Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals1 [CA-G.R. CV No. 48785, dated 26 February 1998; Petition, Annex "A"; Rollo, p. 24-38.] affirming the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Tagaytay, Branch 18, in LRC Cases No. TG-362 and TG-396.2 [Dated 8 September 1994; Records, LRC Case No. TG-362, pp. 440-454.]

The facts are simple:

Conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title were filed by Norma Almanzor and private respondent Salvador De Guzman over parcels of land located in Silang, Cavite. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent De Guzman, to wit -

As earlier mentioned, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, said judgment was affirmed and the petition for registration of private respondents over the subject parcels of land was approved.

Hence, the instant Petition, anchored upon the following assignments of error –

We find merit in the instant Petition.

It is not disputed that the subject parcels of land were released as agricultural land only in 19655 [See Exhibit "S-4"; Records, p. 98.] while the petition for confirmation of imperfect title was filed by private respondents only in 1991.6 [See Petition; Records, LRC Case No. TG-396, pp. 1-18.] Thus the period of occupancy of the subject parcels of land from 1965 until the time the application was filed in 1991 was only twenty six (26) years, four (4) years short of the required thirty (30) year period possession requirement under Sec. 14, P.D. 29 and R.A. No. 6940.

In finding that private respondents' possession of the subject property complied with law, the Court of Appeals reasoned out that - nigel

We disagree.

The Court of Appeals' consideration of the period of possession prior to the time the subject land was released as agricultural is in direct contravention of the pronouncement in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals,8 [G.R. No. 85322, 196 SCRA 476, 480 [1991].] to wit -

So, too, is the Court of Appeals' reliance on the case of Director of Land Management vs. Court of Appeals9 [G.R. No. 94525, 205 SCRA 486 [1992].] misplaced. There, while the period of possession of the applicant's predecessor-in-interest was tacked to his own possession to comply with the required thirty year period possession requirement, the land involved therein was not forest land but alienable public land. On the other hand, in the case before us, the property subject of private respondents' application was only declared alienable in 1965. Prior to such date, the same was forest land incapable of private appropriation. It was not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, could not convert it into private property, (unless) and until such lands were reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.10 [Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95608, 266 SCRA 392, 401 [1997].] alonzo

In summary, therefore, prior to its declaration as alienable land in 1965, any occupation or possession thereon cannot be considered in the counting of the thirty year possession requirement. This is in accord with the ruling in Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, (supra), and because the rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.11 [Ituralde vs. Falcasantos, G.R. No. 128017, 301 SCRA 293, 296 [1999], citing Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 443, 448 [1990].]

While we acknowledge the Court of Appeals' finding that private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the subject land for sixty three (63) years at the time of the application of their petition, our hands are tied by the applicable laws and jurisprudence in giving practical relief to them. The fact remains that from the time the subject land was declared alienable until the time of their application, private respondents' occupation thereof was only twenty six (26) years. We cannot consider their thirty seven (37) years of possession prior to the release of the land as alienable because absent the fact of declassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription. Further, jurisprudence is replete with cases which reiterate that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property. Possession of the land by private respondents, whether spanning decades or centuries, could never ripen into ownership. This Court is constrained to abide by the latin maxim "(d)ura lex, sed lex".12 [De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120652, 286 SCRA 230, 235 [1998].] iska

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED and the February 26, 1998 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48785 as well as that of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 38, in LRC Case No. TG-396 are both REVERSED. Judgment is rendered dismissing LRC Case No. 396 for failure of the applicants therein to comply with the thirty year occupancy and possessory requirements of law for confirmation of imperfect title. No pronouncement as to costs.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur. micks