This is an appeal from the decision1 [Penned by Judge Myrna Dimaranan Vidal.] dated August 25, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 127, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Arson, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private complainant the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo was a 38-year old mason, married, and a resident of Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City, at the time of the offense charged. He used to be a good friend of Almanzor "Elmer" Montesclaros, the grandson of private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen.2 [TSN, May 28, 1996, p. 4.] On February 27, 1996, a few hours before the fire, Montesclaros, in the belief that appellant and his wife were the ones hiding his live-in partner from him, stormed the house of appellant and burned their clothes, furniture, and appliances.3 [TSN, May 28, 1996, p. 6; TSN, June 4, 1996, p. 4.] Montesclaros lived in the house owned by said complainant and located at Banahaw St., Mountain Heights Subdivision, Barrio Makatipo, Kalookan City. It was this house allegedly set on fire by appellant.

The pertinent facts in this case, as summarized by the Solicitor General, which we find supported by the records, are as follows:

On March 11, 1996, appellant was charged with the crime of Arson under the following Information:

On April 22, 1996, appellant, duly assisted by counsel de oficio Atty. Juanito Crisostomo, was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.

During trial, the prosecution presented the following witnesses (1) Mrs. Lina Videña, (2) Mrs. Mona Aquino, both neighbors of appellant; and (3) Fire Investigator Raymundo Savare. When the defense agreed to the proposed stipulation that the value of the burned property was P100,000.00, the State Prosecutor dispensed with the testimony of private complainant,6 [Order dated May 20, 1996, Records, p. 13; TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 22.] the owner of the house.

The defense presented the appellant himself, Ernesto Riolloraza and Marieta Acosta as witnesses. Appellant claimed that at the time of the alleged arson he was sleeping at his mother’s home, some five houses away from the burned house.7 [TSN, May 28, 1996, p. 4.] Ernesto Riolloraza testified he lived in the house behind the home of appellant’s mother; that at around 9:00 in the evening, he saw appellant and his family transferring their belongings to the house of appellant’s mother; that at around 11:00 in the evening, he saw appellant watching TV; and that at around 1:00 AM, he was awakened by the sound of fire sirens; and that he and appellant stood by the roadside and watched the fire.8 [TSN, June 3, 1996, p. 8.] Marieta Acosta, common-law wife of appellant, corroborated appellant’s testimony that they were sleeping in the home of appellant’s mother at the time of the incident.9 [TSN, June 4, 1996, p. 8.]

On August 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision,10 [Records, pp. 53-60.] disposing as follows:

Appellant seasonably interposed the present appeal assigning the following errors:

Appellant centers his appeal on the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence against him. He maintains that the fact that Montesclaros lived in the house which was razed to the ground was not duly proved by the Prosecutor, and that even the Fire Investigator could not determine the true cause of the fire. Appellant further assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses Mona Aquino and Lina Videña since their respective testimonies as to his presence in the locus criminis before and after the incident remain uncorroborated, and therefore, wholly unreliable and insufficient to sustain his conviction.

For the State, the Solicitor General rebutted the factual submissions of appellant. First, appellant himself testified that he knew that Elmer Montesclaros lived in the house of private complainant.11 [TSN, May 28, 1996, p. 6.] Second, the testimony of prosecution witness Mona Aquino though uncorroborated does not impair her credibility since no ill-motive was ascribed to her to testify falsely against appellant. Third, any inconsistency in Lina Videña’s testimony that she did not see appellant at the locus criminis could be explained by a reading of her entire testimony. She saw appellant inside the yard of the burning house during the fire, not after the fire. Further, the Solicitor General stressed that the determination of credibility of witnesses remains within the province of the trial court, whose finding is accorded due respect on appeal, absent any substantial circumstance which could have been overlooked in the decision.

Arson is defined as the malicious destruction of property by fire.12 [Reyes, Luis B., The Revised Penal Code, 1993 ed., p.736. See also P.D. No. 1613, which was amended by Section 10 of R.A. 7659, commonly known as the Death Penalty Law.] In this case, the alleged crime was committed on February 28, 1996, after R.A. 7659 already took effect. The trial court found appellant herein liable under Article 320, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 10 of R.A. No. 7659, which provides as follows:

Appellant’s conviction rests on circumstantial evidence. Pertinently, Section 4 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

In order to justify a conviction upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal responsibility of the accused.13 [U.S. v. Rosal, 12 Phil. 135, 140 (1909).] But no greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct.14 [People v. Ferras, 289 SCRA 94, 103-104 (1998).]

