No person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith. Absence of good faith in the present case is shown by the fact that petitioner clearly has no cause of action against respondents but it recklessly filed suit anyway and wantonly pursued pointless appeals, thereby causing the latter to spend valuable time, money and effort in unnecessarily defending themselves, incurring damages in the process. Supreme

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the July 29, 1998 Decision1 [Rollo, pp. 17-27.] of the Court of Appeals2 [Eighth Division. The Decision was written by J. Salome A. Montoya (chairman and now Presiding Justice) with the concurrence of JJ Conchita Carpio Morales and Bernardo P. Abesamis.] (CA), as well as its December 4, 1998 Resolution in CA-GR CR CV No. 50573. In its Decision, the CA ruled:3 [Rollo, p. 27.]

The trial court ruling4 [Written by Judge Salvador De Guzman Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 142).] modified by the CA reads as follows: Sjcj

The December 4, 1998 CA Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. Scjj

The present Petition finds its roots in an incident which involved three vehicles: a Galant Sigma car driven by Grace Ladaw Morales, a packed passenger jeepney originally driven by Ligorio Bondad, and a DM Transit Bus driven by Eduardo Mendoza.

Pfc. Agapito L. Domingo of the Southern Police District investigated the accident and filed the following report: Jjsc

Before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on April 12, 1985, Petitioner Industrial Insurance Company, Inc. and Grace Ladaw Morales filed a Complaint for damages7 [Ibid., pp. 1-4.] against DM Transit Corporation, Eduardo Diaz, Pablo Bondad and Ligorio Bondad. Petitioner contended that it had paid Morales P29,800 for the damages to her insured car. It also asserted that the December 17, 1984 accident had been caused "solely and proximately" by the "joint gross and wanton negligence, carelessness and imprudence of both defendant drivers Eduardo Diaz y Mendoza and Ligorio Bondad y Hernandez, who failed to exercise and observe the diligence required by law in the management and operation of their respective vehicles and by their defendant employers; D.M. Transit Corporation and Pablo Bondad, respectively, for their failure to exercise the diligence required of them by law in the selection and supervision of their employees including their aforementioned involved drivers."8 [Ibid., p. 3.]

On June 6, 1985, Respondents Pablo and Ligorio Bondad filed their Answer9 [Ibid., pp. 13-19.] denying any responsibility or liability to petitioner and Morales. They asserted that their vehicle was on full stop because of a flat tire. Thus, it was the bus which hit Morales’ car.10 [Ibid., p. 14.] In their Counterclaim, they contended that petitioner had acted in bad faith in impleading them and that, contrary to its allegation, no prior demand had been made upon them.11 [Ibid., p. 16.]

In its October 14, 1991 Decision, the trial court exculpated the Bondads and ordered petitioner to pay them actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the ruling of the trial court with modification. Edpmis

Hence, this Petition for Review.12 [The case was deemed submitted for decision on January 11, 2000, upon the receipt by the Court of the Memorandum for the respondents, signed by Atty. Nelson Cordero Belarmino. The petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Emerico P. Lomibao, was received by the Court on December 16, 1999.]

The appellate court debunked petitioner’s assertion that it had a cause of action against the Bondads, whose negligence was allegedly the proximate cause of the damage to the insured vehicle. Misoedp

The CA, however, reduced the lower court’s award of damages to the Bondads, ratiocinating as follows: Misedp

In its Memorandum,13 [Rollo, p. 53.] petitioner presents the following issues for resolution: Edp

In the main, the core issue is the propriety of the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees, to the respondents. We shall also discuss a preliminary matter: the cause of the accident. Edpsc

The Petition is not meritorious.

Petitioner insists that the negligence of Ligorio and Pablo Bondad was the proximate cause of the accident that damaged the insured vehicle of Grace Ladaw Morales. Scedp

This argument deserves scant consideration. Questions regarding the cause of the accident and the persons responsible for it are factual issues which we cannot pass upon. It is jurisprudentially settled that, as a rule, the jurisdiction of this Court is limited to a review of errors of law allegedly committed by the appellate court. It is not bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.14 [Olan v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 504, March 12, 1998; David-Chan v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 677, February 26, 1997; Benitez v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 243, January 16, 1997; Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 299, December 4, 1996; Imperial v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 65, July 17, 1996.]

