that her sister slept between her and her father;7 [Ibid., pp. 4-5.] and that she did not notice nor witness any unusual incident throughout the evening of December 11, 1996.8 [Ibid., pp. 3-9.]

On December 9, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision9 [Penned by Judge Placido Marquez.] that disregarded ROSENDO’s version and found the facts of this case to be the following:

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

To stave off the imposition of the death penalty, ROSENDO maintains his innocence, faults the information upon which he was charged as substantially defective and asserts that the evidence was insufficient to warrant his conviction.12 [Brief for Accused-Appellant, Rollo, p. 37.] ROSENDO also points out that the information does not charge an offense since it does not aver that the rape was committed by means of force and intimidation. He also draws attention to the fact that the information alleges an erroneous qualifying circumstance, that 16-year-old VIRGINITA is his daughter when in truth she is only his stepdaughter. The lone assignment of error in this case claims that:

ROSENDO capitalizes on the failure of the information to allege that the rape was committed through "force and intimidation"; he reasons that he "cannot be validly convicted in an indictment which does not charge an offense".14 [Ibid.,p. 39.] Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates three ways of committing rape, to wit:

As correctly pointed out by ROSENDO, the information or complaint for rape should expressly allege the commission of the rape in the manner prescribed in Article 335.15 [THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. III, RAMON C. AQUINO AND CAROLINA C. GRIÑO-AQUINO, (1997), pp. 393.] Hence, in the case of People vs. Oso16 [62 Phil 271 (1935)] the allegation in the complaint that the accused had carnal intercourse with the offended woman "against her will" or "without her consent" is insufficient to warrant a conviction for rape, although the evidence proves the commission of the crime.17 [THE REVISED PENAL CODE, supra, p. 394.] However, in this case, the complaint filed by VIRGINITA expressly alleges that the rape was committed "by means of force", viz:

What we have here is a complaint specifically accusing ROSENDO of rape committed "by means of force" and an information that failed to allege this essential element. The case of People vs. Oso19 [Supra.] also established the principle that in case of variance between the complaint filed by the offended party and the information in crimes against chastity, the complaint controls.20 REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, VOL. II, FLORENZ D. REGALADO, (1995), p. 231.] The failure of the information to state that ROSENDO raped VIRGINITA "through force or intimidation" is not a fatal omission in this case because the complaint alleged the ultimate fact that ROSENDO raped VIRGINITA "by means of force". So, at the outset, ROSENDO could have readily ascertained that he was being accused of rape committed through force, a charge that sufficiently complies with Article 335.21 [At the time that the rape for which ROSENDO was charged took place (December 11, 1996), the crime of rape was still classified as a crime against chastity, the prosecution for which must be commenced by complaint by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian as mandated by Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code. It was only on October 22, 1997 that the crime of rape was eventually reclassified as a crime against persons, the prosecution of which is made de officio by virtue of Republic Act 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.]

As to the crucial issue of whether ROSENDO raped VIRGINITA, a careful evaluation of the evidence points to the conclusion that ROSENDO raped VIRGINITA. The victim in this case is sixteen (16) years old. We have held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which they testified is not true.22 [People vs. Clopino, 290 SCRA 432 (1998), p. 444-445.] Moreover, VIRGINITA has no evil motive in prosecuting this case, in fact, her regard for ROSENDO as the one who nurtured her, buttresses the belief that she was mainly moved by her quest for justice in charging her stepfather with a crime which he could pay for with his life.

In ruling that ROSENDO is guilty of rape, the trial court relied mainly on the testimony of VIRGINITA. We find no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court that the version of VIRGINITA is believable and credible. When it comes to the issue of credibility, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying.23 [People vs. Narido, G.R. No. 132058, October 1, 1999.] Hence, in the absence of a palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.24 [People vs. Bolatete, 303 SCRA 709 (1999), p. 729.]

The testimony of VIRGINITA is far from being perfect in all details; nevertheless, she gave a straightforward and faithful account of the rape that occurred on December 11, 1996, as can be seen from the following:

xxx

The fact that VIRGINITA was raped is supported by the medico-legal certificate prepared by Dr. Victorio F. Benedicto (Dr. Benedicto), Municipal Health Officer of Romblon, Romblon. Based on the certificate, VIRGINITA’s "vagina easily admits thumb" and has "old lacerations, multiple".27 [Records, p. 39.] Dr. Benedicto explained in his testimony that the laceration in the labia menora may have been inflicted by a hard object, or an erect penis.28 [TSN, October 22, 1997, p. 6.]

