"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds a preponderance of evidence in favor of plaintiffs and against the defendants and hereby orders said defendants: MisÓ sc

"SO ORDERED."1 [Rollo, pp. 116-117.]

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby ‘modifies’ the decision and judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Biliran, Civil Case No. 984 (MTC CC No. 460) for ‘Forcible Entry with Damages,’ and presently on ‘Appeal’ with this Court, and hereby adjudges, declares and deems aforesaid Civil Case No. 984, for ‘Forcible Entry with Damages,’ appealed to this Court by Defendants Dominador Ibajan, Demetria Ibajan, Nelson C. Sy, Vicente Realino II, and Romeo R. Alvero versus Plaintiff-Spouses William Diu and Jane Jean Diu, thereby, and thereafter, lawfully joined, consolidated, intercalated, and declared, and adjudicated as one (1) sole, single civil action for purposes of its eventual decision, resolution, and disposal, after a full blown hearing with Plaintiff-Appellees and Defendants-Appellants presenting and offering their respective evidences for the Court's final consideration, decision and/or resolution.

"Similarly, this Court, hereby orders the approval of Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint, as formally filed and received by this Court on October 15, 1997, and thereby herein made, and included as part of the Records/Expediente in both cases, more particularly Civil Case No. B-0952, for ‘Annulment of Deeds of Sale with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction,’ for this Court’s eventual decision, resolution and disposal."2 [Rollo, p. 133.] MisÓ spped

"The Court finds merit in both motions for reconsideration. This Court acting as an appellate Court in the Forcible Entry Case No. B-0984 is precluded by law to try anew the appealed case. Section 22 of BP Blg. 129 provides.

"This is the same provision under Section 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997. The ruling in del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals (241 SCRA 519) is to the same effect:

"Of necessity this Court therefore had to meticulously peruse the entire record of this case. It noted that both plaintiffs and defendants in their verification and certification on forum shopping did allege that there is no pending similar action pending in any other court or agency of the government. This of course is not true in the case of the Spouses Diu for said spouses are the defendants in Civil Case No. B-0952 for Annulment of Deeds of Sale presided by the undersigned, and therefore, not only taken judicial notice of the matter. In fact it is clearly stated in its questioned order that this annulment case was filed much earlier, on June 11, 1996, while the Forcible Entry Case was filed much later, on February 10, 1997 in the Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Biliran. Both cases raise the issue of possession and ownership. It is of course fundamental that the issue of the possession in Forcible Entry is only de facto, unlike that in ownership cases which is de jure. Nonetheless the law allows the MTC to resolve the issue of ownership.

"In the present case, this is quite improbable, as the issues of ownership and possession are Intertwined and inseperably linked. In that case of 'De Luzuriaga Jr. vs. Adila, the Supreme Court sustained the order of the Court of First Instance enjoining the Municipal Trial Court from continuing a Forcible Entry Case where there was another case for 'Quieting of Title.' Chief Justice Teehankee concurred and adhered to the view that the Court of First Instance had equal if not superior jurisdiction to resolve identical issues as to who was entitled to possession and to issue a preliminary mandatory injunction if a strong right is established.

"Similarly in the present case, Civil Case No. B-0952 filed eight (8) months earlier that the Forcible Entry Case B-0984, is still pending. The parties should have brought this fact to the attention of the Municipal Trial Judge to obviate or preclude the possibility of making two (2) courts decide on the same issues. That is exactly the very situation that is obtaining now. This Court is saddled with two (2) cases involving ownership and possession. The same documents are relied upon by both parties in the two (2) cases; the same source of their alleged rights and interests. Sppedâ

"The subject property in this case is Lot No. 84 of the Naval Cadastre covered by Tax Decl. 00581 and the house standing thereon covered by Tax Decl. 00583, Annex 'A' and 'B' respectively, in the name of plaintiff William Diu. Defendant spouses Dominador Ibajan and Demetria Ibajan claimed to have bought the same Lot 84 of the Naval Cadastre which they caused to be registered in the name of their son Carmelito Ibajan and wife Finna G. Josep under TCT T - 21540, Annex 'A'. Thereafter they constructed a 2-storey building in the name of Dominador Ibajan under a property Field Appraisal, Annex 'B', and Tax Decl. No. 5365-annex 'C', both in the name of Dominador Ibajan and which they occupied and possessed since 1985.