In this case, we find the trial court correctly held that the following circumstances taken together constitute an unbroken chain of events pointing to one fair and logical conclusion, that accused started the fire which gutted the house of private complainant. Although there is no direct evidence linking appellant to the arson, we agree with the trial court in holding him guilty thereof in the light of the following circumstances duly proved and on record:

First, appellant had the motive to commit the arson. It is not absolutely necessary, and it is frequently impossible for the prosecution to prove the motive of the accused for the commission of the crime charged, nevertheless in a case of arson like the present, the existence or non-existence of a sufficient motive is a fact affecting the credibility of the witnesses.15 [People v. Pulmones, 61 Phil. 680, 684 (1935).] It was duly proved that at around 4:30 in the afternoon of February 27, 1996, private complainant’s grandson, Elmer Montesclaros, stormed the house of appellant and his wife and burned their clothes, household furniture and appliances, like TV and karaoke.16 [TSN, June 4, 1996, pp. 3, 6-7.] When appellant arrived home at around 5:00 in the afternoon and was informed of the incident, he got mad, and as his common-law wife testified, appellant threw a tantrum ("nagdadabog").17 [TSN, June 4, 1996, p. 6.] Appellant had every reason to feel aggrieved about the incident and to retaliate in kind against Montesclaros and his grandmother.

Second, appellant’s intent to commit the arson was established by his previous attempt to set on fire a bed ("papag") inside the same house (private complainant’s) which was burned later in the night. Prosecution witness Mona Aquino testified that at around 5:00 in the afternoon of the same day, she saw appellant carrying a gas stove and knife. When she asked him what he was going to do with the stove, he answered that he was going to burn the house of private complainant.18 [TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 4.] Later, she heard the sound of somebody throwing a chair and breaking bottles next door. When she peeped in the kitchen, she saw that appellant entered the house of private complainant and started pouring gas on a bed ("papag") and then lighted a fire with a disposable lighter. Appellant’s wife rushed in and extinguished the fire with a broomstick. The two later left the house at around 6:00 in the evening.19 [TSN, May 22, 1996, pp. 8-11.]

While it is true that "evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or similar thing at another time," it may be received "to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." In People v. Dadles, 278 SCRA 393 (1997), we held that:

Shortly thereafter, at around 9:00 in the evening, defense witness Ernesto Riolloraza who lived behind the house of appellant’s mother, saw appellant and his family transferring their belongings to said house of appellant’s mother.20 [TSN, June 3, 1996, p. 4; TSN, June 4, 1996, p. 7.]

Third, appellant was not only present at the locus criminis before the incident, he was seen inside the yard of the burning house during the height of the fire. At around 1:00 in the morning of February 28, 1996, prosecution witness Lina Videña was awakened by the barking of their dog, so she went to the back of their house to investigate.21 [TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 3.] Through the holes of the GI sheets, she saw appellant standing alone inside private complainant’s yard watching the house burning.22 [TSN, May 20, 1996, pp. 4-5, 10.] Appellant even looked happy with a canine smile and crazy-looking expression. ("Siya para bang ang mukha niya ay natutuwa na hindi naman humahalakhak, x x x para bang ngiting aso at mukhang nakakaluko, your honor").23 [TSN, May 20, 1996, p. 16.]

Fourth, appellant’s actions subsequent to the incident further point to his culpability. At around 12:00 noon of the same day, private complainant went with prosecution witness Lina Videña to the place of Kagawad Tecson. They were about to leave when appellant arrived. Private complainant asked him why he burned her house and appellant answered, "So what if I burned your house?" Then appellant stared meanly at private complainant, who got nervous and had to take medications.24 [TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 14.] The following day, appellant threatened prosecution witness Mona Aquino, saying that if she would testify against him, he would also burn her house.25 [TSN, May 22, 1996, p. 26.]

All the foregoing circumstances were duly established by the evidence on record. Inseparably linked with one another, they point to no other conclusion than appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While nobody actually saw appellant light the match which set the house on fire, the facts and circumstances proved make a complete chain strongly leading to the conclusion that it was the appellant who perpetrated the crime.26 [People v. Lomuntad, 65 Phil. 605, 607 (1938).]

In prosecutions for arson, proof of the crime charged is complete where the evidence establishes (1) the corpus delicti, that is, a fire because of criminal agency; and (2) the identity of the defendants as the one responsible for the crime.27 [People v. Hidalgo and Gotengco, 102 Phil. 719, 731 (1957), citing Curtis, the Law of Arson, p. 526, section 486.] Corpus delicti means the substance of the crime, it is the fact that a crime has actually been committed. In arson, the corpus delicti rule is generally satisfied by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and of its having been intentionally caused. Even the uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, if credible, may be enough to prove the corpus delicti and to warrant conviction.28 [People v. Gutierrez, 258 SCRA 70, 75-76 (1996), citing other authorities.]

Appellant interposes the defense of alibi in his bid for acquittal. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is axiomatic that the appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.29 [People v. Castillo, 289 SCRA 213, 227-228 (1998).] In this case, appellant himself testified that the house of his mother where he was staying on that fateful night was merely five (5) houses away from the locus criminis, hence considering the distance, it was not physically impossible for him to have perpetrated the crime and then gone home to his mother’s home, appearing as innocent as a lamb.

Lastly, it would not be amiss here to point out that "[i]n the crime of arson, the enormity of the offense is not measured by the value of the property that may be destroyed but rather by the human lives exposed to destruction."30 [U.S. v. Zabala, 6 Phil. 431 (1906).] It is indeed a heinous crime that the law wisely seeks to suppress with the most serious penalty because of its grave anti-social character.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court finding appellant Raul Acosta y Laygo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arson and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify private complainant, Filomena M. Marigomen, in the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment, is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Buena, J., on official leave.