Appellant REYNALDO BAGO was charged with qualified theft, while his co-accused ARMANDO CAPARAS and RODOLFO ONGSECO were charged with simple theft, in an Information1 [Original Records, p. 1.] which reads:

Appellant and his co-accused pled not guilty. Trial ensued.

Appellant was an employee of Azkcon Metal Industries (Azkcon for brevity) from 1988 to 1992. He started working as a factory worker and later became a machine operator and a truck helper. From 1991 to 1992, he served as team leader at the cutting department under the supervision of Material Comptroller WILLIAM HILO who kept track of all the materials coming in and going out of the company’s plant in Kalookan City.2 [TSN, Reynaldo Bago, March 16, 1993, pp. 3-4; July 19, 1993, pp. 4 and 7.]

Azkcon has a business arrangement with Power Construction Supply Company (Power Construction) whereby Azkcon buys cold rolled sheets from the latter. These cold rolled sheets are also cut by Power Construction for a fee and Azkcon converts them into drums or containers. Appellant’s job was to go to Power Construction’s establishment in Quezon City to oversee the cutting of the cold rolled sheets and ensure their delivery to Azkcon using the trucks sent by Hilo.3 [TSN, William Hilo, August 24, 1992, pp. 18-19; TSN, Reynaldo Bago, March 16, 1993, pp. 5-8.]

On April 21, 1992, appellant and his co-workers4 [Danilo Baylosis and Candido Querobin.] went to Power Construction and loaded two cold rolled sheets in a truck owned by Azkcon.5 [TSN, Jun Gavaran, September 7, 1992, pp. 8-9.] Before entering the premises of Azkcon, appellant presented to security guard RUBEN DE LA CRUZ MANANGAN two receipts,6 [Exhibits "A" and "B". TSN, Ruben De La Cruz, August 18, 1992, pp. 3-4.] both dated April 21, 1992, covering the cold rolled sheets from Power Construction. Manangan inspected the contents of the truck. As everything was accounted for, Manangan stamped on the two receipts covering the materials. Appellant then presented a third receipt,7 [Exhibit "C".] with Invoice No. 51111, dated March 23, 1992, for stamping. Manangan likewise stamped the third receipt. As the third receipt bore a different date, Manangan asked appellant if the materials covered by said receipt were in the truck. Appellant replied that the materials had long been delivered. Manangan did not investigate further but later reported the incident to the Chief of Security Department, AFLOR ONG. Ong checked the third receipt and when he failed to find the materials listed thereon, he reported to Hilo.8 [TSN, Ruben Manangan, August 18, 1992, pp. 3-8, 11-15; TSN, Aflor Ong, August 18, 1992, pp. 20-27.]

Upon receipt of the report, Hilo discreetly conducted a more in-depth investigation. He found out that the materials covered by the third receipt, worth P192,000.00, were not delivered to Azkcon. He checked the third receipt and the gate pass of Power Construction for March 23, 1992 - the date of the questioned transaction - and discovered that the truck used by appellant on said date did not belong to Azkcon. It also turned out that the subject materials had already been paid for by Azkcon.9 [TSN, William Hilo, August 24, 1992, pp. 3-10, 14-17.]

Power Construction’s security guard, JUN GAVARAN, confirmed that on March 23, 1992, appellant and his companions picked up cold rolled sheets from Power Construction and loaded them in a truck. The truck did not bear the logo of Azkcon. Gavaran noted on a ledger that the truck came at 2:15 p.m. and left at 3:35 p.m.

Hilo did not immediately report the matter to his superior. He chose to wait for appellant to commit a similar misdemeanor and catch him red-handed. He waited in vain. He then decided to inform his superiors about the theft in May 1992. Hilo was directed to report the theft and file a complaint with the police authorities.

