I understand that this is an appeal by an employer from a decision holding it sudsidiarily liable with the driver. The driver’s appeal from the judgment of conviction was dismissed because the driver jumped bail. Hence, the decision in the criminal case insofar as the criminal liability is concerned is already firm and final. Accordingly, for this reason alone we cannot modify the decision as to him. The modifications introduced in the ponencia is very substantial for it deletes the award of indemnity.

Also, the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424- the action for damages based on quasi-delict – did not appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the case. That decision had long become final and executory.

Since there was no appeal from the dismissal of the civil case to the Court of Appeals, it logically follows that it was not brought to that Court. Obviously, too, it was never brought to our jurisdiction. Accordingly, there is nothing to remand to the court of origin for further proceedings.

I believe that we cannot even suspend the rules to accommodate the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424. Such suspension would do much violence to the rules and open floodgates to dangerous precedents.

The simple solution in this case is to sustain the judgment of the trial court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, holding petitioner, as employer of the offending driver, subsidiarily liable for the damages adjudged.

It is settled that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (Article 100, Revised Penal Code). Employers are subsidiarily civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees. (Article 103, id.).

The aggrieved parties in criminal cases may pursue their claims for damages either as delictual damages, or quasi-delictual damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which the Code considers as "entirely distinct and separate from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Revised Penal Code." However, article 2177 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "the plaintiffs cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."

The offended parties filed a separate action for damages under Article 2176. It must, however, be pointed out that, as can be gathered from the ponencia, only petitioner was made as defendant in that civil case. Part of the first paragraph of page three of the ponencia reads:

On November 29, 1989, the offended parties actually filed with the Regional Trial Court, Isabela, Branch 19, Cauayan, a complaint against petiitoner Rafael Reyes Trucking corporation, as employer of driver Romeo Dunca y de Tumol, based on quasi-delicts.

Obviously then there was no separate civil action for damages arising from the felony. It was then deemed impliedly instituted in the criminal action against the driver.

The civil case against petitioner alone was consolidated with the criminal case where the civil aspect arising from the delict was impliedly instituted against the driver. Hence, there was no legal obstacle for the trial court to award damages therein, such as indemnity for the death, etc. and pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, to make petitioner subsidiarily liable for the awards. Considering, however, the abovestated proscription in article 2177 of the Civil Code, the trial court had dismissed the civil case for damages against petitioner, which was already made subsidiarily liable for the damages in the criminal case.

To recapitulate, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals committed no error.

I vote to DENY the petition.