PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE VALLA1 [The Information and Decision did not indicate his middle name.], accused-appellant. Scnc-m

On appeal is the decision dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62, convicting appellant of the crime of rape with homicide, imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity and P30,000.00 as actual and moral damages.

Appellant was 28 years old, married, cousin of the victim, and resident of Barangay Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, at the time of incident. The victim was an eight (8) year-old girl, Dyesebel "Gigi" de la Cruz, who was reported missing and the following day found raped and strangled to death near the riverbank of the Tayuman river in Quezon province.

The facts, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, which we find to be supported by the records, are as follows:

On August 14, 1990, appellant was charged with the crime of "rape with murder" under the following Information:3 [Records, pp. 2-3.]

Upon arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Ronaldo Salamillas, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.4 [Records, p. 8.] Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Myra Pines, the victim’s 12 year-old playmate, who heard the victim’s cries as she was being strangled, but became afraid and went home instead; (2) Aristeo Allarey, the Barangay Captain of Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, who organized a search party upon report of the mother that her daughter was missing, and before whom, appellant admitted that he raped and killed the victim, and even offered his (appellant’s) daughter in return; (3) Gonzalo de la Cruz, father of the victim, who took part in the search party, and who witnessed appellant’s confession to the commission of the crime; (4) Reynaldo Merle, Barangay Tanod of Barangay Ilayang, Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon, another member of the search party; (5) Bayani Samadan, Kagawad of the Barangay, also a member of the search party; (6) Rodolfo Rosales, police investigator of San Francisco, Quezon, Philippine National Police; (7) Dr. Araceli R. Madatu, Senior Resident Physician of Bondoc Peninsula District Hospital, Catanauan, Quezon, who testified that when the cadaver was brought for examination, it was in cadaveric rigidity, the legs were spread like a woman about to give birth ("parang nanganganak"), the tongue sticking out ("nakalawit), the skull crushed ("basag"), and the pubic area had blisters resulting from cigarette burns, ("pinagpapaso ng sigarilyo"), and the vagina had a laceration up to the anus, evidencing that the child was raped.5 [TSN, January 14, 1992, pp. 4-6.]

In addition to the oral evidence, the prosecution offered as documentary evidence the sworn statements of Barangay Captain Aristeo Allarey and Gonzalo de la Cruz, the Criminal Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Court of San Francisco, San Andres, Quezon, and the Medico-legal Certificate signed by Dr. Madatu. Scs-daad

On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses (1) appellant himself who bluntly denied any participation in the rape/killing of the victim, or that he made any confessions to the barangay captain; he interposed the defense of alibi that at the time of the alleged rape/killing, he was at his house in Barangay Ilayang Tayuman, San Francisco, Quezon together with his wife, their child and his brother, caring for his sick child,6 [TSN, July 21, 1992, pp. 3-11.] and (2) his father Emilio Valla, who corroborated his story.7 [TSN, November 4, 1992, pp. 3-10.] The defense offered no documentary evidence.

On March 29, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision8 [Records, pp. 228-245.] finding appellant guilty of the crime of "rape with homicide," the dispositive portion of which reads:

Hence, the present appeal. Appellant assigns the following errors:9 [Rollo, p. 48.]

In his brief, appellant claims that the testimony of prosecution witness Allarey was inconsistent since on direct examination, Allarey narrated that when he summoned appellant, the latter did not immediately appear,10 [TSN, February 5, 1991, p. 15.] but on cross-examination, he said that appellant immediately reported to him.11 [Id. at 20.] Appellant also contends that Merle’s testimony that appellant was "tulala" at the time he confessed to the commission of the crime12 [TSN, July 18, 1991, p. 13.] was inconsistent with appellant’s alleged begging for forgiveness for the crime.13 [Id. at 11.] Further, appellant adds that his statement offering to exchange his own daughter for the victim was made because of compulsion from the crowd. Appellant further insists that his alibi should be given due consideration since the prosecution failed to overturn his alibi which was duly corroborated by the testimony of his father.

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, recommends affirmance of the judgment in toto. The OSG contends that the alleged inconsistencies, assuming them to be so, are too minor and insignificant to destroy the credibility of said prosecution witnesses, particularly where the testimonies of all the prosecution witnesses are consistent and compatible with each other on material points. Anent the defense of alibi, the OSG points out that appellant’s house is located within the same barangay where the incident took place, therefore there is no physical impossibility regarding his commission of the crime. Supr-ema

In sum, the crucial issue centers on the assessment of credibility of the witnesses. In this case, the trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. We find no reason to disturb this finding. As consistently held by the Court, the trial judge’s evaluation of the testimony of a witness is generally accorded not only the highest respect, but also finality, unless some weighty circumstance has been ignored or misunderstood but which could change the result. Having had the direct opportunity to observe the witness on the stand, the trial judge was in a vantage position to assess his demeanor, and determine if he was telling the truth or not.14 [People vs. Sanchez, 302 SCRA 21, 45 (1999).]

