GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Supr-eme

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals1 [15th Division, Justices Gloria c. Paras, Bonifacio A. Cacdac, and Serafin V.C. Guingona.] in CA-G.R. No. 07512 affirming the decision of Branch 111of the Regional Trial Court2 [Per Judge Sofronio G. Sayo.] of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 85-86-94-P convicting Wilma Barrameda of the crime of estafa under article 315, par. 1(B) of the Revised Penal Code.

The information3 [Records, p. ], filed on September 5, 1985, reads as follows:

Accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge on April 21, 19864 [Records, p. 46.] and thereafter trial on the merits ensued.

The facts of the case as set out in the People’s Brief and quoted in toto by the Court of appeals are as follows:

For her part, accused-petitioner denied ever having received the amount of US$1,400.00 and 400,000.00 yen from private complainant Lolita Watanabe intended for her mother. Instead, she alleged in substance that before she left for Japan for the Philippines on November 27, 1984, private complainant visited her and requested her to bring two boxes of assorted goods for her parent. Accused-petitioner brought the two boxes to the airport but she was not able to bring them to the Philippines as these were excess baggage and private complainant did not give her money for their freight charges. Instead, she called the Guiking couple, where private complainant was staying, and requested them to inform the latter that the two boxes were left at the airport. As to the motive behind the filing of the case against her, accused-petitioner opined that her husband, from whom she has separated, must have connived with his sister Papiniana Paguinto and Lolita Watanabe in filing the case against her to prevent her from leaving the Philippines for Japan. Esmsc

On 25 May 1989, the trial court rendered the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which states as follows:

This decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals on July 13, 1989 wherein accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:

On 15 August 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision affirming in toto the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court.5 [Rollo, pp. 38-44.] On 6 September 1990, accused-appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision which was however denied in a Resolution dated November 28, 1990.6 [Rollo, p. 46-47.]

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari wherein accused-appellant claims that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed in toto the decision of the regional trial court knowing fully well that the said decision is contrary to law and jurisprudence.7 [Rollo, p. 6.] In support, accused-petitioner reiterates the assignment of errors she raised during the proceedings in the appellate court. Esmso

We find for the respondents.

In her petition, accused-petitioner first questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City in taking cognizance of the case. Accused-petitioner alleges that not a single element of the crime occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. As such, the complaint should have been filed in Japan, where the money was allegedly turned-over to accused-petitioner, or in San Pedro, Laguna, where Papiniana Paguinto allegedly demanded the delivery of the money. Accused-appellant argues further that the crime of estafa did not even reach its incipient stage because no demand was ever made by the offended party.

The contentions of accused-petitioner are misplaced.

Accused-petitioner was charged with the crime of estafa through misappropriation or conversion as defined in and penalized under paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code.8 [Revised Penal Code, Art. 315, par. 1 (b) Esmmis

"By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal property received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property;"] The elements of the said crime are: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission of for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denail is to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.9 [Fontanilla vs. People, 258 SCRA 460; Manahan, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202.]

In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or where any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.10 [People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77.] In the case at bench, if one of these elements is proven to have occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay, then the said court made a valid exercise of its jurisdiction. Esm

On this point, respondent Court of Appelas correctly ruled that a demand was made by the mother of the private complainant at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport ("NAIA"), which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. Thus:

It must be noted that the specific word "demand" need not be used to show that demand had indeed been made upon the person charged of the offense. A query as to the whereabouts of the money, such as the one proven in the case at bench, is tantamount to a demand.12 [Tubb vs. People, 101 Phil. 114.]

Thus, the trial court validly exercised its jurisdiction over the crime charged against accused-petitioner inasmuch as one of the elements of estafa, that of demand, occurred within its territorial jurisdiction.

Accused-petitioner next alleges that the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant on the ground that the prosecution was not able to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.13 [Rollo, p. 15.] In support, accused-petitioner faults the trial court in appreciating and giving credence to the evidence, both oral and documentary, presented by the prosecution.

On the issue of credibility of witnesses, it is axiomatic that appellate courts will usually not disturb the findings of the trial court, the latter being in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of substance and value had been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.14 [People vs. Flores, 252 SCRA 31.] S-jcj

On this point, we find no error in the conclusion of the trial court that accused-petitioner indeed received the amount of US$1,400.00 and 400,000 yen from the private complainant for delivery to the latter’s mother, Papiniana Paguinto. In arriving at this conclusion, the trial court took into account the testimony of private complainant herself who positively declared that the amount was actually given to and received by accused-petitioner. Thus:

XXX

This claim of private complainant was strongly corroborated by the testimonies of Papiniana Paguinto, the mother of private complainant, who testified that she met accused-petitioner at the Manila International Airport on November 27, 1984 in order to get the money sent by her daughter. When the witness got to the airport, accused-petitioner embraced her and told her that private complainant sent her some money but that she had misplaced it.16 [TSN, June 25, 1984, pp. 6-10.] Accused-appellant then told her that the money might be in her baggage and so they proceeded to the house of Ruben Barrameda, private complainant’s uncle, to search for the money. They were able to go to the house of Ruben Barrameda but they decided against opening the luggage as a lot of people were present, the place being a beerhouse.17 Ibid., p. 19.] From the residence of Ruben Cabrera, accused-petitioner proceeded to her house in San Pedrom Laguna. The witness did not anymore go with her as it was getting late. Nevertheless, accused-petitioner promised her that she would bring the money the following day. When accused-petitioner failed to bring the money, the witness and her husband proceeded accused-petitioner’s residence to demand for the money. However, they were informed by accused-petitioner that she still had not found the money entrusted to her.18 [Ibid., pp. 13-14.]

