This is a case of a 9-year old child who was not believed by her mother that she was raped by the latter’s second live-in partner, appellant herein. This notwithstanding, appellant was charged,1 ["On the basis of the Affidavit/Complaint, signed by the complainant Michelle Robles and assisted by her guardian Corazon S. Flores, the undersigned hereby accuses Petronillo Castillo of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:

Contrary to law." (Records, p. 1).] convicted and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua by the trial court.2 [WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape of her (sic) step-daughter below 12 years of age as defined and penalized in Article 335, par. 3, Chapter two of the Revised Penal Code, the accused Petronillo Castillo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs.

The facts narrated in the People’s Brief are as follows:

x x x....x x x....x x x

In this appeal, appellant raises a lone assignment of error:

The appellant contends that the testimony of private complainant "reveals glaring inconsistencies and allegations that are improbable and contrary to human experience, resulting in the failure of her case to meet the test of moral certainty and guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." According to appellant, complainant testified that he got a knife which he allegedly used to threaten her from telling anybody about the incident, whereas she did not mention about a knife in her affidavit of complaint.

Appellant’s contention lacks merit. Although she did not mention a knife in her affidavit, such omission did not diminish or affect her credibility as a witness. Notably, ex-parte affidavits are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate and will thus not prevail over a witness’ statements on the stand.4 [People v. Salazar, 277 SCRA 67, August 11, 1997. ]

The gravamen of the evil act of rape, at the time of the commission of the crime, is the sexual congress of a woman by force and without her consent.5 [People v. Philip Tan. Jr., 264 SCRA 425 (1996)] Mere contact by the male’s sex organ of the female’s sex organ consummates rape. However, if the victim is below twelve years of age at the time her honor was violated, proof of force, intimidation or consent is absolutely unnecessary,6 [People v. Lagrosa, Jr., 230 SCRA 298 (1994); People v. Andres, 253 SCRA 751 (1996)] not only because force is not an element of statutory rape, but the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the woman is below the age of twelve.

From the victim’s own testimony, she openly narrated in court her nightmare in the maniacal hands of appellant:

Subjected to questioning by the trial court, the victim did not retract from her testimony:

x x x....x x x....x x x

It is clear from the foregoing that there was sexual intercourse. The victim could not cry for help because her mouth was covered and she was threatened with a knife which impelled her into submission. It has been held that the act of holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring the woman to submission.9 [People v. Reynaldo, 191 SCRA 701 (1990)] At any rate, force or intimidation is immaterial in statutory rape.

The victim’s testimony that appellant inserted his organ into her vagina is further corroborated by the medical findings of the Medico-Legal Officer who examined her, to wit:

The absence of spermatozoa in the victim’s vagina is not fatal to her cause. Her credible testimony alone suffices to establish appellant’s guilt. Besides, in rape, the important consideration is not the emission of semen but the penetration of the female genitalia by the male organ11 [People v. Galleno, 291 SCRA 761 (1998)] and the slightest penetration is considered as equivalent to consummated sexual intercourse.12 [See People v. Ligotan, 331 Phil. 98 (1996); People v. Lazaro, 249 SCRA 234 (1995)] In fact, the mere touching by the male’s organ or instrument of sex of the labia of the pudendum of the female’s private parts is sufficient to consummate rape.13 [People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999)]

Appellant further contends that he could not have possibly raped the victim because the place where the crime occurred is small and there were at least 20 persons therein. Against such contention, however, the Court had consistently ruled that rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks along the roadside, in school premises, in a house where there are other occupants,14 [People v. Ulili, 44 SCAD 213; People v. Viray, 164 SCRA 135 (1988) cited in People v. Tan, Jr., 332 Phil. 465 (1996)] in the same room where other members of the family are also sleeping15 [People v. Villorente, 10 SCRA 647 (1964)] and even in places which to many would appear unlikely and high-risk venues for its commission.16 [People v. Dado, 314 Phil. 635 (1995); People v. Rafanan, 182 SCRA 811 (1990)] There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion.17 [People v. Papa Talaboc, 326 Phil. 451 (1996)]

Appellant argues that the information is "too general in terms" since it alleges that the crime occurred "sometime in May 1991," whereas in the victim’s sworn statement the sexual violation continued until February 1992."18 [Appellant’s Brief, p. 7; Rollo, p. 46.]

