For review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is the decision1 [Rollo, pp. 29-35.] of the Court of Appeals dated May 12, 1998 in CA-G.R. No. 17883, which affirmed the joint judgment2 [Id. at 38-44.] rendered on October 20, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 41, in Criminal Cases Nos. 6929, 6940, 6941, 6942, and 6943, finding petitioner guilty of violating Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Also for review is the appellate court’s resolution dated August 15, 1998, denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Xlaw

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Petitioner Paulino Villanueva was a finance officer of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police (now Philippine National Police). He occasionally dabbled in money-lending. Private complainant below, Carmencita S. Rafer, was his neighbor. She was married to an overseas worker and had some extra cash available for investment. On March 1989, petitioner issued SOLIDBANK (Daet Branch) Check No. PA-0145244, postdated September 30, 1989, in the amount to P50,000.00 payable to Carmencita Rafer. That same month, petitioner issued SOLIDBANK (Daet Branch) Check No. PA-0145247 postdated September 30, 1989, for P52,000.00 payable to the spouses Jesus and Carmencita Rafer. The following month, petitioner again issued SOLIDBANK (Daet Branch) Check No. PA-0145246, postdated October 31, 1989, payable to the Rafer couple in the sum of P100,000.00. Two months later, petitioner made out two more checks payable to Carmencita Rafer, i.e. SOLIDBANK (Daet Branch) Check No. PA-0145258, postdated December 30, 1989, for P20,000.00 and SOLIDBANK (Daet Branch) Check No. PA-0139884, postdated December 31, 1989, in the amount of P75,000.00. Xsc

On February 22 and 23, 1990, Carmencita Rafer tried to encash the five checks issued by petitioner at the Daet branch of Solidbank. The said checks were dishonored and stamped "Account Closed." Rafer then repeatedly demanded that petitioner make good the value of the dishonored checks, but petitioner refused. She then complained, and the Prosecutor charged petitioner in five informations for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, the Bouncing Checks Law.

The information in Criminal Case No. 6929 reads: Scmis

The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 6940 to 6943, inclusive, were similarly worded as in Criminal Case No. 6929, except as to the dates, check numbers, and amounts involved. The cases were then consolidated and jointly tried. Missc

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "Not Guilty" to all five charges.

Private complainant argued that the dishonored checks were meant to be the payments of various loans extended by her to petitioner. Petitioner, in turn, did not deny having drawn the checks subject of the offense, but raised the defense that:

On October 20, 1994, the trial court rendered a joint judgment, which found the petitioner guilty on all five counts. The fallo of said judgment reads:

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. In affirming the trial court’s judgment in toto, the appellate court held: Jospped

Petitioner then belatedly moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court denied the same on August 15, 1998. The Court of Appeals resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration noted: Sppedjo

Hence, the instant petition relying on the following grounds:

The principal issues before us are: Miso

We will now resolve these issues seriatim. Petitioner contends firstly that he received the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the joint judgment of the trial court on May 18, 1998. At that time, his counsel had already withdrawn from the case. After some difficulty in getting a new lawyer, petitioner then hired Atty. Silverio L. Ibay, Jr., as his new counsel de parte. The latter filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration on June 2, 1998, which was the deadline for filing petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The Motion for Reconsideration was belatedly filed on June 11, 1998. It was denied by the Court of Appeals for having been filed out of time. Petitioner contends that this procedural blunder by his lawyer, in effect, violated his constitutional right to counsel.8 [Const. art. III, sec. 14 (2).] Petitioner now asks us to apply our ruling in De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 171 (1996), where we held that an accused may not be penalized for the costly importunings of his lawyer. Nexold

We are, however, unable to agree with petitioner’s contention. The records show petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice in the trial court, and also by counsel de parte before the Court of Appeals. When his new lawyer filed his motion for reconsideration out of time, there was no violation of petitioner’s right to counsel. The constitutional right to counsel is not violated where a member of the Bar represents petitioner.9 [People v. Sesbreño, G.R. No. 121764, September 9, 1999 reiterating Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988).]

Further, a client is bound by the acts of his counsel.10 [People v. Hernandez, 260 SCRA 25, 38 (1996) citing People v. Ravelo, 202 SCRA 655 (1991).] The rule extends even to the mistakes and negligence committed by the latter, except only when such mistakes or neglect would result in serious injustice to the client. In our view, petitioner here has failed to present any cogent reason why this Court should find an exception in his case. There is no showing that Atty. Ibay was so grossly incompetent or so grossly negligent when he filed a tardy motion for reconsideration on petitioner’s behalf. In fact, it could be said petitioner was the one who should be faulted, having hired Atty. Ibay when the period to move for reconsideration had run out. A party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect.11 [Macapagal v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 491, 502 (1997).] Manikx

With respect to the second issue, petitioner insists that private complainant’s affidavit of desistance dated May 14, 1998 is newly discovered evidence which can tip the scales in his favor if a new trial were to be granted.

We cannot sustain petitioner’s contention. The requisites for newly discovered evidence as a ground for a new trial are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial with reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment.12 [Amper v. Sandiganbayan, 279 SCRA 434, 441-442 (1997).]

In the instant case, private complainant executed her Affidavit of Desistance only on May 14, 1998 or 6 years after her testimony and after the Court of Appeals had affirmed the trial court’s decision and had denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. It is settled that affidavits of recantation made by a witness after the conviction of the accused deserve only scant consideration.13 [Molina v. People, 259 SCRA 138, 157 (1996).] Moreover, there is nothing in said affidavit, which would support a different conclusion. The third requisite is, therefore, lacking. The Court of Appeals, thus, committed no reversible error in refusing to treat said desistance as newly discovered evidence to warrant a new trial. To hold otherwise would put no end to litigation as every accused could simply wrangle an affidavit of desistance from a principal witness to seek a new trial or to prolong one. Maniks

With respect to the third issue, petitioner charges the Court of Appeals with manifest error in affirming his conviction since his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He insists that since the checks drawn by petitioner were made not to apply for account or for value but merely to provide his wife with reasons to transact with private complainant below, B.P. Blg. 22 should not have applied to him.

The elements of the offense penalized under B.P. Blg. 22, are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (2) the knowledge of the marker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.14 [Idos v. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 194, 204 (1998).]

In the instant case, it is undisputed that petitioner issued the five bouncing checks to private complainant. With respect to the first element of the offense, the Court of Appeals found: Manikan

With respect to the second element of the offense, the Court of Appeals said:

Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not, as a general rule, reviewable by the Supreme Court in petitions for certiorari under Rule 45, the exception being only when the findings of the appellate court are at variance with those of the trial court.17 [Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 673, 682 (1998); Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, 364 (1996).] In the instant case, it is to be noted that the appellate court confirmed the factual findings of the trial court. The facts thus established are now conclusive upon this Court.

Respecting the third element of the offense, it is undisputed that the checks in question were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

Given the foregoing circumstances, the inescapable conclusion is that the prosecution has overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused and, consequently, has proved petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR 17883 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.