The central issue posed before this Court in the present case is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8551 (RA 8551), otherwise known as the "Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998,"1 [Entitled "An Act Providing For the Reform And Reorganization Of The Philippine National Police And For Other Purposes, Amending Certain Provisions Of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-Nine Hundred And Seventy-Five Entitled, ‘An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Re-Organized Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And For Other Purposes." Took effect on March 6, 1998.] by virtue of which petitioners herein, who were all members of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), were separated from office. Petitioners claim that such law violates their constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure. Scä juris

The NAPOLCOM was originally created under Republic Act No. 6975 (RA 6975), entitled "An Act Establishing The Philippine National Police Under A Reorganized Department Of The Interior And Local Government, And For Other Purposes." Under RA 6975, the members of the NAPOLCOM were petitioners Edgar Dula Torres, Alexis C. Canonizado, Rogelio A. Pureza and respondent Jose Percival L. Adiong. Dula Torres was first appointed to the NAPOLCOM on January 8, 1991 for a six year term. He was re-appointed on January 23, 1997 for another six years. Canonizado was appointed on January 25, 1993 to serve the unexpired term of another Commissioner which ended on December 31, 1995. On August 23, 1995, Canonizado was re-appointed for another six years. Pureza was appointed on January 2, 1997 for a similar term of six years. Respondent Adiong’s appointment to the NAPOLCOM was issued on July 23, 1996. None of their terms had expired at the time the amendatory law was passed.2 [Rollo, 81.]

On March 6, 1998, RA 8551 took effect; it declared that the terms of the current Commissioners were deemed as expired upon its effectivity. Pursuant thereto, President Ramos appointed Romeo L. Cairme on March 11, 1998 as a member of the NAPOLCOM for a full six year term. On the same date, Adiong, was given a term extension of two years since he had served less than two years of his previous term. Cairme and Adiong both took their oaths of office on April 6, 1998.3 [Ibid..] Completing the membership of the NAPOLCOM are Leo S. Magahum and Cleofe M. Factoran, who were appointed by President Estrada on June 30, 1998 and who took their oaths of office on July 2, 1998.4 [Ibid., 83.] Jurisä

According to petitioners, sections 4 and 8 of RA 8551 are unconstitutional. Section 4, amending section 13 of Republic Act No. 6975, provides -

Meanwhile, section 8 states that -

Petitioners argue that their removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their security of tenure. Scsä daad

It is beyond dispute that petitioners herein are members of the civil service, which embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.5 [Constitution, art. 9 (B), sec. 2 (1).] As such, they cannot be removed or suspended from office, except for cause provided by law.6 [Id., art. 9 (B), sec. 2 (3).] The phrase "except for cause provided by law" refers to "… reasons which the law and sound public policy recognize as sufficient warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the exercise of discretion may deem sufficient."7 [De los Santos vs. Mallare, 87 Phil 289 (1950).]

Public respondents insist that the express declaration in section 8 of RA 8551 that the terms of petitioners’ offices are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to impliedly abolish the NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975 pursuant to a bona fide reorganization. In support of their theory, public respondents cite the various changes introduced by RA 8551 in the functions, composition and character of the NAPOLCOM as proof of Congress’ intention to abolish the body created under RA 6975 in order to replace it with a new NAPOLCOM which is more civilian in nature, in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Petitioners’ posit the theory that the abolition of petitioners’ offices was a result of a reorganization of the NAPOLCOM allegedly effected by RA 8551.8 [Rollo, 84-94.] Sdaad

The creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function.9 [Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission, 243 SCRA 196 (1995).] It is acknowledged that Congress may abolish any office it creates without impairing the officer’s right to continue in the position held10 [Manalang v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil 903 (1954).] and that such power may be exercised for various reasons, such as the lack of funds11 [Ginzon v. Municipality of Murcia, 158 SCRA 1 (1988); Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 184 (1984).] or in the interest of economy.12 [Abrot v. Court of Appeals, 116 SCRA 468 (1982).] However, in order for the abolition to be valid, it must be made in good faith, not for political or personal reasons, or in order to circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service employees.13 [Baldoz v. Office of the President, 78 SCRA 354 (1977).] SdaaÓ miso