A police team, led by SPO3 ALFREDO ALFARO, investigated appellant at Azkcon. Appellant insisted that the materials covered by the third receipt had been delivered to Azkcon. The investigation of appellant continued at the police station. PO3 Andres Balod interrogated appellant. Appellant asked for a lawyer and was brought to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where he was assisted by Atty. Florimond C. Rous. Atty. Rous talked to him and inquired if he was willing to give a statement to the police. The interrogation then proceeded and appellant admitted his participation in the theft. He disclosed that his cohorts on May 23, 1992 were ARMANDO CAPARAS and RODOLFO ONGSECO, former employees of Azkcon. He revealed that they usually loaded the stolen materials in a truck rented by Caparas and Ongseco. He received P10,000 to P35,00010 [TSN, Andres Balod, September 7, 1992, pp. 25-28.] for his participation in the different thefts.11 [TSN, Andres Balod, September 7, 1992, pp. 25-28.] Appellant affixed his signature on the written statement.12 [Id., pp. 48-49.] After the investigation, PO3 Balod referred the case to Fiscal Paragua. Â h Y

The next day, the police went to Malinta, Valenzuela and apprehended accused Caparas and Ongseco. It was appellant who pointed out the residence of Caparas and Ongseco to the police. The two identified a certain Chua as the alleged buyer of the stolen goods. The police invited Chua for investigation. Inexplicably, the investigation of Chua was not reduced to writing.13 [TSN, Alfredo Alfaro, August 10, 1992, pp. 4-6, 10-13.]

Appellant denied participation in the crime charged. He described his job as team leader at the cutting department of Azkcon. He said that Hilo would order him to proceed to Power Construction Supply to oversee the cutting and procurement of the materials needed by Azkcon. Hilo would then instruct him to wait for his call and the arrival of their truck at Power Construction Supply. They would usually use Azkcon’s trucks, but at other times, Hilo would rent trucks from others.14 [TSN, Reynaldo Bago, March 16, 1993, pp. 5-8; July 19, 1993, pp. 36-37.]

As soon as the truck would arrive at the premises of the supplier, the driver would ask for appellant. He would then load the materials in the truck and would show the receipts covering the materials to the security guard of Power Construction Supply for stamping. The materials inside the truck would be counterchecked against the quantity and quality stated in the receipts. Appellant would then return to Azkcon usually at about 4:00 p.m. Thus, he would mainly stay at the supplier’s premises to oversee the cutting of the cold rolled sheets.15 [TSN, Reynaldo Bago, March 16, 1993, pp. 5-8; July 19, 1993, pp. 4-10, 14, 20.]

Appellant claimed he does not know prosecution witness Jun Gavaran, the security guard of Philippine Construction Supply. He also denied knowing accused Caparas and Ongseco. Allegedly, he saw them for the first time at the police station. He admitted knowing prosecution witnesses Manangan and Ong. He acknowledged that he had no quarrel with Gavaran, Manangan and Ong.16 [TSN, Reynaldo Bago, July 19, 1993, pp. 14, 34-35.]

On May 21, 1992, four (4) policemen in civilian clothes arrested him without a warrant while working in Azkcon. They told him that Hilo filed a complaint against him. He was detained at the La Loma police station. Hilo came and pointed him as the one responsible for the theft but without informing him what he stole. Upon orders of Hilo, the policemen started to beat him. They forced him to admit the crime. They also compelled him to give a statement but he refused.17 [TSN, Reynaldo Bago, March 16, 1993, pp. 9-13.]

The next day, the policemen and Hilo brought him to Valenzuela. Hilo indicated to the policemen the residence of accused Caparas and Ongseco. That was the first time he saw his co-accused.18 [TSN, Reynaldo Bago, September 9, 1993, pp. 6-7.]

Then, the policemen forced appellant to go to the IBP office in Quezon City. They gave him Atty. Rous as counsel although he insisted on hiring his own counsel. Atty. Rous never conferred with him. No investigation was conducted at the IBP. The police did not ask him a single question. Without reading his prepared statement, he signed it as the police threatened to harm him. He acknowledged his signatures on the invoices marked as Exhibits "A" to "D",19 [Invoice Nos. 51429, 51428, 51111 (Customer’s Copy) and 51111 (Gate Pass), Original Records, pp. 90-93.] but claimed he could not recall the circumstances under which he signed them.20 [TSN, Reynaldo Bago, March 16, 1993, pp. 13-19; September 9, 1993, p. 4.]

