Unlawful and unauthorized use of government property by incumbent public officers constitutes fraud. Thus, the provision on preventive suspension in the Anti-Graft Law applies to such officers even if the alleged violations are primarily considered as election offenses.

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the October 14, 1997 Decision1 [Rollo, pp. 52-55.] and the January 26, 1998 Resolution of the Court of Appeals2 [Special Ninth Division composed of J. Artemon D. Luna, Division chairman and ponente; and JJ. Bennie A. Adefuin de la Cruz and Demetrio G. Demetria, who both concurred.] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 43903.3 [Entitled "Rogelio Juan, Pedro de Jesus, Delfin Carreon and Antonio Galguerra v. Hon. Lucas P. Bersamin, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, and People of the Philippines."] The assailed Decision dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioners. In that Petition, they questioned the April 3, 1997 Order4 [Penned by Judge Lucas P. Bersamin.] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-64564-6, directing their immediate suspension from office. On the other hand, the questioned CA Resolution denied their Motion for Reconsideration. Esm

The procedural and factual antecedents of this case are summarized in the challenged Decision as follows:

In its Decision, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s discretion to order petitioners’ suspension from office. It ruled:

Hence, this Petition.7 [The case was deemed submitted for decision on June 9, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of respondent’s Memorandum, which was signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Fernanda Lampas Peralta and Asst. Sol. Marilou B. Dayao. Petitioners’ Memorandum, submitted by Atty. Cenon C. Sorreta, was received by the Court on February 11, 1999.]

In their Memorandum, petitioners urge the Court to resolve the following questions:

Citing RA 7691,8 [Petition, pp. 28-43; rollo, pp. 30-45.] petitioners likewise assail the authority of the trial court to hear the cases against them.

For the sake of clarity, the discussion of the case will revolve around three points: first, the jurisdiction of regional trial courts over violations of the Election Code; second, the propriety of petitioners’ suspension; and third, the alleged procedural lapses of the trial court.

We find no merit in the Petition.

Petitioners insist that the RTC did not have the jurisdiction to hear and decide the cases filed against them, because the penalty for the offenses charged did not exceed six years. Thus, they claim that the authority to hear the cases is vested by RA 7691 in the first-level courts. Exsm

The argument does not persuade. It is evident from Section 32, BP 129, as amended by Section 2 of RA 7691, that the jurisdiction of first-level courts -- the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts -- does not cover those criminal cases which by specific provision of law are cognizable by regional trial courts. Section 32 provides:

Petitioners were charged with violating Section 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code. Under Section 268 of the said Code, regional trial courts have exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of the Code, "except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote." The said provision reads:

Worth noting also is this Court’s disquisition in COMELEC v. Noynay:9 [292 SCRA 254, July 9, 1998, per Davide, J. (Now CJ)]

Clearly then, regional trial courts have jurisdiction to hear and decide cases for violation of the Omnibus Election Code, such as those filed against petitioners.

Petitioners contend that their cases are not subject to Section 13 of RA 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which mandates the preventive suspension of indicted public officials. We disagree.

Petitioners were accused of using barangay property for election campaign purposes and other partisan political activities during their incumbency as barangay officials, in violation of Section 261 (o) of the Omnibus Election Code, which reads as follows:

On the other hand, Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended, provides:

Interestingly, prior to its amendment by BP 195,10 ["AN ACT AMENDING SECTION EIGHT, NINE, TEN, ELEVEN, AND THIRTEEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED AND NINETEEN, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT."] the said provision had applied to public officers who, under a valid information, were charged with violations of RA 3019 or with offenses covered by the Revised Penal Code provision on bribery.11 [Before its amendment, Section 13 of R.A. 3019 read as follows: "Sec. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime, administrative proceedings have been filed against him."] The amendatory law expanded the scope of the provision; now, public officers may likewise be suspended from office if, under a valid information, they are charged with an offense falling under Title 7 of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or with any other form of fraud involving government funds or property.

True, the cases against petitioners involve violations of the Election Code; however, the charges are not unidimensional. Every law must be read together with the provisions of any other complementing law, unless both are otherwise irreconcilable. It must be emphasized that petitioners were incumbent public officers charged with the unauthorized and unlawful use of government property in their custody, in the pursuit of personal interests. The crime being imputed to them is akin to that committed by public officers as laid down in the Revised Penal Code. Certainly, petitioners’ acts constitute fraud against the government; thus, the present case is covered by Section 13 of RA 3019. Calrky

The aforementioned proviso reinforces the principle that a public office is a public trust. Its purpose is to prevent the accused public officer from hampering his prosecution by intimidating or influencing witnesses, tampering with documentary evidence, or committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.12 [Pimentel v. Garchitorena, 208 SCRA 122, April 14, 1992.] Preventive suspension is not a penalty;13 [Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773, February 20, 1996; Bunye v. Escareal, 226 SCRA 332, September 10, 1993; Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan, 201 SCRA 417, September 6, 1991.] petitioners, whose culpability remains to be proven, are still entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence.

Petitioners assail the trial court’s Order of suspension on the ground that it was issued pursuant to the initial "Motion for Removal From Office,"14 [Rollo, pp. 64-65.] received by the trial court on December 6, 1996. The records show that this Motion neither complied with the notice requirements provided under the Rules of Court, nor was it filed by one who was a party to their cases.

The Court has held time and again that a motion that does not meet the notice requirements of Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court15 [Section 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.

Section 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.] is pro forma, and that the trial court has no authority to act on it. The requisites laid down in the aforementioned provisions are categorical and mandatory, and the failure of the movants to comply with them renders their Motions fatally defective. 16 [People v. Court of Appeals et al., GR No. 126005, January 21, 1999; Tan v. Court of Appeals and Bloomberry Export Manufacturing, Inc., 295 SCRA 755, September 22, 1998; Goldloop Properties, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 498, August 11, 1992.]

The Rules mandate the service of a copy of a motion containing a notice of time and place of hearing, in order to afford the adverse party time to study and answer the arguments in the said motion before its resolution by the court.

Considering the circumstances of the present Petition, however, we believe that the requirements of procedural due process were substantially complied with, and that such compliance justifies a liberal interpretation of the above-mentioned rules. Mesm

In his "Manifestation on Comment of the Accused," the COMELEC prosecutor adopted the assailed Motion as well as the February 28, 1997 "Supplement to Motion for Removal from Office." This action should be considered to have thus cured the procedural defect pointed out by petitioners. More important, however, is the fact that the trial court heard petitioners and considered their arguments. In their six-page Memorandum17 [Rollo, pp. 82-87.] filed pursuant to the directive of the trial court, petitioners were able to ventilate their arguments against the Motion for Removal from Office. They contended that neither RA 3019 nor Section 60 of the Local Government Code justified their suspension from office. Indeed, the purpose of a notice of hearing was served;18 [See Vlasons Enterprises Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR Nos. 121662-64, July 6, 1999.] the pleadings that were filed for and against them negated their allegations of procedural prejudice.

Under Section 13 of RA 3019, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory after the determination of the validity of the information, as enunciated in Socrates v. Sandiganbayan19 [253 SCRA 773, February 20, 1996, per Regalado, J.] which we quote:

In the case at bar, while there was no pre-suspension hearing held to determine the validity of the Informations that had been filed against petitioners, we believe that the numerous pleadings filed for and against them have achieved the goal of this procedure. The right to due process is satisfied not just by an oral hearing but by the filing and the consideration by the court of the parties’ pleadings, memoranda and other position papers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.