An abolition of office connotes an intention to do away with such office wholly and permanently, as the word "abolished" denotes.14 [Busacay v. Buenaventura and Murao, 93 Phil 786 (1953).] Where one office is abolished and replaced with another office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity. Thus, in U.P. Board of Regents v. Rasul15 [200 SCRA 685 (1991). See Gacho v. Osmena, Jr., 103 Phil 837 (1958); Brillo v. Enage, 94 Phil 732 (1954).] we said:

This was also our ruling in Guerrero v. Arizabal,16 [186 SCRA 108 (1990).] wherein we declared that the substantial identity in the functions between the two offices was indicia of bad faith in the removal of petitioner pursuant to a reorganization.

We come now to the case at bench. The question that must first be resolved is whether or not petitioners were removed by virtue of a valid abolition of their office by Congress. More specifically, whether the changes effected by RA 8551 in reference to the NAPOLCOM were so substantial as to effectively create a completely new office in contemplation of the law. In answer to this query, the case of Mayor v. Macaraig17 [194 SCRA 672 (1991).] is squarely in point. NcmmisÓ

In that case, the petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 671518 [Entitled "An Act To Extend Protection To Labor, Strengthen The Constitutional Rights Of Workers To Self-Organization, Collective Bargaining And Peaceful Concerted Activities, Foster Industrial Peace And Harmony, Promote The Preferential Use Of Voluntary Modes Of Settling Labor Disputes And Reorgnize The National Labor Relations Commission, Amending Presidential Decree No. 441, As Amended, Otherwise Known As The Labor Code Of The Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor And For Other Purposes."

Took effect on March 21, 1989.] insofar as it declared vacant the positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission and provided for the removal of the incumbents upon the appointment and qualification of their successors.19 [Id. SEC. 35 provides –Ncmâ

Equity of the Incumbent. – Incumbent career officials and rank-and-file employees of the National Labor Relations Commission not otherwise affected by the Act shall continue to hold office without need of reappointment. However, consistent with the need to professionalize the higher levels of officialdom invested with adjudicatory powers and functions, and to upgrade their qualifications, ranks, and salaries or emoluments, all positions of the Commissioners, Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters of the present National Labor Relations Commission are hereby declared vacant. However, subject officials shall continue to temporarily discharge their duties and functions until their successors shall have been duly appointed and qualified. (underscoring supplied)] The Court held that the removal of petitioners was unconstitutional since Republic Act No. 6715 did not expressly or impliedly abolish the offices of petitioners, there being no irreconcilable inconsistency in the nature, duties and functions of the petitioners’ offices under the old law and the new law. Thus:

This is precisely what RA 8851 seeks to do - declare the offices of petitioners vacant, by declaring that "the terms of office of the current Commissioners are deemed expired," thereby removing petitioners herein from the civil service. Congress may only be conceded this power if it is done pursuant to a bona fide abolition of the NAPOLCOM.

RA 8551 did not expressly abolish petitioners’ positions. In order to determine whether there has been an implied abolition, it becomes necessary to examine the changes introduced by the new law in the nature, composition and functions of the NAPOLCOM. Manikanä

Under RA 6975, the NAPOLCOM was described as a collegial body within the Department of the Interior and Local Government,20 [RA 6975, sec. 13.] (Department) whereas under RA 8551 it is made "an agency attached to the Department for policy and program coordination."21 [RA 8551, sec. 4.] Contrary to what public respondents would have us believe, this does not result in the creation of an entirely new office. In Mayor, the NLRC, prior to the passage of the amendatory law, was also considered an integral part of the Department of Labor and Employment. RA 6715, however, changed that by declaring that it shall instead "..be attached to the Department of Labor and Employment for program coordination only…." making it a more autonomous body. The Court held that this change in the NLRC’s nature was not sufficient to justify a conclusion that the new law abolished the offices of the labor commissioners. Maniksâ

