The arguments and the issues raised in an appellant’s brief must pertain to errors allegedly committed by the trial court, not to those matters that are no longer in dispute. Although herein appellant did not strictly adhere to this rule and despite his anemic Brief, this Court carefully pored over the entire records of this case in the interest of substantial justice, and it is thoroughly convinced that the trial court did not err in convicting him of the crimes charged. However, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we are motu proprio modifying the award of civil liabilities.

Appellant Alfredo Cabande appeals the July 24, 1997 Decision1 [Written by Judge Andres S. Maligaya.] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan (Branch 16) in Criminal Case Nos. 1568-M-90 and 1569-M-90, finding him guilty of two counts of murder and sentencing him to two terms of reclusion perpetua.

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Edsel N. Rutor filed two Informations both dated July 31, 1990, charging appellant with murder. The Information in Criminal Case No. 1568-M-90 reads as follows:

The Information in Criminal Case No. 1569-M-90 was similarly worded, except for the name of the victim, who was Victor Trinidad in lieu of Vicente Trinidad.3 [Records, p. 1.]

In an Order dated August 28, 1990, the RTC ordered the consolidation of the two cases.4 [Records, p. 6.] The proceedings were stalled because appellant surrendered only in 1993. When arraigned on July 28, 1993, appellant, with the assistance of counsel,5 [Atty. Sergio E. Bernabe; records, p. 45.] entered a plea of not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued. On August 26, 1997,6 [Records, p. 405.] the trial court promulgated its assailed Decision dated July 24, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

In view of the penalty imposed, this appeal was lodged directly with this Court.7 [The case was deemed submitted for decision on November 5, 1999, when this Court received the Appellee’s Brief. The filing of a reply brief was deemed waived, as none was submitted within the reglementary period.]

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General summarizes the prosecution’s version of the facts in this wise:8 [Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 163-165. This was signed by Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez, Assistant Solicitor General Nestor J. Ballacillo and Solicitor Ma. Ana C. Rivera.]

In his Brief, appellant presents the following statement of facts:9 [Appellant’s Brief, pp. 1-2; rollo, pp. 94-95. This was signed by Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez.]

In convicting appellant, the trial court relied on the eyewitness account of Christopher Trinidad, who was five years old when the crime was committed and who was then riding the jeepney together with the two victims, his father and paternal grandfather, Vicente. The court a quo also noted that there was a feud between appellant and the victims over the ownership of a parcel of land. It further observed that appellant did not surrender to the police for three years, although he knew that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. It concluded that the killing was qualified by treachery, because the victims "were totally defenseless and had no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate when shot."

In his Brief, appellant submits the following as "ground for acquittal":10 [Appellant’s Brief, p. 4; rollo p. 97.]

In discussing this argument, he invoked three "sub-topics germane to said ground":11 [Appellant’s Brief, pp. 4-6, 8; rollo, pp. 97-99, 101.]

Considering that an appeal throws the criminal case wide open for review and is not limited to the issues raised by the appellant,12 [People v. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124, January 28, 1998.] the Court will address the following matters: (1) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2) presence of qualifying circumstances and (3) damages.

The appeal is devoid of merit. Nonetheless, after going through the records of this case, the Court resolves to modify appellant’s civil liability.

The conviction of appellant was based on the testimony of Christopher Trinidad, the five-year-old boy who was then seated at the back of the jeep when his father and grandfather were shot. The narration of the boy was straightforward, clear, guileless and positive. Its pertinent portions are reproduced hereunder:13 [TSN, August 4, 1993, pp. 7-12.]

x x x......x x x......x x x

Well-settled is the rule that the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, in the absence of a clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance that could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied.14 [People v. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19, March 14, 1996; People v. Lua, 256 SCRA 539, April 26, 1996.] This is because the lower court had the opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witnesses as they testified. In the present case, the witness was only eight years old when he testified and positively identified appellant as the gunman. Despite a grueling cross-examination,15 [TSN, August 18, 1993, pp. 1-26.] he remained steadfast in declaring that he saw his father and grandfather shot by appellant. There is no indication at all that his testimony was tainted with mendacity. Thus, we find no reason to reverse or modify the trial court’s assessment.

Moreover, appellant fails to cite any reason for this Court to reject the testimony of the boy. In fact, his Brief contains no argument challenging the credibility of the said witness or the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.

The trial court’s conclusion that appellant was the perpetrator was bolstered by the fact that he eluded arrest for three years, although he knew that he had already been charged. Indeed, flight is an indication of guilt.16 [People v. Salvame, 270 SCRA 766, April 4, 1997; People v. Cloud, 265 SCRA 472, December 10, 1996.]

In this appeal, appellant also fails to raise the defense of alibi which he narrated during the trial. Nonetheless, we have examined the records motu proprio, and we hold that this defense is devoid of merit.

Appellant testified that when the crime was committed, he was in Baguio City for an appointment in connection with his business as a lumber dealer. When informed that the person he was supposed to meet could not make it, he left around 10:00 a.m. that day and proceeded to Alilem, Ilocos Sur, to meet his wife.

It is axiomatic that alibi, which is inherently weak and easily fabricated, must be established by clear and convincing evidence.17 [People v. Lapay, 298 SCRA 62, October 14, 1998; People v. Cabanela, 299 SCRA 153, November 24, 1998; People v. Jose, 250 SCRA 319, November 24, 1995.] We agree with the trial court, however, that appellant’s defense was "unworthy of belief and full of inconsistencies." The trial court explained:

In any event, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible witnesses.19 [People v. Grefaldia, 298 SCRA 337, October 30, 1998; People v. Marollano, 276 SCRA 84, July 24, 1997; People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, April 18, 1997.]