True, there are instances when this Court may review factual issues,15 [See Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997.] but petitioner has failed to demonstrate why his case falls under any of them. There is no contrariety between the findings of the trial court and those of the CA as to what and who had caused the December 17, 1984 accident. We find no reason to modify or reverse both courts’ finding that the mishap was caused by the negligence of Eduardo Diaz, the bus driver. Calrspped

In justifying the award of attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses, the appellate court held that respondents were compelled to litigate an unfounded suit because of petitioner’s negligence and lack of prudence in not verifying the facts before filing this action. In affirming the award of moral damages, it accepted the trial court’s justification that respondents had "been recklessly and without basis x x x impleaded by the plaintiff in spite of the clear language in the Traffic Investigation Report x x x submitted by Pfc. Agapito Domingo."16 [RTC Decision, p. 16; Records, p. 58.]

We agree.

Attorney’s fees may be awarded by a court if one who claims it is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect one’s interests by reason of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought.17 [Art. 2208, Civil Code.]

In this case, the records show that petitioner’s suit against respondents was manifestly unjustified. In the first place, the contact between the vehicles of respondents and of Morales was completely due to the impact of the onrushing bus. This fact is manifest in the police investigation report and, significantly, in the findings of facts of both lower courts. Sccalr

Moreover, even a cursory examination of the events would show that respondents were not even remotely the cause of the accident. Their vehicle was on the shoulder of the road because of a flat tire. In view of their emergency situation, they could not have done anything to avoid getting hit by the bus. Verily, an ordinary person has no reason to think that respondents could have caused the accident. It is difficult to imagine how petitioner could have thought so. Calrsc

More significantly, petitioner knew that respondents were not the cause of the accident. This is evident from its failure to even make a prior formal demand on them before initiating the suit. Indeed, the cause of the accident was the negligence of the DM Transit bus driver. In this light, we agree with the following findings of the trial court:

In impleading respondents, petitioner clearly acted in wanton disregard of facts that were as obvious then as they are now. To repeat, even a cursory examination of the police investigation report and other pertinent data at the time would show that there was no reason to implead respondents. The carelessness and lack of diligence of petitioner destroy its claim of good faith. Accordingly, the award of attorney’s fees should be sustained. Sppedsc

In the same vein, we affirm the award of moral damages. To sustain this award, it must be shown that (1) the claimant suffered injury, and (2) such injury sprung from any of the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. It is not enough that the claimant alleges mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like as a result of the acts of the other party. It is necessary that such acts be shown to have been tainted with bad faith or ill motive.19 [Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 413, July 14, 1997.]

In the case at bar, it has been shown that the petitioner acted in bad faith in compelling respondents to litigate an unfounded claim. As a result, Respondent Ligorio Bondad "could no longer concentrate on his job." Moreover, Pablo Bondad became sick and even suffered a mild stroke. Indeed, respondents’ anxiety is not difficult to understand. They were innocently attending to a flat tire on the shoulder of the road; the next thing they knew, they were already being blamed for an accident. Worse, they were forced to commute all the way from Laguna to Makati in order to attend the hearings. Under the circumstances of this case, the award of moral damages is justified. Sdjad

Likewise, we affirm the award of exemplary damages because petitioner’s conduct needlessly dragged innocent bystanders into an unfounded litigation. Indeed, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.20 [Kierulf v. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 433, March 13, 1997.]

In sum, the Court affirms the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. The facts of this case clearly show that petitioner was motivated by bad faith in impleading respondents. Indeed, a person’s right to litigate, as a rule, should not be penalized. This right, however, must be exercised in good faith.21 [ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 572, January 21, 1999; "J" Marketing Corp. v. Sia, Jr., 285 SCRA 580, January 29, 1998; Saba v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 50, August 24, 1990.]

One final note. Respondents pray that the amount of actual, moral and exemplary damages awarded by the trial court be reinstated.22 [Respondents’ Memorandum, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 65-66.] We cannot do so in this case because they did not appeal the CA Decision. Jurisprudentially, they are deemed to be satisfied with it and thus cannot be allowed to attack it belatedly in their Memorandum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Double costs against petitioner. Misact

Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., abroad-on official business. Acctmis