The argument is likewise without merit. The information charges only one offense – that committed in May 1991. Besides, there is no variance between the time proved and the time alleged in the information. It cannot be said that appellant was deprived of the opportunity to prepare for his defense.19 [U.S. v. Bongasil, 34 Phil. 835 (1916)] The information alleged that the crime occurred in May 1991, only that the victim cannot remember the exact day of the month when it happened. It is sufficient if the time averred is near the actual date as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit, and since that was done in this case, it was not shown that the time proved did not surprise or substantially prejudice the defense.20 [U.S. v. Dichao, 27 Phil. 421 (1914)] Besides, in a rape case, the date or time is not an essential element of the crime and therefore need not be accurately stated.21 [People v. Pagpaguitan, G.R. No. 116599, September 27, 1999; People v. Garcia, 346 Phil. 475 (1997)] Assuming that there were several rapes committed between May 1991 up to February 1992, appellant was only charged and convicted of one crime of rape. He is not, as he cannot, be convicted of other rapes of which he was not charged even if the same were proven during trial, otherwise, it would violate his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Finally, the issue boils down to credibility of witness. Time and again, this Court has repeatedly ruled that matters affecting credibility are best left to the trial court because of its unique opportunity of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness’s deportment on the stand while testifying, an opportunity denied to the appellate courts22 [People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455 (1999) citing People v. Tan. Jr, 264 SCRA 425 (1996)] which usually rely on the cold pages of the silent records of the case.

In the case at bar, it was not convincingly shown that the court a quo had overlooked or disregarded significant facts and circumstances which when considered would have affected the outcome of the case23 [People v. Dio, 44 SCAD 559; People v. Matrimonio, 215 SCRA 613 (1992)] or justify a departure from the assessments and findings of the court below. The absence of any improper or ill-motive on the part of the principal witness for the prosecution all the more strengthens the conclusion that no such motive exists.24 [People v. Ravanes, 284 SCRA 634 (1998)] Besides, the tender age of complainant when she was raped (9 years old), and at the time she testified (12 years old), further lends to her credibility.25 [People v. Tan, Jr., 332 Phil. 465 (1996)] Apparent in this Court’s decision in rape cases where the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of twelve to sixteen is the considerable receptivity on the part of this Tribunal to lend credence to their vision of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and embarrassment to which such a gruelling experience as a court trial, where they are called upon to lay bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy, did expose them to. This is not to say that an uncritical acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that skepticism should be kept under control.26 [People v. Molina, 53 SCRA 495 (1973) reiterated in People v. Egot, 130 SCRA 134 (1984) and in People v. Quidilla, 166 SCRA 778 (1988)]

The avalanche of revelation, notwithstanding the threats on her life and that against her half-siblings, did not deter the victim from revealing to her mother what appellant did to her. The most painful part of her agony is that she was not believed by no less than her own mother but she was lucky to have an aunt who came to her rescue. Rape victims would usually first seek help from their own mothers before they call on other relatives. Unfortunately for complainant, she was not believed by her mother whom she expected to be the first to come to her aid.

Statutory rape committed in 1991 is punishable by reclusion perpetua.27 [Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) before its amendment by R.A. 8353.] Although under the present law, the rape of a child below 18 years old with the offender being a common law spouse of the parent of the victim carries the mandatory penalty of death, the same cannot be applied to appellant because its retroactive application would be unfavorable to him.28 [Article 22, RPC. R.A. No. 7659 took effect on December 31, 1993.] On the civil indemnity, the award of P50,000.00 given by the trial court is proper. However, in addition thereto, victims of rape are also entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00 without need of proof other than the fact of rape, and exemplary damages of P20,000.00.29 [People v. Batoon, G.R. No. 134194, October 26, 1999.]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 70 in Criminal Case No. 1780-B, convicting appellant of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that in ADDITION to the P50,000.00 indemnity awarded by the trial court, appellant is also ordered to pay the complainant moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 plus exemplary damages of P20,000.00.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.