After seven (7) days at the La Loma police station, he was taken to the Fiscal’s Office in Quezon City. The inquest fiscal did not talk to him. He was asked about the voluntariness of his signature in his extra-judicial confession.21 [Exhibit "K"; Original Records, pp. 101-102.]

Thereafter, he was brought back to the station.22 [TSN, Reynaldo Bago, September 9, 1993, pp. 9-12.]

Appellant’s father, PABLO BAGO, testified that on June 15, 1992, he went to the NBI to seek protection for his son as they were receiving threats from Hilo and police officers Balod and Alfaro. Days later, Hilo, Alfaro and Balod went to his house in Quezon City looking for appellant. Hilo warned that appellant should admit the crime lest something untoward would happen to him.23 [TSN, Pablo Bago, September 13, 1993, pp. 5-7.] Again, after his son’s arraignment, a certain Col. Hernandez visited their house and insisted on taking appellant to Azkcon. Pablo refused, arguing that the case had already been filed in court.24 [Id., pp. 7-9.] On another occasion, Col. Hernandez and his lady friend dropped by his house and convinced him and his son to talk to Mr. King, the owner of Azkcon. During their meeting, Mr. King allegedly told Pablo that he knew that appellant was innocent but asked him to testify against the persons responsible for the crime. Pablo replied that they would think about the proposal.25 [TSN, Pablo Bago, September 13, 1993, pp. 10-14.] Mr. King’s lawyer, Atty. Capistrano, also gave him the same advice. Atty. Capistrano requested them to go to his office where appellant could execute a statement. Instead of going there, Pablo and the appellant proceeded to the office of appellant’s lawyer.26 [Id., pp. 15, 20.]

Allegedly, appellant was maltreated while in the custody of the police. Pablo claimed that he reported the physical abuse to the NBI.27 [Id., pp. 27-28.]

Prosecution’s rebuttal witness ATTY. FLORIMUND C. ROUS, free legal aid counsel of IBP, testified that on May 22, 1992, appellant was brought to their office for the execution of his extra-judicial confession. As a matter of procedure, he first examined the body of appellant to determine any sign of physical abuse or maltreatment while the latter was in police custody. Finding none, he inquired from appellant whether he was willing to confess to the commission of the theft. Beforehand, he already informed appellant of the consequence of his confession, i.e., that it could be used against him. Nonetheless, appellant affirmed his willingness to execute a written confession. Thus, the policeman proceeded to take the statement of appellant. Appellant signed his extrajudicial confession28 [Exhibit "K"; TSN, Atty. Florimund Rous, November 29, 1993, pp. 6-14.] in his (Atty. Rous’) presence.

Rebuttal witness ATTY. MELANIO CAPISTRANO testified that he was Azkcon’s legal counsel. He confirmed that a conference was held at Azkcon premises in connection with the theft. Present were appellant, Pablo Bago, Mr. King and a former employee of Azkcon. Due to the complexity of the modus operandi, Mr. King suspected that appellant had other companions in committing the theft. Mr. King then informed him that appellant had agreed to turn state witness. Appellant confessed that his supervisor William Hilo, a certain Severino Encarnacion and his co-accused Ongseco and Caparas took part in the heist. Allegedly, Encarnacion was the brains behind the theft; Hilo took care of the operations on the Azkcon side, while Ongseco and Caparas took care of the procurement of the stolen goods. Atty. Capistrano expressed reservations about the involvement of Hilo as he was the one who reported the theft to the management. After the conference, he advised appellant to consult his own lawyer and execute a statement so he could determine if they would use appellant as a state witness. Prior to his arraignment, appellant was told that he should decide whether he wanted to be a state witness. In their next scheduled meeting, appellant and his lawyer, Atty. Jambora, failed to appear.29 [TSN, Atty. Melanio Capistrano, April 25, 1994, pp. 7-18.]

On sur-rebuttal, Pablo Bago insisted that on July 1992, Col. Hernandez went to Peñaranda, Nueva Ecija and took pictures of his house. Col. Hernandez invited him and appellant to go to Azkcon. They refused as appellant had already posted bail at that time. Atty. Capistrano, on the other hand, insisted that appellant should name the other employees involved in the theft so that they could be dismissed from the company.30 [TSN, Pablo Bago, August 1, 1994, pp. 4-9.]