VIRGINITA positively identified ROSENDO as her assailant and she even recounted that the rape that took place on December 11, 1996 was only the last of the many rapes perpetrated by ROSENDO against her. To support his claim that no rape happened on December 11, 1996, ROSENDO presented Marian, the half-sister of VIRGINITA. Marian testified that she did not witness anything unusual that fateful night. However, the positive declaration of VIRGINITA that she was raped by ROSENDO prevails over the negative testimony of Marian. It is an established rule that an affirmative testimony is far stronger than negative testimony, especially so when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness.29 [People vs. Sagun, 303 SCRA 382 (1999), p. 392.] Marian testified that the sleeping position was that VIRGINITA was in between her and her father, ROSENDO, which notably runs counter to the testimony of ROSENDO that it was Marian who slept in between him and VIRGINITA. It is thus possible that Marian could not have witnessed the rape of VIRGINITA because Marian was sleeping at the time that the crime was being committed. It is also not farfetched for the rape to have been perpetrated despite the presence of Marian considering the doctrine that the nearby presence of people in a certain place is no guarantee that rape will not and cannot be committed.30 People vs. Perez, 296 SCRA 17 (1998), p. 30.] Up to now, there is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.31 [Ibid.]

ROSENDO calls attention to the testimony of VIRGINITA wherein she declared that force and intimidation was employed on the previous incidents of rape allegedly committed by him. VIRGINITA allegedly failed to categorically state that force and intimidation attended the rape that occurred in the evening of December 11, 1996, the rape for which ROSENDO is charged.32 [Brief for Accused-Appellant, Rollo, p. 37.] The following testimony of VIRGINITA allegedly proves his point:

Contrary to the contention of ROSENDO, a rape victim might be compelled to submit herself, against her will, to the rapist’s demands simply because of fear for life and personal safety.34 [People vs. Ramon, G.R. No. 130407, December 15, 1999.] In her testimony, VIRGINITA mentioned that every time ROSENDO would ravish her, he would threaten her not to tell anyone or else he would kill her and that her body "would not be enough to be chopped".35 [TSN, September 19, 1997, p. 27.] The fact that VIRGINITA failed to unequivocally declare that she was threatened or forced by ROSENDO on December 11, 1996 to have sexual congress with him does not negate the fact that the repeated and menacing threats of ROSENDO instilled fear in the mind of VIRGINITA. Furthermore, the moral ascendancy and influence of ROSENDO over VIRGINITA, his stepdaughter, can substitute for violence or intimidation.36 [People vs. Ramon, supra.] The use of actual force or intimidation for the rape that ROSENDO committed on December 11, 1996 is therefore not indispensable in sustaining his conviction.

ROSENDO further argues that the inaccuracy of the information in alleging the relationship between him and VIRGINITA precluded the trial court from imposing the penalty of death. He invokes the case of People vs. Perez37 [Supra.] wherein we declared that the minority of the victim and the relationship of the accused and the victim must be alleged in the information so as not to violate the right of the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charge against him.

The contention has merit. In this case, the information indeed falls short of satisfying the constitutional mandate to duly inform the accused of the gravity of the nature of the accusation against him.

Republic Act 7659 introduced seven modes of committing rape,38 [Section 11. The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:

7. When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation.]
including the twin special qualifying circumstances of the victim’s age and the relationship between the victim and the culprit, which would warrant the automatic imposition of the death penalty. The seven modes of committing rape partake of the nature of a qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since their presence increases the penalty of rape to one (1) degree.39 [People vs. Flores, G.R. No. 123599, December 13, 1999.] The long-standing rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment, if the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances.40 [People vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 131820, February 29, 2000.] For rape to be qualified as heinous, warranting the imposition of the death penalty, the circumstances of the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be both alleged in the information for rape.41 [See People vs. Calayca, 301 SCRA 192 (1999); People vs. Bolatete, supra and People vs. Panique, G.R. No. 125763, October 13, 1999.]

