THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129964-65. August 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLOS
MENEQUE y MONTON, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES,
J.:
Accused Carlos Meneque
was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental with Murder
for allegedly killing Mario Aguilar and Ricardo Cabarang. The charges were
contained in two separate informations filed with the trial court on October
21, 1992, stating-
CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 12851
That on or about the 6th day of March 1991, in the Municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with M-14 rifle, with evident premeditation and treachery, with intent to kill, did then And there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one MARIO AGUILAR y BAVIERA, thereby inflicting upon him multiple injuries which caused his death.
Contrary to law.
CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 12852
That on or about the 6th day of March 1991, in the Municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with M-14 rifle, with evident premeditation and treachery, with intent to kill, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one RICARDO CABARANG y ORTIZ, thereby inflicting upon him "Gunshot wounds" which caused his death.
Contrary to law.[1]
Upon arraignment, accused
pleaded not guilty to the two counts of murder. Thus, trial ensued.
Prosecution witness John
Dulaca, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP)[2] and a resident of the municipality of Don
Salvador Benedicto, Negros Occidental, testified that at around two o'clock in
the afternoon of March 6, 1991, he was at the house of Noel Benedicto, together
with Mario Aguilar, Ricardo Cabarang and Pat. Eduardo Carino, when they
suddenly heard a gunshot.[3] Looking out the window, he and his
companions saw accused[4] holding an M-14 rifle.[5] They saw accused trying to break into the
teachers' quarters located beside Benedicto's house before proceeding towards
them.[6] When accused reached the house of Benedicto,
he pointed his gun at Carino, challenging the latter to a fight, but Carino
told him that he would not fight.[7] Accused then fired a shot towards the
ceiling of the house.[8] Dulaca and Carino ran towards the kitchen.
As they were running, accused rapidly fired his gun. Aguilar and Cabarang,
however, were not able to move, while Benedicto hid inside his room.[9] Dulaca and Carino escaped by making a hole
in the kitchen wall. Then Dulaca, followed by Carino, ran towards his house and
got his gun.[10] However, when they returned to Benedicto's
house, he saw Cabarang, who was covered in blood, being carried into the police
car in order to be brought to the hospital, whereas Aguilar was already dead.[11]
John Dulaca's testimony
was substantially corroborated by Johnny Alimon and Ernesto Gonzales.
Johnny Alimon, the driver
of the service jeep of the municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto, Negros
Occidental, declared that on March 6, 1991, he was resting at the teachers'
quarters when at around 2:15 p.m., he heard accused[12] shouting and challenging people to a fight.
He then heard gunshots. He looked outside and saw accused standing in front of
the teachers' quarters and holding an M-14 rifle.[13] Accused tried to set the teachers' quarters
on fire but the matches he was holding fizzled out.[14] When accused succeeded in breaking into the
teachers' quarters, Alimon hurriedly left through the comfort room window and
ran towards the market.[15] From the market, he could still hear
gunshots. Subsequently, he saw accused leave the teachers' quarters and proceed
to the house of Noel Benedicto. As accused was approaching Benedicto's house,
he kept on firing his M-14. From the house of Benedicto, accused went to the
municipal hall.[16] After accused had left, Alimon ran towards
the house of Benedicto, where he found Cabarang wounded, while Aguilar was
already dead. Alimon got the jeep from the municipal hall and brought Cabarang
to the hospital.[17] Meanwhile, Ernesto Gonzales testified that
on March 6, 1991, at around two in the afternoon, he was sitting inside a jeep
parked in front of the municipal hall with Felix Salipdan when accused[18] approached them and challenged them to a
fight. Gonzales told accused that he would not fight with him.[19] Accused left them and went to the barracks,
but upon emerging therefrom, he again approached Gonzales and Salipdan and
pointed his gun at each of them for several seconds. They again told accused that they would not fight with him.[20] Accused returned to the barracks once more.
When he emerged, Gonzales observed that he had changed into an all-black
fatigue uniform and that he was carrying ammunition. Gonzales noted that
accused was headed towards the poblacion. Later on, Gonzales heard a series of
gunshots.[21]
Accused invoked
self-defense. He testified that on March 6, 1991, at about two in the
afternoon, he was on his way to the barracks located at the municipal hall, as
he was a member of the armed forces temporarily assigned to the municipality of
Don Salvador Benedicto, when he was invited by Mario Aguilar to join their
group. He hesitated at first since he was not acquainted with the members of
the group, but he eventually acceded for the sake of camaraderie.[22] In the course of their conversation, Aguilar
told him that military men are braggarts. As he was a military man, accused was
offended by the comment and threatened to leave the group if they persisted in
pursuing such a topic. The group momentarily dropped the topic only to resume
their discussion some minutes later.[23] Accused stood up to leave the group, but he
was pulled down by one of the men, while another man tired to grab his gun. As
they grappled for its possession, the gun was accidentally fired, causing the
man who was wrestling for possession of the gun to loose his grip on it.
