MENDOZA, J., concurring in the judgment: ExÓ sm

Petitioner has no cause of action for prohibition or mandamus against respondents. Consistent with his claim that P.D. No. 1315 is unconstitutional, he cannot ask the NHA to relocate the 24 squatter families occupying Lot Nos. 3603, 3605, and 3607. For such power is to be exercised by the NHA only with respect to lands acquired by the government and placed under the administration of NHA. Thus, after declaring the lots enumerated therein as "expropriated," §1 of P.D. No. 1315 directs the NHA "to immediately take possession, control and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition of their improvements." Indeed, if P.D. No. 1315 is valid, the relocation of the squatters is no concern of petitioner. In such case, the distribution of the land to the squatters as beneficiaries of the law should in fact be undertaken.

Instead, what petitioner should do is to bring an action for ejectment against the squatters and, as an incident thereof, raise in issue the constitutional validity of P.D. No. 1315, since the squatters claim the right to occupy petitioner’s land by virtue of this Decree.

The majority, echoing the Solicitor General’s warning, argues that to allow petitioner to question the validity of P.D. No. 1315 many years after its promulgation, could give rise to legal and social complications. Apparently, they refer to the fact that other lots have been acquired by the government by virtue of P.D. No. 1315. I do not share this dire and apocalyptic view. As far back as 1960, this Court in Alfonso v. Pasay City1 [106 Phil. 1017 (1960). For an even earlier case, see Herrera v. Auditor General, 102 Phil. 875 (1958)] already ruled that if property is taken by the government without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and is devoted to public use, such as a road, after many years, the property owner may no longer bring an action for recovery of his land but may simply demand payment of just compensation for his land. This ruling was reiterated in other cases2 [Ministerio v. Court of First Instance, 40 SCRA 464 (1971); Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360 (1972)] and is now the settled doctrine on this matter.

The court, in an ejectment case, may accordingly pass upon the constitutionality of P.D. No. 1315 without in the least placing in doubt the validity of the previous acquisitions by the government. As already noted, P.D. No. 1315 declares petitioner’s land expropriated. Whether this can be done, or whether under the ruling in Manotok v. NHA3 [150 SCRA 89 (1987)], such expropriation by legislative fiat constitutes an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law, is a question which must be litigated in such action. Kyleä

Petitioner’s cause of action, if any, is against those occupying his properties and the appropriate vehicle for challenging the validity of P.D. No. 1315 is to do so in an ejectment case, since the squatters justify their occupation of the lots in question as beneficiaries of the Decree. On the other hand, beyond upholding the squatters’ right under the Decree, the NHA has done nothing that is remediable by prohibition and/or mandamus.

I vote to deny the petition for review and to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the reasons herein stated.