The lawful severance by an employer of an employer-employee relationship would require a valid cause. There are, under the Labor Code, two groups of valid causes, and these are the just causes under Article 2821 [ART. 282. Termination by employer. -- An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

(a)......Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b)......Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c)......Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

(d)......Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representative; and

(e)......Other causes analogous to the foregoing.] and the authorized causes under Article 2832 [ART. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel. -- The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year.] and Article 284.3 [ART. 284. Disease as ground for termination. -- An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.]

An employee whose employment is terminated for a just cause is not entitled to the payment of separation benefits.4 [See San Miguel Corporation vs. NLRC, 255 SCRA 580. Section 7, Rule I, Book VI, of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code provides:

"Sec. 7. Termination of employment by employer. - The just causes for terminating the services of an employee shall be those provided in Article 282 of the Code. The separation from work of an employee for a just cause does not entitle him to the termination pay provided in Code, without prejudice, however, to whatever rights, benefits and privileges he may have under the applicable individual or collective bargaining agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or practice."] Separation pay would be due, however, when the lay-off is on account of an authorized cause. The amount of separation pay would depend on the ground for the termination of employment. A lay-off due to the installation of a labor saving device, redundancy (Article 283) or disease (Article 284), entitles the worker to a separation pay equivalent to "one (1) month pay or at least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher." When the termination of employment is due to retrenchment to prevent losses, or to closure or cessation of operations of an establishment or undertaking not due to serious business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay is only an equivalent of "one (1) month pay or at least one-half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher." In the above instances, a fraction of at least six (6) months is considered as one (1) whole year.

In this jurisdiction, the right to due process is constitutional and statutory.

Due process in the context of a termination of employment, particularly, would be two-fold, i.e., substantive due process which is complied with when the action of the employer is predicated on a just cause or an authorized cause, and procedural due process which is satisfied when the employee has the opportunity to contest the existence of the ground invoked by the employer in terminating the contract of employment and to be heard thereon. I find it difficult to ascribe either a want of wisdom or a lack of legal basis to the early pronouncements of this Court that sanction the termination of employment when a just or an authorized cause to warrant the termination is clearly extant. Regrettably, the Court in some of those pronouncements has used, less than guarded in my view, the term "due process" when referring to the notices prescribed in the Labor Code,5 [See Footnote 2.] and its implementing rules6 [Section 1, Rule XXIII, of the Rules Implementing the Labor Code clearly states that "(i)n cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for just or authorized causes as provided by law, and subject to the requirements of due process."

"(a)......A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side;

(b)......A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if the employee so desires, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him; and

(c)......A written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify his termination."

In cases of termination based on authorized causes under Article 283 of the Labor Code, Section 2, II, of the same Rule mandates that there be "a written notice to the employee and the appropriate Regional Office of the Department (of Labor and Employment) at least thirty days before the effectivity of the termination," specifying the ground/s therefor.] that could, thereby, albeit unintendedly and without meaning to, confuse the latter with the notice requirement in adjudicatory proceedings. It is not seldom when the law puts up various conditions in the juridical relations of parties; it would not be accurate to consider, I believe, an infraction thereof to ipso-facto raise a problem of due process. The mere failure of notice of the dismissal or lay-off does not foreclose the right of an employee from disputing the validity, in general, of the termination of his employment, or the veracity, in particular, of the cause that has been invoked in order to justify that termination. In assailing the dismissal or lay-off, an employee is entitled to be heard and to be given the corresponding due notice of the proceedings. It would be when this right is withheld without cogent reasons that, indeed, it can rightly be claimed that the fundamental demands of procedural due process have been unduly discarded.

I do appreciate the fact that the prescribed notices can have consequential benefits to an employee who is dismissed or laid off, as the case may be; its non-observance by an employer, therefore, can verily entitle the employee to an award of damages but, to repeat, not to the extent of rendering outrightly illegal that dismissal or lay-off predicated on valid grounds. I would consider the indemnification to the employee not a penalty or a fine against the employer, the levy of either of which would require an appropriate legislative enactment; rather, I take the grant of indemnity as justifiable as an award of nominal damages in accordance with the provisions of Articles 2221-2223 of the Civil Code, viz:

There is no fixed formula for determining the precise amount of nominal damages. In fixing the amount of nominal damages to be awarded, the circumstances of each case should thus be taken into account, such as, to exemplify, the -

I might stress the rule that the award of nominal damages is not for the purpose of indemnification for a loss but for the recognition and vindication of a right. The degree of recovery therefor can depend, on the one hand, on the constitution of the right, and, upon the other hand, on the extent and manner by which that right is ignored to the prejudice of the holder of that right.

In fine7 [See MGG Marine Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 259 SCRA 664.] -

A. A just cause or an authorized cause and a written notice of dismissal or lay-off, as the case may be, are required concurrently but not really equipollent in their consequence, in terminating an employer-employee relationship.

B. Where there is neither just cause nor authorized cause, the reinstatement of the employee and the payment of back salaries would be proper and should be decreed. If the dismissal or lay-off is attended by bad faith or if the employer acted in wanton or oppressive manner, moral and exemplary damages might also be awarded. In this respect, the Civil Code provides:

Separation pay can substitute for reinstatement if such reinstatement is not feasible, such as in case of a clearly strained employer-employee relationship (limited to managerial positions and contracts of employment predicated on trust and confidence) or when the work or position formerly held by the dismissed employee plainly has since ceased to be available.

C.......Where there is just cause or an authorized cause for the dismissal or lay-off but the required written notices therefor have not been properly observed by an employer, it would neither be right and justifiable nor likely intended by law to order either the reinstatement of the dismissed or laid-off employee or the payment of back salaries to him simply for the lack of such notices if, and so long as, the employee is not deprived of an opportunity to contest that dismissal or lay-off and to accordingly be heard thereon. In the termination of employment for an authorized cause (this cause being attributable to the employer), the laid-off employee is statutorily entitled to separation pay, unlike a dismissal for a just cause (a cause attributable to an employee) where no separation pay is due. In either case, if an employer fails to comply with the requirements of notice in terminating the services of the employee, the employer must be made to pay, as so hereinabove expressed, corresponding damages to the employee.

WHEREFORE, I vote to hold (a) that the lay-off in the case at bar is due to redundancy and that, accordingly, the separation pay to petitioner should be increased to one month, instead of one-half month, pay for every year of service, and (b) that petitioner is entitled to his unpaid wages, proportionate 13th-month pay, and an indemnity of P10,000.00 in keeping with the nature and purpose of, as well as the rationale behind, the grant of nominal damages.