The importance of duly informing the accused of the accusation against him is a constitutional right that cannot be taken lightly, more so if the penalty to be imposed is grave, such as the forfeiture of his life. The essence of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is that "every element of the offense must be alleged in the complaint or information"42 [Balitaan vs. CFI of Batangas, 115 SCRA 729 (1982), p. 739.] so as to "enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense. He is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense."43 [Ibid.]

In setting out the elements of a crime in the information or complaint, the pertinent provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically, Section 9 of Rule 110, provides the following guideline:

The cited provision is one of the many provisions in the Rules of Court that serves to implement the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the charges against him. Relevant to this case is the phrase "a person of common understanding," which has its origin in this jurisdiction in the phrase "a person of ordinary intelligence".44 [People vs. Teves, G.R. No. 128839, July 20, 1999.]

In one case wherein the informations therein alleged:

this Court spared the life of the accused, despite the mention of the age of the victim and the word "daughter" in said informations, on the ground that the quoted informations failed to duly allege the special qualifying circumstances of the victim’s minority and the relationship between the victim and the accused because as phrased, they unduly lay stress on the generic aggravating circumstance of "taking advantage of superior strength".45 [Ibid.] We further explained that:

In People vs. Dimapilis47 [300 SCRA 279 (1998)], the accused escaped the imposition of the death penalty when the information failed to properly allege the actual relationship of the minor victim with the accused. The information stated that the accused was the stepfather of the victim when in reality, the accused was the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother. We stressed that a stepdaughter is a daughter of one’s spouse by a previous marriage or the daughter of one of the spouses by a former marriage.48 [Ibid., p. 308.] The inaccurate designation in the information of the relationship between the victim and the accused in said case was considered a technical flaw committed by the prosecution that cannot be ignored.49 [Ibid., p. 309.] Furthermore, the incorrect allegation that the accused is the stepfather of the victim when the accused is the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother precludes a finding of qualified rape since the relationship alleged in the information against the accused is different from that actually proven.50 [People vs. Manggasin, 306 SCRA 228 (1999), p. 248.] Similarly, in the more recent case of People vs. Poñado51 [People vs. Poñado, G.R. No. 130334, July 28, 1999.], the information also failed to correctly allege that the accused was the common-law spouse of the victim, instead, the information erroneously alleged that the accused was the stepfather of the victim. On this basis, the accused was not convicted of qualified rape and was merely meted out the penalty of reclusion perpetua, this Court thus emphasized that:

Here, to deem that the information against ROSENDO duly alleged the special circumstances of relationship of stepfather and stepdaughter would be to deprive him of his constitutional right to be correctly informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him. What the information in this case specifically designated was that the said accused "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge of his daughter, VIRGINITA MENDEZ"53 [Rollo, p. 6.] when in truth, the actual relationship of ROSENDO with the victim is that of stepfather and stepdaughter. The fact that VIRGINITA is merely the stepdaughter of ROSENDO was duly proven in the trial and admitted by the parties.

The recent pronouncements of this Court in People vs. Teves54 [Supra.] and People vs. Poñado55 [Supra.] decidedly indicate this Court’s insistence on no less than an accurate description in the information of the inculpatory relationship that would aggravate the offense to one of qualified rape, in order to satisfy the constitutional requirement that an accused should be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.56 [See also People vs. Dimapilis, supra, and People vs. Manggasin, supra.] We therefore cannot sanction the imposition of the death penalty on ROSENDO for raping his stepdaughter when the information fatally failed to designate the actual or correct relationship of ROSENDO and VIRGINITA. The penalty should thus only be for simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.

With respect to the civil liability, in line with current rulings, if in the crime of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the amount of P75,000.00; if the death penalty is not decreed by the court, the victim would instead be entitled to P50,000.00.57 [People vs. Poñado, supra.] An additional award of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases, separate and distinct from the indemnity.58 [People vs. Garigadi, G.R. No. 110111, October 26, 1999.]

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon, in Criminal Case No. 2061 finding accused-appellant Rosendo Mendez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the sentence is reduced from DEATH to Reclusion Perpetua and accused-appellant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages to the offended party, Virginita Mendez.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.