Another amendment pointed out by public respondents is the revision of the NAPOLCOM’s composition. RA 8551 expanded the membership of the NAPOLCOM from four to five Commissioners by adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member. In addition, the new law provided that three of the regular Commissioners shall come from the civilian sector who are neither active nor former members of the police or military, and that the fourth regular Commissioner shall come from the law enforcement sector either active or retired. Furthermore, it is required that at least one of the Commissioners shall be a woman.22 [Id.] Again, as we held in Mayor, such revisions do not constitute such essential changes in the nature of the NAPOLCOM as to result in an implied abolition of such office. It will be noted that the organizational structure of the NAPOLCOM, as provided in section 20 of RA 6975 as amended by section 10 of RA 8551,23 [Id., SEC. 10. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"(b) Staff Services. – The staff services of the Commission shall be as follows: Maniâ kx

"(4) The Personnel and Administrative Service, which shall perform personnel functions for the Commission, administer the entrance and promotional examinations for policemen, provide the necessary services relating to records, correspondence, supplies, property and equipment, security and general services, and the maintenance and utilization of facilities, and provide services relating to manpower, career planning and development, personnel transactions and employee welfare; Nexâ old

"(c) Disciplinary Appellate Boards. – The Commission shall establish a formal administrative disciplinary appellate machinery consisting of the National Appellate Board and the regional appellate boards. Miso

(amendments are underscored)] remains essentially the same and that, except for the addition of the PNP Chief as ex-officio member, the composition of the NAPOLCOM is also substantially identical under the two laws. Also, under both laws, the Secretary of the Department shall act as the ex-officio Chairman of the Commission and the Vice-Chairman shall be one of the Commissioners designated by the President.24 [RA 6975, sec. 13; RA 8551, sec. 4.]

Finally, the powers and duties of the NAPOLCOM remain basically unchanged by the amendments. Under RA 6975, the Commission has the following powers and functions: Sppedä jo

Meanwhile, the NAPOLCOM’s functions under section 5 of RA 8551 are:

Clearly, the NAPOLCOM continues to exercise substantially the same administrative, supervisory, rule-making, advisory and adjudicatory functions. ScÓ lex

Public respondents argue that the fact that the NAPOLCOM is now vested with administrative control and operational supervision over the PNP, whereas under RA 6975 it only exercised administrative control should be construed as evidence of legislative intent to abolish such office.25 [Rollo, 88.] This contention is bereft of merit. Control means "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the that of the latter."26 [Blaquera v. Alcala, 295 SCRA 366 (1998).] On the other hand, to supervise is to oversee, to have oversight of, to superintend the execution of or the performance of a thing, or the movements or work of a person, to inspect with authority; it is the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties.27 [Borres v. Canonoy, G.R. No. L-31641, October 23, 1981.] Thus, the power of control necessarily encompasses the power of supervision and adding the phrase "operational supervision" under the powers of the NAPOLCOM would not bring about a substantial change in its functions so as to arrive at the conclusion that a completely new office has been created.

Public respondents would have this Court believe that RA 8551 reorganized the NAPOLCOM resulting in the abolition of petitioners’ offices. We hold that there has been absolutely no attempt by Congress to effect such a reorganization. Sclawä

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them.28 [De Leon and De Leon, Jr., The Law On Public Officers And Election Law (1994 ed.), 365.] It involves a reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.29 [Dario v. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 (1989).] Naturally, it may result in the loss of one’s position through removal or abolition of an office. However, for a reorganization to be valid, it must also pass the test of good faith, laid down in Dario v. Mison:30 [176 SCRA 84 (1989). See Dytiapco v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 88 (1992); Domingo v. Development Bank of the Philippines, 207 SCRA 766 (1992); Pari-an v. Civil Service Commission, 202 SCRA 772 (1991).]

