Freedom To Build, Incorporated, an owner-developer and seller of low-cost housing, sold to petitioner-spouses, a house and lot designated Lot No. 33, Block 14, of the De la Costa Homes in Barangka, Marikina, Metro Manila. The Contract to Sell executed between the parties, contained a Restrictive Covenant providing certain prohibitions, to wit:1 [Restrictive Covenants: Apendix, Records, p. 11.]

The above restrictions were also contained in Transfer Certificate of Title No. N-115384 covering the lot issued in the name of petitioner-spouses.

The controversy arose when petitioners, despite repeated warnings from respondent, extended the roof of their house to the property line and expanded the second floor of their house to a point directly above the original front wall.3 [By mutual agreement between the Homeowners Association and the developer, the restriction was relaxed from 4-meters to a 2-meter setback.] Respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 261, Pasig City, an action to demolish the unauthorized structures.

After trial, judgment was rendered against petitioners; thus:

On appeal to it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.

In their petition for review to this Court, the spouses contest the judgment of the courts below. Adjacent owners reportedly have no objection to the construction, and have even expressed interest in undertaking a similar expansion in their respective residences. Moreover, the couple's two children, a son and a daughter, might soon get married and then share, with their families, living quarters with petitioners. The latter also assail the personality of private respondent to question the construction which have effectively relinquished its ownership, right or interest over the subdivision upon the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the individual homeowners. Per the contract between Freedom to Build Incorporated and the De la Costa Low Income Project Homeowners' Association (hereinafter homeowners' association), petitioners aver, the enforcement of the prohibitions contained in the "Restrictive Covenant" originally residing on respondent is now lodged in the homeowners' association. Petitioners maintain that it is incumbent upon the homeowners' association, not on respondent, to enforce compliance with the provisions of the covenant.

A perusal of the provisions of the covenant would show that the restrictions therein imposed were intended -

Restrictive covenants are not, strictly speaking, synonymous with easements. While it may be correct to state that restrictive covenants on the use of land or the location or character of buildings or other structures thereon may broadly be said to create easements or rights, it can also be contended that such covenants, being limitations on the manner in which one may use his own property,6 [Kutchinski vs. Thompson, 101 NJ Eq. 649, 138 A569.] do not result in true easements,7 [Moses vs. Hazen, 63 App DC 104, 69 F 2d 842, 98 ALR 386.] but a case of servitudes (burden), sometimes characterized to be negative easements or reciprocal negative easements. Negative easement is the most common easement created by covenant or agreement whose effect is to preclude the owner of the land from doing an act, which, if no easement existed, he would be entitled to do.8 [Wilson vs. Owen (Mo) 261 SW2d 19.]

Courts which generally view restrictive covenants with disfavor for being a restriction on the use of one's property, have, nevertheless, sustained them9 [Firth vs. Marovich, 160 Cal 257, 116 P729.] where the covenants are reasonable,10 [Townsend vs. Allen, 114 Cal App 2d 291, 250 P2d 292, 39 ALR 2d 1108.] not contrary to public policy,11 [Fusha vs. Dacono Town Site Co. 60 Colo 315, 153 P226.] or to law,12 [Supra, Townsend.] and not in restraint of trade.13 [Whitney vs. Union R. Co. 11 Gray (Mass) 359.] Subject to these limitations, courts enforce restrictions to the same extent that will lend judicial sanction to any other valid contractual relationship.14 [Hartman vs. Wells, 257 III 167, 100 NE 500. In a notable number of cases, restrictions imposed on property conveyed were declared invalid for having contravened some constitutional or statutory provision, or where found to be of no benefit to anyone and a serious interference in the proper development of the community (Harris vs. Pease, 135 Conn 535, 66 A2d 590, 10 ALR 2d 819) and where it amounted to a prohibition of the use of property. (Baker vs. Henderson, 137 Tex 266, 153 SW2d 465.)14 In general, frontline restrictions on constructions have been held to be valid stipulations.15 [Bagiano vs. Harrow, 247 Mich 481 226 NW 262.]

The provisions in a restrictive covenant prescribing the type of the building to be erected are crafted not solely for the purpose of creating easements, generally of light and view, nor as a restriction as to the type of construction,16 [Hutchinson vs. Ulrich, 145 III 336, 34 NE 556.] but may also be aimed as a check on the subsequent uses of the building17 [Id, See also Schwarzchild vs. Welborne 186 Va 1052, 45 SE 2d 152.] conformably with what the developer originally might have intended the stipulations to be. In its Memorandum, respondent states in arguing for the validity of the restrictive covenant that the -

There appears to be no cogent reasons for not upholding restrictive covenants aimed to promote aesthetics, health, and privacy or to prevent overcrowding.

Viewed accordingly, the statement of petitioners that their immediate neighbors have not opposed the construction is unavailing to their cause, the subject restrictive covenant not being intended for the benefit of adjacent owners but to prescribe the uses of the building, i.e., to ensure, among other things, that the structures built on De la Costa Homes Subdivision would prevent overcrowding and promote privacy among subdivision dwellers. The argument then of petitioners that expansion is necessary in order to accommodate the individual families of their two children must fail for like reason. Nor can petitioners claim good faith; the restrictive covenants are explicitly written in the Contract To Sell and annotated at the back of the Transfer Certificate of Title.

Petitioners raise the issue of the personality of respondent to enforce the provisions of the covenant. Broadly speaking, a suit for equitable enforcement of a restrictive covenant can only be made by one for whose benefit it is intended.19 [Aull vs. Kraft (Tex Civ App) 286 SW2d 460.] It is not thus normally enforceable by one who has no right nor interest in the land for the benefit of which the restriction has been imposed.20 [Lillard vs. Jet Homes, Inc. (La App) 129 So2d 109)20 Thus, a developer of a subdivision can enforce restrictions, even as against remote grantees of lots, only if he retains part of the land.21 [19 ALR 2d 1281 No. 5.] There would have been merit in the argument of petitioners - that respondent, having relinquished ownership of the subdivision to the homeowners, is precluded from claiming any right or interest on the same property - had not the homeowners' association, confirmed by its board of directors, allowed respondent to enforce the provisions of the restrictive covenant.

Finally, petitioners argue that for lack of a specific provision, prescribing the penalty of demolition in the "Restrictive Covenant" in the event of a breach thereof, the prayer of respondent to demolish the structure should fail. This argument has no merit; Article 1168 of the New Civil Code states:

This Court is not unaware of its ruling in Ayala Corporation vs. Ray Burton Development Corporation,22 [294 SCRA 48.] which has merely adjudged the payment of damages in lieu of demolition. In the aforementioned case, however, the elaborate mathematical formula for the determination of compensatory damages which takes into account the current construction cost index during the immediately preceding 5 years based on the weighted average of wholesale price and wage indices of the National Census and Statistics Office and the Bureau of Labor Statistics is explicitly provided for in the Deed of Restrictions entered into by the parties. This unique and peculiar circumstance, among other strong justifications therein mentioned, is not extant in the case at bar.

In sum, the Court holds that -

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision, dated 13 July 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50085, sustaining that of the court a quo, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.