At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218, which affirmed the decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna, in LRC NO. B-467, ordering the registration of Lot No. 6 in the name of the private respondent.

The facts that matter are as follows:

On May 15, 1975, the private respondent, Aquilino Cariño, filed with the then Branch I, Court of First Instance of Laguna, a petition1 [Original Records (O.R.), p. 4-6.] for registration of Lot No. 6, a sugar land with an area of forty-three thousand six hundred fourteen (43,614) square meters, more or less, forming part of a bigger tract of land surveyed as Psu-108952 and situated in Barrio Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna.

Private respondent declared that subject land was originally owned by his mother, Teresa Lauchangco, who died on February 15, 1911,2 [Direct Examination of Aquilino Cariño, August 23, 1977; O.R., p. 36.] and later administered by him in behalf of his five brothers and sisters, after the death of their father in 1934.3 [Id., pp. 40-41.]

In 1949, private respondent and his brother, Severino Cariño, became co-owners of Lot No. 6 by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of the land embraced in Plan Psu-108952, among the heirs of Teresa Lauchangco. On July 26, 1963, through another deed of extrajudicial settlement, sole ownership of Lot No. 6 was adjudicated to the private respondent.4 [Id., p. 36.]

Pertinent report of the Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands (now Bureau of Lands Management), disclosed:

"x x x

With the private respondent as lone witness for his petition, and the Director of Lands as the only oppositor, the proceedings below ended. On February 5, 1990, on the basis of the evidence on record, the trial court granted private respondent's petition, disposing thus:

From the aforesaid decision, petitioner (as oppositor) went to the Court of Appeals, which, on November 11, 1993, affirmed the decision appealed from.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present Petition; theorizing that:

The Petition is impressed with merit.

The petition for land registration8 [O. R. p. 4.] at bar is under the Land Registration Act.9 [Act No. 496.] Pursuant to said Act, he who alleges in his petition or application, ownership in fee simple, must present muniments of title since the Spanish times, such as a titulo real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase; and ‘informacion possessoria’ or ‘possessory information title’, which would become a ‘titulo gratuito’ or a gratuitous title.10 [Javellana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40353, December 13, 1999.]

In the case under consideration, the private respondents (petitioner below) has not produced a single muniment of title to substantiate his claim of ownership.11 [Tsn., p. 10, Cross-examination of Aquilino Cariño, August 23, 1977.] The Court has therefore no other recourse, but to dismiss private respondent's petition for the registration of subject land under Act 496.

Anyway, even if considered as petition for confirmation of imperfect title under the Public land Act (CA No. 141), as amended, private respondent’s petition would meet the same fate. For insufficiency of evidence, its denial is inevitable. The evidence adduced by the private respondent is not enough to prove his possession of subject lot in concept of owner, in the manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,12 [Further amended by P.D. No. 1073, issued on January 25, 1977.] as amended by R.A. No. 1942 and R.A. No. 3872, the law prevailing at the time the Petition of private respondent was filed on May 15, 1975, provides:

Possession of public lands, however long, never confers title upon the possessor, unless the occupant can prove possession or occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required period to constitute a grant from the State.13 [Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210, p. 218, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195.]

Notwithstanding absence of opposition from the government, the petitioner in land registration cases is not relieved of the burden of proving the imperfect right or title sought to be confirmed. In Director of Lands vs. Agustin,14 [42 Phil. 227.] this Court stressed that:

There is thus an imperative necessity of the most rigorous scrutiny before imperfect titles over public agricultural lands may be granted judicial recognition.16 [Republic vs. Marcos, 52 SCRA 238, pp. 244-245.]

The underlying principle is that all lands that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the state as part of the public domain. As enunciated in Republic vs. Lee:"17 [Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 20, citing Santiago vs. De los Santos, 61 SCRA 146.]

In order that a petition for registration of land may prosper and the petitioners may savor the benefit resulting from the issuance of certificate of title for the land petitioned for, the burden is upon him (petitioner) to show that he and/or his predecessor-in-interest has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land sought for registration, for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the petition for confirmation of title.19 [Javellana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40353, December 13, 1999.]

In the case under consideration, private respondent can only trace his own possession of subject parcel of land to the year 1949, when the same was adjudicated to him by virtue of an extra-judicial settlement and partition. Assuming that such a partition was truly effected, the private respondent has possessed the property thus partitioned for only twenty-six (26) years as of 1975, when he filed his petition for the registration thereof. To bridge the gap, he proceeded to tack his possession to what he theorized upon as possession of the same land by his parents. However, other than his unilateral assertion, private respondent has not introduced sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegation that his late mother possessed the land in question even prior to 1911.