Accused took the opportunity to run away from the group. As he was running, he heard
gun fire. He turned around and saw that the group of Aguilar was firing in his
direction. Accused retraced his steps and fired back at them before running
towards the barracks.[24] Upon reaching the barracks, he was
approached by Rogelio de Jose, who asked him what had happened. He told Rogelio that he was fired upon by a
group of persons and that he was lucky not to have gotten hit. Accused then
looked for his commanding officer and surrendered his M-14 rifle.[25]
Rogelio de Jose
corroborated accused's testimony. He
testified that on March 6, 1991, at around 2 o'clock, he was in the
municipality of Don Salvador Benedicto upon the request of accused's wife, who
instructed him to ask accused for money for their sick child. He found accused
at a store and decided to wait for him outside.[26] De Jose noted that there were three people
inside the store. As he was waiting, de Jose heard the people inside having a
heated argument and then he heard accused say that if there is some trouble, he
might as well go out.[27] De Jose claims that he saw accused trying to
get out of the store, but that he was prevented from doing so by two men who
were attempting to grab his firearm. As
the three were struggling to gain possession of the gun, it fired twice. Accused ran away from the store, towards the
direction of their camp.[28] De Jose followed accused and asked him what
had happened. Accused told him that a
group of men had ganged up on him.[29]
On January 29, 1997, the trial court
convicted accused for the murder of Mario Aguilar and Ricardo Cabarang and
accordingly, imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
of the murders and ordered him to pay the heirs of each of the victims
P50,000.00 as indemnity.[30]
In ruling thus, the trial court considered
the witnesses of the prosecution to be more credible than those of the defense.
With regards to accused's plea of self-defense, the trial court held that
accused had failed to prove the same with clear and convincing evidence. Meanwhile, Rogelio de Jose's testimony was
considered as "weak, illogical and incoherent." Also, the trial court
found that the killings were committed with treachery since "the victims
Mario Aguilar and Ricardo Cabarang were not in [a] position to defend
themselves when the accused unexpectedly fired his M-14."[31]
The sole issue raised by
accused in his appeal is whether or not the trial court gravely erred in not
appreciating the justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor.[32]
A plea of self-defense
automatically shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense
since such a plea means that the accused admits to having performed the
criminal act, but disclaims legal liability on the ground that his life had
been exposed to harm first before he committed the act in defense of himself.[33] Thus, when the accused invokes self-defense,
he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after the accused's open admission of responsibility for the
killing.[34] The requisites in order for self-defense to
be appreciated as a justifying circumstance are: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[35] The accused must prove the existence of all
of these elements by clear and convincing evidence.[36]
In the present case,
accused-appellant claims that he was merely having a conversation with the
group of Aguilar, who invited him in the first place, when they insulted him;
that when he stood up to leave, they assaulted him and two persons tried to
grab his firearm; that he was able to retain possession of his gun and to run
away from the group; and that as he was scampering away, the group of Aguilar
fired upon him, so he fired back.[37]
We cannot give credence
to accused-appellant's version of events. Apart from his own self-serving
statements, accused-appellant's testimony is uncorroborated by independent and
competent evidence.[38] We agree with the trial court that the
testimony of Rogelio de Jose, the only other witness for the defense, was weak
and untenable. On direct examination,
de Jose claimed that he witnessed the fighting between accused-appellant and
some men inside the store which accused-appellant had entered. However, on
cross-examination, de Jose admitted that he could not see inside the store.[39] De Jose's contradictory statements impair
his credibility.
Moreover, accused-appellant's
testimony is intrinsically doubtful. He
claims that he was assaulted by the group of Aguilar whose members were
supposedly armed. However, despite their alleged superiority in strength and
number, accused-appellant, surprisingly, did not sustain any wounds; no member
of Aguilar's group had used their firearms against accused-appellant. Rather, it was Cabarang and Aguilar who
ended up getting killed by, if the version of accused-appellant is to be
believed, the haphazard firing by accused-appellant of his M-14 rifle as he was
running away from Noel Benedicto's house. It is well-settled that the nature
and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are considered important indicia
which disprove a plea of self-defense.[40] Given the circumstance obtaining in the
present case, it is difficult, if not impossible to conclude that
accused-appellant was the unwitting and defenseless victim of a murderous
aggression by the group of Aguilar.
It is firmly established
doctrine that absent any showing that it has overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied some facts of weight and substance which, if properly considered,
would have altered the result of the case, the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses must be sustained by the appellate court.[41] Since the trial court had the distinct
opportunity of directly observing the demeanor of the witness, it is therefore
in a better position to ascertain whether or not he or she is telling the
truth.[42] Based on our own critical study of the
records of this case, we find that the trial court was justified in upholding
the testimony of the prosecution witnesses as being worthy of full faith and
credence. The defense has not proven that the prosecution witnesses were moved
by improper motives, thus, it must be presumed that they were not so moved.[43] On the contrary, we find that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were clear and straightforward and
coincided on all material points.
