SECOND DIVISION

Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the death of his grandfather, So Pek Giok, he had been occupying the premises for his textile business and religiously paid rent. DCCSI acceded to petitioner’s request. The lease contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed.

In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and petitioner. They also claimed damages.

After trial, the trial court ruled: ScmisÓ

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied.

On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. On motion for reconsideration, the appellate court modified the decision by reducing the award of attorney’s fees from five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) pesos.

Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following issues:

The foregoing issues involve, essentially, the correct interpretation of the applicable law on tortuous conduct, particularly unlawful interference with contract. We have to begin, obviously, with certain fundamental principles on torts and damages.

Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.6 [Custodio vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 483, 490 (1996)] One becomes liable in an action for damages for a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion is substantial, (c) the defendant’s conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general negligence rules.7 [Restatement of the Law, Torts 2d, Sec. 822.]

The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse.8 [30 Am Jur., Section 19, pp. 71 - 72; Sampaguita Pictures Inc. vs. Vasquez, et al. (Court of Appeals, 68 O.G. 7666)] ScÓ lex

A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private property.9 [74 Am Jur 2d Torts, Section 34. Interference with property rights, p. 631.] This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In the case before us, petitioner’s Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latter’s property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant case.

Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest.10 [45 Am Jur 2d Interference, Justification, Privilege Section 30. Furtherance of one’s own interests, p. 307.] One view is that, as a general rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor’s motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer’s interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection.11 [Zoby vs. American Fidelity Co. 242 Federal Reporter, 2d Series, 76, 80 (1957)] Moreover, justification for protecting one’s financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others.12 [Ibid.] It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.13 [Ibid.] Jurisä sc

As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy,14 [29 Phil 542, 549 (1915)] we held that where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one’s conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.15 [Kurtz vs. Oremland, 33 N. J. Super. 443, 111 A.2d 100; Restatement of the Law, Torts, 2d, Sec. 769.]

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him.

Section 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, "Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party." Petitioner argues that damage is an essential element of tort interference, and since the trial court and the appellate court ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorney’s fees.

It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because the extent of damages was not quantifiable. We had a similar situation in Gilchrist, where it was difficult or impossible to determine the extent of damage and there was nothing on record to serve as basis thereof. In that case we refrained from awarding damages. We believe the same conclusion applies in this case. CÓ alrsc

While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner’s interference.

Lastly, the recovery of attorney’s fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages, is allowed under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code.16 [People vs. Bergante, 286 SCRA 629, 645 (1998)] One such occasion is when the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.17 [Article 2208 (2), Civil Code of the Philippines.] But we have consistently held that the award of considerable damages should have clear factual and legal bases.18 [De la Paz, Jr. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 154 SCRA 65, 76 (1987); Rubio vs. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 488 (1986)] In connection with attorney’s fees, the award should be commensurate to the benefits that would have been derived from a favorable judgment. Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of damages by the trial court calls for appellate review such that the award if far too excessive can be reduced.19 [Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 446, 460 (1987)] This ruling applies with equal force on the award of attorney’s fees. In a long line of cases we said, "It is not sound policy to place a penalty on the right to litigate. To compel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful opponent would throw wide open the door of temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to swell the fees to undue proportions."20 [Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 159 SCRA 433, 442 (1988)] Sâ djad

Considering that the respondent corporation’s lease contract, at the time when the cause of action accrued, ran only on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find even the reduced amount of attorney’s fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still exorbitant in the light of prevailing jurisprudence.21 [Mayer Steel Pipe Corp. vs. CA, 274 SCRA 432 (1997); Fortune Express vs. CA, G.R. 119756, March 18, 1999; RCBC vs. CA, G.R. 133107, March 25, 1999; Urquiaga vs. CA, G.R. 127833, January 22, 1999.] Consequently, the amount of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) awarded by respondent appellate court should be reduced to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos as the reasonable award for attorney’s fees in favor of private respondent corporation. Scä juris

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784 are hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney’s fees is reduced from two hundred thousand (P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos. No pronouncement as to costs.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.10/29/99 1:51 PM