It is exceedingly apparent to this Court that RA 8551 effected a reorganization of the PNP, not of the NAPOLCOM. They are two separate and distinct bodies, with one having supervision and control over the other. In fact, it is the NAPOLCOM that is given the duty of submitting a proposed reorganization plan of the PNP to Congress.31 [RA 8551, SEC. 13. Authority of the Commission to Reorganize the PNP. –

Notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6975 on the organizational structure and rank classification of the PNP, the Commission shall conduct a management audit, and prepare and submit to Congress a proposed reorganization plan of the PNP not later than December 31, 1998, subject to the limitations provided under this Act and based on the following criteria: a) increased police visibility through dispersal of personnel from the headquarters to the field offices and by the appointment and assignment of non-uniformed personnel to positions which are purely administrative, technical, clerical or menial in nature and other positions which are not actually and directly related to police operation; and b) efficient and optimized delivery of police services to the communities. RtcÓ spped

The PNP reorganization program shall be approved by Congress through a joint resolution.] As mentioned earlier, the basic structure of the NAPOLCOM has been preserved by the amendatory law. There has been no revision in its lines of control, authority and responsibility, neither has there been a reduction in its membership, nor a consolidation or abolition of the offices constituting the same. Adding the Chief of the PNP as an ex-officio member of the Commission does not result in a reorganization.

No bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners, petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their removal from office, removes civil service employees from office without legal cause and must therefore be struck down for being constitutionally infirm. SdaÓ adsc

Petitioners are thus entitled to be reinstated to office. It is of no moment that there are now new appointees to the NAPOLCOM. It is a well-entrenched principle that when a regular government employee is illegally dismissed, his position never became vacant under the law and he is considered as not having left his office. The new appointments made in order to replace petitioners are not valid.32 [Floreza v. Ongpin, 182 SCRA 692 (1990); Tanala v. Legaspi, 13 SCRA 566 (1965).]

At this juncture, we note that it is alleged by public respondents that on June 30, 1998, Canonizado accepted an appointment by President Estrada as the Inspector General of Internal Affairs Services (IAS) of the PNP, pursuant to sections 40 and 41 of RA 8551 and that he took his oath of office before the President on July 7, 1998. However, this is a mere allegation on the part of public respondents of which this Court cannot take judicial notice. Furthermore, this issue has not been fully ventilated in the pleadings of the parties. Therefore, such allegation cannot be taken into consideration by this Court in passing upon the issues in the present case. Missdaa

Petitioners also assail the constitutionality of section 4 of RA 8551 insofar as it limits the law enforcement sector to only one position on the Commission and categorizes the police as being part of the law enforcement sector despite section 6 of Article XVI of the Constitution which provides that the police force shall be civilian in character. Moreover, it is asserted by petitioners that the requirement in section 4 that one of the Commissioners shall be a woman has no rational basis and is therefore discriminatory. They claim that it amounts to class legislation and amounts to an undue restriction upon the appointing power of the President as provided under section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.33 [Rollo, 8-12.]

In view of our ruling upon the unconstitutionality of petitioners’ removal from office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551, we find that there is no longer any need to pass upon these remaining constitutional questions. It is beyond doubt that the legislature has the power to provide for the composition of the NAPOLCOM since it created such body. Besides, these questions go into the very wisdom of the law, and unquestionably lie beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.34 [Osmena v, Commission on Elections, 288 SCRA 447 (1998).] slxä mis

WHEREFORE, we grant the petition, but only to the extent of declaring section 8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional for being in violation of the petitioners’ right to security of tenure. The removal from office of petitioners as a result of the application of such unconstitutional provision of law and the appointment of new Commissioners in their stead is therefore null and void. Petitioners herein are entitled to REINSTATEMENT and to the payment of full backwages to be reckoned from the date they were removed from office.35 [Mendoza v. Quisumbing, 186 SCRA 108 (1990).]

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.