On April 26, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City31 [Branch 92.] convicted appellant of qualified theft. Accused Caparas and Ongseco were acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The dispositive portion of the decision32 [Rollo, pp. 39-62. Penned by Presiding Judge Juan Q. Enriquez.] reads:

Appellant moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s decision. The motion was denied for lack of merit,33 [Order dated August 15, 1995, Original Records, pp. 291-294.] although the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision was amended, thus:

The Appellant’s Brief raises two issues, to wit: Misoedpâ

We affirm with modification.

Appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove even by circumstantial evidence that he asported the cold rolled sheets in question. He asserts that these materials were delivered to Azkcon as evidenced by the receipt34 [Exhibit "C".] duly stamped by the guard on duty. He states:

Appellant also contends that his task was to oversee the delivery of the materials from their supplier to Azkcon. Allegedly, it was erroneous to conclude that he stole the materials just because they could not be found in its premises as he was not responsible for any material lost therein.

Lastly, appellant belittles the documents showing that the truck he used in taking out the materials from Power Construction on March 23, 1992 did not belong to Azkcon. He claims that said documents had no bearing on his culpability. Scjuris

We reject these contentions. Mis-edp

First. Appellant, in effect, assails the testimony of Ruben Manangan, the security guard who stamped the receipt marked as Exhibit "C", on the ground that the receipt itself shows that the materials were delivered to Azkcon. Appellant argues that the receipt is the best evidence and should be given more credence than Manangan’s testimony. Appellant’s argument is bereft of merit for Manangan’s testimony is corroborated by another witness, William Hilo, Material Comptroller of Azkcon who kept track of all materials coming in and going out of Azkcon’s plant. He testified that on April 21, 1992, he received three (3) receipts but only two (2) materials were delivered to Azkcon’s premises. The receipt marked as Exhibit "C" covered the missing materials. Manangan’s testimony is further corroborated by two (2) pieces of documentary evidence: first, by Power Construction Supply Co. Gatepass Invoice No. 51111 dated March 22, 199236 [Exhibit "D".] which shows that the materials covered by Exhibit "C" were taken out by appellant from the premises of Power Construction Supply on March 23, 1992, about a month before the receipt was stamped; and second, by a document from Power Construction Supply dated March 23, 1992 containing information about the truck used in pulling out the materials from Power Construction Supply on said date. The truck bore license plate no. PRC-513 and was not owned by Azkcon. The truck belonged to a certain Ruel Fernando who had no contractual relation with Azkcon and said vehicle was not to be used to take out materials from Power Construction Supply. In view of these corroborations, we hold that the trial court did not err in giving credence to Manangan’s testimony despite the receipt. Esä m

Appellant can not rely on the best evidence rule which states: Msesm

The rule cannot be invoked unless the content of a writing is the subject of judicial inquiry, in which case, the best evidence is the original writing itself. The rule pertains to the admissibility of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a document. In the case at bar, no secondary evidence is offered to prove the content of a document. What is being questioned by appellant is the weight given by the trial court to the testimony of Manangan over the receipt which on its face shows that the materials in question were delivered to Azkcon’s premises. Clearly, the best evidence rule finds no application on this issue. Esâ msc

Second. It is well settled that before conviction can be based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain of events which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of others, as the author of the crime.38 [People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995); People vs. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995).] Thus, the following requisites must be met: 1) there must be more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.39 [People vs. Cadevida, et al., 219 SCRA 218 (1993).]

In the case at bar, the trial court convicted the appellant based on this chain of events: Courtä

The trial court concluded that the foregoing circumstances lead to a reasonable conclusion that appellant asported the materials covered by Exhibit "C".