The alleged inconsistency in the testimony of Allarey as to whether appellant immediately reported to him after being summoned, and in the testimony of Merle that appellant was "tulala" at the time he admitted responsibility for the crime, merely refer to minor details which do not in actuality touch upon the "whys" and "wherefores" of the crime committed.15 [Id. at 51; People v. Muñoz, 163 SCRA 730, 743 (1988).] Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the assailants.16 [Ibid.; Sumalpong v. CA, 268 SCRA 764, 771 (1997); People v. Sison, 189 SCRA 643, 648 (1990).] In fact, some minor inconsistencies could show that the witness was not previously coached so as to tailor his testimony, and thus they serve as badges of credibility.

Further, the prosecution witnesses, particularly the barangay officials, had no motive to falsely testify against appellant, who is their townmate, nor did they have any reason to impute such a heinous crime against appellant if it were not true. Appellant’s claim that he was implicated in the crime "because he did not immediately accomplish the cutting of the grass in the ricefield"17 [TSN, July 21, 1992, p. 10.] is too preposterous to even merit consideration.

More importantly, the declaration of appellant acknowledging his guilt of the offense may be given in evidence against him under Section 33 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. Note that his extrajudicial confession is corroborated by the corpus delicti as required by Section 3 of Rule 133. The Rules do not require that all the elements of the crime must be clearly established by evidence independent of the confession. Corpus delicti only means that there should be some concrete evidence tending to show the commission of the crime apart from the confession. In this case, the fact of the crime was sufficiently proven through the testimonies by witnesses such as Myra Pines, who heard the cries of the victim, and the other members of the search party who found the body of the victim, and witnessed the confession of the appellant, as well as documentary evidence presented during trial such as the medico-legal certificate (Exhibit "D") attesting that the victim had been raped and killed. Jur-is

The statement of the accused asking for forgiveness and even offering his own daughter in exchange for his crime18 [TSN, February 5, 1991, pp. 16, 25; TSN, July 18, 1991, p. 11; TSN, September 17, 1991, pp. 10-11.] may also be regarded as part of the res gestae under Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Res gestae means "things done".19 [People v. Sanchez, 213 SCRA 70, 78 (1992), citing Underhill’s Criminal Evidence, 5th ed. vol. I., section 266, p. 664.] There are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence, in this case the discovery of the body of the victim; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood, in this case, appellant had begged for forgiveness immediately after the body was found; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances, in this case, appellant had admitted to raping and killing the victim, and even "offered" his daughter in exchange for the victim.20 [People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 290 SCRA 257, 273 (1998).]

Appellant’s defense of denial and alibi is likewise riddled with glaring inconsistencies. During his testimony, he claimed that on the night of the incident, he was at home with his wife and brother, taking care of his sick child, and emphatically declared that nobody else was with them.21 [TSN, July 21, 1992, p. 4]1 However, appellant’s father testified that he was also with appellant at the time of the incident, creating a doubt regarding his alibi. Although appellant’s father initially denied knowing the victim, he later admitted that he knew her as the daughter of Gonzalo de la Cruz.22 [TSN, November 4, 1992, p. 3-4] Evidently, appellant’s defense was fabricated in a desperate attempt to exculpate him.

As to the crime committed, the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the special complex crime of "rape with homicide," and not "rape with murder" as designated in the Information, since "homicide" is herein taken in its generic sense.

The aggravating circumstance of ignominy under Article 14, No. 17 of the Revised Penal Code should be appreciated considering that the medico-legal officer testified that the pubic area of the victim bore blisters brought about by a contact with a lighted cigarette. This circumstance added disgrace and obloquy to the material injury inflicted upon the victim of the crime.23 [People v. Acaya, 163 SCRA 768, 774 (1988).]

At the time of the commission of the crime, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code imposed the penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. However, the 1987 Constitution suspended the imposition of death penalty, and therefore, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

As to the amount of damages, however, the trial court erred in awarding P50,000.00 only as indemnity and P30,000.00 for actual and moral damages. Hence, correction is called for. This being a case of rape with homicide, civil indemnity in the amount of P100,000.00 should be awarded, pursuant to current jurisprudence.24 [People v. Robles, G.R. No. 124300, March 25, 1999, p. 11.] Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should also be awarded to the heirs of the victim, without need of further proof.25 [Id. at 12.] In view of the attendance of one aggravating circumstance, exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00 should likewise be awarded, pursuant to Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. But the award of actual damages cannot be allowed for lack of supporting evidence.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant VICENTE VALLA is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against appellant. Sc-juris

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.