In asking for his acquittal, appellant, for reasons known only to him and his defense counsel, argues mainly that no evidence supported the three qualifying circumstances alleged in the two Informations: abuse of superior strength, evident premeditation and treachery. In other words, he is putting forth arguments which, even if accepted, would result only in a modification of the crime and a reduction of the corresponding penalty.

He argues that the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation. Likewise, he points out that abuse of superior strength should not be appreciated, because it is deemed absorbed by treachery.

We find no reason to discuss these arguments further. Arguments in an appellant’s brief must pertain to errors allegedly committed by the trial court.20 [Rule 44, Section 13 (f), in relation to Rule 125, Section 1.] In this case, the court a quo did not hold that these two circumstances, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, were proven by the prosecution. Rather, it ruled that the crime committed was murder because of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

Arguing that the trial court should not have appreciated treachery as a circumstance that qualified the killing to murder, appellant maintains that the two victims were not unarmed at the time.21 [Appellant’s Brief, p. 10; rollo, p. 103.] Furthermore, he contends that they had opportunities to defend themselves. They could have retreated, sped away or otherwise made themselves "ready for the consequences."22 [Ibid., p. 12; rollo, p. 105.]

We are not convinced. There is treachery when one commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof without risk to oneself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.23 [People v. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1, April 1, 1996; People v. Torrefiel, 265 SCRA 369, April 18, 1996.]

In the present case, it was clear that appellant, together with an unidentified companion, blocked the path of the jeep. When it stopped, he approached Victor and shot him pointblank. The latter was already kneeling on the ground when appellant shot him once more in the head. The latter then approached Vicente, who was cowering at the back of the jeep, and shot him too. We reject the submission of appellant that there was no conclusive proof that the victims were unarmed at the time. The manner in which he carried out the attack spoke only too well of their inability to defend themselves.

Moreover, the mere fact that there was a feud between appellant and the victims did not necessarily prove that the attack was expected. If the victims had been expecting an attack, they should not have brought the youngsters with them. In any event, an accused cannot escape the appreciation of alevosia by threatening the victims in advance. As the solicitor general pointed out, what was decisive was the suddenness of the attack which made it impossible for the victims to retaliate, flee, or defend themselves.

Clearly, the trial court did not err in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

In line with current jurisprudence,24 [People v. Vermudez, GR No. 119464, January 28, 1999; People v. Albao, 287 SCRA 129, March 6, 1998.] we affirm the award of indemnity ex delicto to the heirs of each victim in the sum of P50,000 or a total of P100,000. This may be awarded without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. Likewise, we sustain the award of P100,000 to the heirs of each victim for the wake and burial expenses, for these were duly proven.25 [Exhibit P, P1-21, Q, R, R1-17.] Although the records show that they were entitled to moral damages,26 [TSN, July 14,1994, pp. 2-7; TSN, January 20, 1994, pp. 4-6.] we hold that the award should be reduced to P100,000 or P50,000 for each set of heirs of the victims.

We cannot sustain, however, the award of exemplary damages, which are awarded only in the presence of one or more aggravating circumstances.27 [Article 2230 of the Civil Code provides that "in criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was commited with one or more aggravating circumstances.] None was established in this case.

Likewise, we hold that the trial court erred in awarding "P1.5 million and P337,000.00 for victims Victor and Vicente Trinidad, respectively, as loss of income for 5 years." The amount of indemnity for loss of earning capacity is based on the income at the time of death and the probable life expectancy of the victim.28 [People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, April 18, 1997.] It should be stressed that the amount recoverable is not the entire earnings, but only that portion which the beneficiaries would have received.29 [People v. Delmendo, 296 SCRA 371, September 25, 1998.] Thus, indemnity for lost income refers to the victim’s total earnings minus the necessary living expenses. In computing this award, the Court has used the following formula:

In the case of Victor, his wife testified that the annual income from their piggery business was P300,000. Considering that the two of them operated and managed the business, the profits should be divided equally between them. Accordingly, the annual income of Victor, who was 39 years old at the time of his death, was P150,000. Considering that his living expenses have not been proven, the Court exercises the discretion to ascertain and fix the same.31 [People v. Ronnie Reyes and Nestor Pagal GR No. 120642, July 2, 1999.] Under the circumstances, we find the amount of P50,000 as reasonable living expenses.32 There appears to be no fixed rule in the determination of the amount of reasonable and necessary living expenses. In People v. Espanola (supra),the victim’s gross annual income was P39,146.25, and the Court deducted from it living expenses in the sum of P15,600 per annum. In People v. Delmendo (supra), the victim was earning P250,000 a year and the Court deducted the amount of P100,000 as living expenses. In People v. Cawaling (supra), the annual income of the victim was P36,000, and the Court allowed P12,000 as living expenses. In a recent case, People v. Ronnie Reyes and Nestor Pagal (supra), the Court held that one half of the gross earnings (P120,000) constituted necessary living expenses (P60,000). The same computation was also applied in People v. Alberto Nullan (GR No. 126303, April 14, 1999) and in People v. Jose Silvestre (GR No. 127573, May 12, 1999). On the other hand, in People v. Jerez (285 SCRA 393, January 29, 1998), living expenses were not deducted from the gross earnings.] Hence, the lost earnings of Victor Trinidad should be computed as follows:

On the other hand, the wife of Vicente testified that the latter was earning P50,000 a year from his business. From this amount, P25,000 may be deducted as reasonable and necessary living expenses. Hence, the lost earnings of Vicente, who was 74 years old at the time, should be computed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is AFFIRMED, except in regard to the civil liabilities which are MODIFIED; accordingly, appellant is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims as follows:

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.