We agree. Misact

Appellant cannot rely on the fact that the third receipt was duly stamped by security guard Ruben Manangan on April 21, 1992. Manangan explained well why he stamped the receipt. He said:40 [TSN, Ruben Manangan, August 18, 1992, pp. 3-5, 13-14.]

x x x x x x x x x

x x x x x x x x x

x x x x x x x x x

x x x x x x x x x

x x x x x x x x x

x x x x x x x x x

Prosecution witness Aflor Ong testified as follows:43 [TSN, Aflor Ong, August 18, 1992, pp. 20-25.]

x x x x x x x x x

The trial court correctly found that appellant was a trusted employee of Azkcon. He was in-charge of overseeing the cutting of the materials at Power Construction and ensuring their delivery to Azkcon. Due to this trust, he succeeded in withdrawing from the said supplier the cold rolled sheets covered by Exhibits "A" and "B" dated April 21, 1992 and Exhibit "C" (Invoice No. 51111), dated March 23, 1992. Appellant signed these receipts to signify that he obtained the materials from the supplier. However, only the materials covered by Exhibits "A" and "B" were delivered to Azkcon on April 21, 1992. Those covered by Exhibit "C" were not delivered. Significantly, the materials procured on April 21, 1992 were delivered that same day, as shown by the stamp marks on Exhibits "A" and "B". In contrast, the materials he took from the supplier on March 23, 1992 could not be found in the premises of Azkcon and there was no evidence that he delivered them on said date or on any other day thereafter. Inexplicably, appellant presented the third receipt (Invoice No. 51111) dated March 23, 1992 for stamping only on April 21, 1992. The reasonable conclusion is that he asported the materials covered by Exhibit "C".

Clearly, all the elements of theft were established, to wit: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things.45 [Article 308, Revised Penal Code. "Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent. "] As the theft was committed with grave abuse of confidence, appellant is guilty of qualified theft.

Third. We now come to the correctness of the penalty imposed on appellant.

The trial court sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General opined that the penalty was erroneous. It noted that:

x x x x x x x x x

We disagree.

Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code provides the penalty for simple theft. It reads:

The value of the property stolen by appellant was P194,448.00. Under Article 309, the basic penalty is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the maximum period since the value of the stolen goods exceeded P22,000.00. To determine the additional years of imprisonment prescribed in Article 309 (1), we have to deduct the amount of P22,000.00, thus leaving the amount of P172,448.00. Next, the net amount should be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount below P10,000.00. Thus, seventeen (17) years must be added to the basic penalty of the maximum period of prision mayor minimum and medium periods.46 [Cf. People vs. Pabalan, 262 SCRA 574, 591 (1996).] The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods has a range of six years (6) and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Its maximum period is eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years, and the incremental penalty is seventeen (17) years. Had appellant committed simple theft, the penalty should have been twenty years of reclusion temporal, the maximum penalty allowable under Article 309, subject to the Indeterminate Sentence Law. Slxmis

Considering that the theft is qualified by grave abuse of confidence, the penalty is two degrees higher than that specified under Article 309.47 [Article 310, Revised Penal Code provides: "Qualified Theft.-The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed … with grave abuse of confidence …"] In the case of People vs. Cañales,48 [297 SCRA 667, 676-678 (1998).] we were confronted with the same issue of determining how the penalty under Article 309 should be increased by two degrees. In said case, we adopted the disquisition of the appellate court, thus: Slxsc

This reiterated our ruling in People vs. Reyes,49 [People vs. Reyes, 212 SCRA 402, 411-412 (1992).] where we held: Mesmä

In accord with the foregoing, we hold that appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of death under Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code. Missdaa

Fourth. As regards the grant of actual damages, the rule is that actual damages cannot be allowed unless supported by evidence in the record.51 [People vs. Nialda, 289 SCRA 521 (1998).] William Hilo testified that the value of the missing cold rolled sheets was P192,000.00 and the incurred cutting cost was P2,448.00, for a total value of P194,448.00.52 [TSN, William Hilo, August 24, 1992, p. 17.] Thus, the award for actual damages must be reduced by P417.00.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the April 26, 1995 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 92), in Criminal Case No. Q-92-30833, as amended by the Order dated August 15, 1995, is AFFIRMED subject to the modification that the actual damages is reduced to P194,448.00. Kycalrâ

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.