Ruben Barrameda, likewise testified and he corroborated the version of the events of the prosecution. He testified that on November 26, 1984, her niece, the private complainant, called him up from Japan and requested that he fetch her mother, witness Papiniana Paguinto.19 [TSN. August 11, 1986, pp. 15-16.] Upon fetching Paguinto from her house, they immediately called up private complainant in Japan. He was beside Paguinto during the whole telephone conversation and he overheard that the private complainant was sending money to Paguinto.20 [Ibid., pp. 18-21.] After the phone conversation, Papiniana Paguinto also told him that the money would be sent through accused-appellant Wilma Barrameda who would be arriving the following day.21 [Ibid., p. 23.] The following day, on November 27, 1984, accused-appellant and Papiniana Paguinto went to his house in order to call private complainant. Paguinto was able to talk with private complainant who told her that she wanted to speak with accused-appellant.22 [Ibid., pp. 26-30.] He then overheard accused-appellant tell private complainant not to worry as the money might have been misplaced in her luggage.23 [Ibid., p. 31.] Mis-oedp

The receipt of the misappropriated amount was further evidenced by a letter dated November 15, 198424 [Exhibit "A".] sent by private complainant to her mother through a certain "Nancy". In this letter, private complainant enclosed US$400.00 and informed her mother that she will be sending the equivalent of P50,000.00 through accused-petitioner. Likewise, the telephone calls made at Ruben Barrameda’s house regarding the receipt of the misappropriated amounts were supported by telephone bill receipts.25 [Exhibits "B", "B-1", and "B-2".]

In contrast, the trial court noted that the version of the defense as to what ranspired, as shown in the testimony of accused-appellant, "smacks of inconsistencies which render the uncorroborated testimony of the accused unworthy of belief."26 [Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 28.] As previously stated, the findings of the trial court regarding the issue of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are entitled to great respect and are accorded the highest consideration by the Supreme Court.27 [Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 542.] Furthermore, accused-petitioner’s defense is a mere denial which is a feeble defense which cannot stand against the positive testimony of eyewitnesses and by the evidence on record.28 [People vs. Flores, 252 SCRA 31.]

Accused-petitioner likewise takes exception to the admission by the trial court of the November 15, 1984 letter and the telephone bill receipts. In objecting to the admissibility of the November 15, 1984 letter, accused-petitioner argues that the letter was not properly identified by the person ("Nancy") thru whom the letter was sent.29 [Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 11.] On the other hand, the telephone bill receipts were objected to for being written in a foreign language (Japanese) with no accompanying translation. Ed-pm-is

Again, accused-petitioner’s arguments are not convincing.

A perusal of the records show that the November 15, 1984 letter was properly identified by private complainant, Lolita Watanabe, who wrote the letter30 [TSN, September 8, 1986, pp. 57-61.] and by Papiniana Paguinto, who received the same.31 [TSN, June 25, 1986, pp. 46-51.] The testimony of "Nancy", through whom the letter was allegedly sent, was not necessary for its proper identification as her testimony would be merely corroborative.

As for the telephone bill receipts, a perusal of the aforementioned documents clearly shows that the Japanese entries appearing therein have English or numerical entries which show the date, type, destination/origin, etc. From these receipts, it is evident that calls were made on November 26 and 27 to the Philippines and the party called was a cetain "Paguinto,"32 [Exhibits "B-1-1" and "B-1-2".] as stated by Ruben Barrameda in his testimony.

It must be noted, however, that these receipts were merely presented in connection with the telephone conversations between private complainant in Japan and her mother in the Philippines wherein the fact that money was sent thru accused-appellant was shown. As such, these receipts were simply supporting evidence which show that these telephone conversations were made. Hence, even if they were excluded, the fact that accused-petitioner failed to deliver tha amount in her custody to Papiniana Paguinto is amply supported by other evidence on record. Sc-jj

In sum, the prosecution has conclusively shown that accused-petitioner received money equivalent to P50,000.00 from private complainant Lolita Paguinto Watanabe, in trust and under the obligation to deliver the same to her mother, Papiniana Paguinto. The accused denied having received the said amount, which denial has been proven to be false. The denial made by accused-petitioner was to prejudice of the private-complainant and her mother. Finally, demand was made for the return of the money from accused-petitioner which she failed to do.

Under these circumstances, accused-petitioner is clearly guilty of the crime of estafa through misappropriation or conversion as penalized under Article 315, paragraph 1(B) of the Revised Penal Code which states as follows:

The Court notes, however, that the penalty imposed by the trial court is erroneous. Considering that the total amount of the fraud committed is P50,000.00, the applicable penalty is that provided in the 1st paragraph of Article 315 which states as follows:

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law33 [Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225.], if the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, such as estafa, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that precribed by the Code for the offense.34 [Ibid., Section 1.] Lex-juris

Applying the foregoing rules, the trial court correctly imposed ten (10) years of prision mayor as the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. However, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the penalty one degree lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code which is prision correcional minimum. Considering that there are no aggravating circumstances, the minimum of accused-petitioner’s indeterminate sentence should properly be two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correcional.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, th petition is DENIED and the decision of the trial court and Court of Appelas are hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the petitioner is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correcional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum. Accused-petitioner is likewise ordered to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P50,000.00 representing the amount embezzled, and to pay the costs.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima JJ., concur. 10/6/99 4:13 PM