Basic is the rule that the petitioner in a land registration case must prove the facts and circumstances evidencing his alleged ownership of the land applied for. General statements, which are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.20 [Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 150, p. 156.]

From the relevant documentary evidence, it can be gleaned that the earliest tax declaration covering Lot No. 6 was Tax Declaration No. 3214 issued in 1949 under the names of the private respondent and his brother, Severino Carino. The same was followed by Tax Declaration No. 1921 issued in 1969 declaring an assessed value of Five Thousand Two Hundred Thirty-three (P5,233.00) Pesos and Tax Declaration No. 6359 issued in 1974 in the name of private respondent, declaring an assessment of Twenty-One Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy (P21,770.00) Pesos.21 [O.R., pp. 34 and 41.]

It bears stressing that the Exhibit "E" referred to in the decision below as the tax declaration for subject land under the names of the parents of herein private respondent does not appear to have any sustainable basis. Said Exhibit "E" shows that it is Tax Declaration 1921 for Lot No. 6 in the name of private respondent and not in the name of his parents.22 [O. R., p. 41.]

The rule that findings of fact by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding upon this Court is not without exceptions. Where, as in this case, pertinent records belie the findings by the lower courts that subject land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of private respondent's predecessor-in-interest, such findings have to be disregarded by this Court. In Republic vs. Court of Appeals,23 [167 SCRA 150, p. 155.] the Court ratiocinated thus:

Verily, the Court of Appeals just adopted entirely the findings of the trial court. Had it examined the original records of the case, the said court could have verified that the land involved was never declared for taxation purposes by the parents of the private respondent. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of claim of ownership.25 [Director of Lands vs. Santiago, 160 SCRA 186, p. 194, citing Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177; Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 219 SCRA 339, p. 348.] In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:26 160 SCRA 186.]

As stressed by the Solicitor General, the contention of private respondent that his mother had been in possession of subject land even prior to 1911 is self-serving, hearsay, and inadmissible in evidence. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner", by which characteristics private respondent describes his possession and that of his parents, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the private respondent, as applicant, to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession of his parents was of the nature and duration required by law. His bare allegations without more, do not amount to preponderant evidence that would shift the burden of proof to the oppositor.28 [Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 21.]

In a case,29 [Supra.] this Court set aside the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals for the registration of a parcel of land in the name of the applicant, pursuant to Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Law; holding as follows:

In Director of Lands vs. Datu,31 [115 SCRA 25.] the application for confirmation of imperfect title was likewise denied on the basis of the following disquisition, to wit:

They did not present as witness their predecessor, Peñaflor, to testify on his alleged possession of the land. They alleged in their application that they had tenants on the land. Not a single tenant was presented as witness to prove that the applicants had possessed the land as owners.

Neither can private respondent seek refuge under P.D. No. 1073,33 [Issued on January 25, 1977.] amending Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, under which law a certificate of title may issue to any occupant of a public land, who is a Filipino citizen, upon proof of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Failing to prove that his predecessors-in-interest occupied subject land under the conditions laid down by law, the private respondent could only establish his possession since 1949, four years later than June 12, 1945, as set by law.

The Court cannot apply here the juris et de jure presumption that the lot being claimed by the private respondent ceased to be a public land and has become private property.34 [Republic vs. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71, p. 74.] To reiterate, under the Regalian doctrine all lands belong to the State.35 [Lee Hong vs. David, 48 SCRA 372; Piñero vs. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386.] Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its basic rights over the same as dominus.36 [Republic vs. Lee, 197 SCRA 13, p. 20; citing: Santiago vs .de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146.]

Private respondent having failed to come forward with muniments of title to reinforce his petition for registration under the Land Registration Act (Act 496), and to present convincing and positive proof of his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious occupation of Lot No. 6 en concepto de dueno for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of his petition,37 [Director of Lands vs. Datu, supra.] the Court is of the opinion, and so finds, that subject Lot No. 6 surveyed under Psu-108952, forms part of the pubic domain not registrable in the name of private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 11, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. 29218 affirming the Decision, dated February 5, 1990, of Branch XXIV, Regional Trial Court of Laguna in LRC No. B-467, is SET ASIDE; and Lot No. 6, covered by and more particularly described in Psu-108952, is hereby declared a public land, under the administrative supervision and power of disposition of the Bureau of Lands Management. No pronouncement as to costs.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.