"A series of events and transactions transpired over the land and the building thereon involving millions. The undersigned as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court Branch 16, recalls the petition for the issuance of a second owner's copy of the transfer certificate of title to the land in question pursued by the plaintiff-appellee William Diu by virtue of a power of attorney from Carmelito Ibajan. All these transactions are now the subject of the annulment case pending before this Court which can decide the issue of possession only after the trial involving the issue of ownership. Until then this court is thus hard put to say who was or who is entitled to possession for which reason this Court correspondingly orders the DISMISSAL of this appealed Forcible Entry Case, leaving only the Annulment of Deeds of Sale Case, still pending for the final determination of the primary issues of possession and ownership."

"SO ORDERED."3 [Rollo, pp. 139-141.]

"I

"THE DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE NO. B-0984 FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY ON APPEAL BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH BUT A DRASTIC DEVIATION FROM THE LAW AND WELL-KNOWN RULES AS WELL AS THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

"II

"THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IT'S APPLICATION OF THE RULE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING."4 [Rollo, p. 18.]

"x x x. Well-settled is the rule that in an ejectment suit, the only issue is possession de facto or physical or material possession (Del Rosario v. CA, 311 Phil. 589; Mediran v. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752; Somodio v. CA, 235 SCRA 307;. De Luna v. CA, 212 SCRA 276.) and not possession de jure. (Oblea v. CA, 313 Phil. 804; Joven v. CA, 212 SCRA 700; Javier v. Veridiano II, 237 SCRA 565.) So that, even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings, as in this case, the court may pass upon such issue but only to determine the question of possession (Sec. 33(2), B.P. 129 as amended by RA 7691 provides that 'Metropolitan Trial Courts shall exercise: Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when in such cases, the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.' Paragraph 10 of the Interim Rules likewise provides that 'Metropolitan Trial Courts, x x x without distinction, may try cases of forcible entry and detainer even if the question of ownership is raised in the pleadings and the question of possession could not be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, but the question of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.) especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. (Guzman v. CA, 177 SCRA 604; Munar v. CA, 238 SCRA 372; De Luna v. CA, supra.) It cannot dispose with finality the issue of ownership - such issue being inutile in an ejectment suit except to throw light on the question of possession. (Manuel v. CA, 199 SCRA 603.) This is why the issue of ownership or title is generally immaterial and foreign to an ejectment suit. (Fige v. CA, 233 SCRA 586; Manuel v. CA, supra; See also German Management and Services, Inc. v. CA, 177 SCRA 495.)

"Detainer, being a mere quieting process, questions raised on real property are incidentally discussed. (Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303.) In fact, any evidence of ownership is expressly banned by Sec. 4 of Rule 70 (Sec. 4, Rule 70 provides: 'Evidence of title, when admissible. - Evidence of title to the land or building may be received solely for the purpose of determining the character and extent of possession and damages for detention.') except to resolve the question of possession. (Tiu v. CA, 37 SCRA 99; Calupitan v. Aglahi, 65 Phil. 575; Pitargue v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5.) Thus, all that the court may do, is to make an initial determination of who is the owner of the property so that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession absent other evidence to resolve the latter. But such determination of ownership is not clothed with finality. Neither will it affect ownership of the property nor constitute a binding and conclusive adjudication on the merits with respect to the issue of ownership. (See Sec. 7, Rule 70 which states that 'The Judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the facts therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not involving possession.' Sps. Medina and Bernal v. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278; Manlapaz v. CA, 191 SCRA 795; Javier v. Veridiano II, supra.) It cannot bar a later action to settle ownership. (Asset Privatization Trust v. CA, 229 SCRA 627; Javier v. Veridiano, supra; Peñalosa v. Tuason, supra; Dela Cruz v. CA, 133 SCRA 520; Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342; Section 7, rule 70.) Consequently, although it was proper for the RTC, on appeal in this ejectment suit, to delve on the issue of ownership and received evidence on possession de jure, (Pitargue v. Sorilla, supra; Consing v. Jamandre, 64 SCRA 1; De/a Santa v. CA, 140 SCRA 44.) it cannot adjudicate with semblance of."10 [At pp. 394-396.]