The trial court correctly
convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder since the killing of
Cabarang and Aguilar was performed with treachery. Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.[44] There is treachery when the attack is sudden
and unexpected, rendering the victim unable to defend himself.[45] In this case, the group of Aguilar had no
reason to anticipate an attack from accused-appellant since the latter was
virtually a stranger to them and there were no prior quarrels or altercations
between themselves and accused-appellant.
Thus, they were taken completely by surprise when accused-appellant
headed towards the house of Noel Benedicto and started firing at them. Being unarmed, John Dulaca and Eduardo
Carino's reaction was merely to get out of the house, which they accomplished
by boring a hole through the kitchen wall.
Meanwhile, Noel Benedicto removed himself from accused-appellant's path
by hiding in his room. Mario Aguilar
and Ricardo Cabarang, however, were not as fortunate. The intense fear and shock caused by accused-appellant's violent
rampage prevented them from fleeing and, being unarmed, they obviously could
not put up any defensive action in the face of such an implacable and
unanticipated aggression. Undisputedly, the circumstances obtaining in this
case shows the presence of treachery for the means employed by
accused-appellant ensured the execution of his criminal designs upon the
victims herein without any risk to himself arising from any defense which the
offended parties might have made.[46]
We agree with the trial
court that accused-appellant is guilty of two separate murders[47] and that the proper penalty which should be
imposed upon him is reclusion perpetua for each of the murders. When the crime was committed, the imposable
penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. Since no aggravating or
mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period.[48]
Pursuant to current
jurisprudence, accused-appellant is liable to each set of heirs in the amount
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) by way of indemnity, or a total indemnity
of P100,000.00.[49] However, no actual damages may be awarded
since the prosecution failed to produce receipts to substantiate the same.[50]
WHEREFORE, the January 29, 1997 Decision of Branch 44
of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),
Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
[1] Records,
1-2.
[2] TSN,
October 3, 1995, 4-5.
[3] Ibid.,
9.
[4] Dulaca
identified accused-appellant in court. Ibid.,
26-27.
[5]Ibid.,
10.
[6] Ibid.,
11-1
[7] Ibid.,
12-14.
[8] Ibid.,
14.
[9] Ibid.,
16-18.
[10] Ibid.,
18-20.
[11] Ibid.,
20-23.
[12] Alimon
identified accused-appellant in court.
TSN, November 14, 1995, 9-10.
[13] Ibid.,
3-5.
[14] Ibid.,
5.
[15] Ibid.,
6.
[16] Ibid.,
6-8.
[17] Ibid.,
8-9.
[18] Gonzales
identified accused-appellant in court.
Gonzales knew accused-appellant because he was their supervisor in the
CAFGU. TSN, October 3, 1995, 50-52.
[19] Ibid.,
42-44.
[20] Ibid.,
44-48.
[21] Ibid.,
48-49.
[22] TSN,
October 14, 1996, 4-5.
[23] Ibid.,
5-6.
[24] Ibid.,
7-8.
[25] Ibid.,
9.
[26] TSN,
December 9, 1996, 4-5.
[27] Ibid.,
5-6.
[28] Ibid.,
6-7
[29] Ibid., 7.
[30] Rollo,
23-24.
[31] Ibid.,
21-22.
[32] Ibid.,
70.
[33] People
v. De la Cruz, 291 SCRA 164 (1998); People v. Timblor, 285 SCRA
64 (1998).
[34] People
v. Peņa, 291 SCRA 606 (1998); People v. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705
(1998).
[35] People
v. Cario, 288 SCRA 404 (1998); People v. Timblor, supra.
[36] People
v. Noay, 296 SCRA 292 (1998).
[37] Rollo,
70-71.
[38] People
v. De la Cruz, supra.
[39] TSN,
December 9, 1996, 5-7, 12-13.
[40] People
v. Umadhay, 293 SCRA 545 (1998); People v. Caņete, 287 SCRA 490
(1998).
[41] People
v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157 (1998); People v. Viovicente, 286 SCRA 1
(1998).
[42] People
v. Albao, 287 SCRA 129 (1998); People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79
(1998).
[43] People
v. Mendoza, supra.
[44] People
v. Gungon, 287 SCRA 618 (1998).
[45] People
v. Cortes, 286 SCRA 295 (1998).
[46] People
v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 (1998).
[47] People
v. Toling, 62 SCRA 17 (1975), citing People v. Salazar, 105 Phil
1058 (1959); People v. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31 (1960); People v. Remollino,
109 Phil 607 (1960).
[48] Revised
Penal Code, art. 64.
[49] People
v. Solis, 291 SCRA 529 (1998).
[50] People
v. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158 (1998).