"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The parcel of land described in Plan Psu-161277 and the improvements thereon situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines, with an area of 4,845 square meters is brought under the operation of the property registration decree (PD No. 1529) and the title thereto is registered and confirmed in the name of applicant Jose Lachica, married to Adela Raz of Kalibo, Aklan, Philippines; Lexjuris

2. A ten (10) meter road width along the national road mentioned in the application be segregated for future road widening program upon payment of just compensation to be annotated at the back of the title;

3. For lack of merit, the opposition filed by the spouses Manuel and Susana Braulio, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba are hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED."1 [Record, pp. 632-633.]

"Applicant Jose Lachica filed this application for title to land on April 28, 1958 with the claim that the land applied for was purchased by him and his wife, Adela Raz from, from one Eulalio Raz. The documents attached to the application are: technical description, surveyor’s certificate, certification by the chief deputy assessor of Aklan and the blue print of Psu-161277. Jjjuris

The initial hearing was scheduled for October 31, 1958 and the certificate of publication in the Official Gazette was issued on September 23, 1958. The certification of posting of the notice of initial hearing was issued on October 13, 1958.

The land applied for is residential, situated in the Poblacion of Banga, Aklan, with an area of 4,845 square meters, bounded on the northeast by the property of the Municipality of Banga (Sketch, Exh. "F").

The initial hearing was held on October 31, 1958. An order of general default was issued but those who presented their opposition, namely, Octabela Alba Vda. De Raz, Manuel and Susana Braulio, Jose Rago, representing Apolonia Rebeco, the Director of Lands and the Municipality of Banga represented by the Provincial Fiscal, were given thirty (30) days to file their written opposition.

Manuel C. Braulio and Susana P. Braulio filed their opposition on October 31, 1958. They opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the 240 square meters of the land applied for alleging that they are the owners in fee simple and possessors of said portion and all the improvements thereon for not less than 70 years together with their predecessor-in-interest deriving their title by purchase from the original owners. They prayed for the Court to declare them the true and absolute owners of the disputed portion of the same in their names.

On October 31, 1958, Octabela Vda. de Raz filed her opposition. Esä m

Jose Rago filed his opposition on November 29, 1958 as the duly constituted attorney-in-fact of Apolonia Rebeco although no special power of attorney was attached. He opposed the registration of the northeastern portion of the land applied for, with an area of 43.83 square meters. He alleged that his principal is the owner by right of succession and is in the possession of said portion with all its improvements for more than 80 years together with his predecessor-in-interest, continuously, peacefully and openly under claim of ownership. He prayed that his principal be declared the true and absolute owner of the disputed portion of 43.83 square meters.

On March 22, 1966, the Court issued an Order allowing the applicant to hire another surveyor to segregate the non-controversial portion of the land applied for and to notify the oppositors and their counsels.

On January 12, 1970, a motion to lift the order of general default and to admit the attached opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as a motion to admit the attached amended petition of Octabela Vda. de Raz were filed. The Court in its order dated March 21, 1970 admitted said opposition and set aside the order of default.

In their opposition, Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz, alleged that they are the co-owners of a portion of the land applied for with an area of 2,262 square meters bounded on the north by Januario Masigon, Nicolas Realtor, Agustina Rebeldia and Apolonia Rebeco, on the south by Eulalio Raz and on the west by the public market of Banga. They claimed to have inherited the above-mentioned portion from their late father, Eufrosino M. Alba, who purchased the same from Dionisia Regado in 1918. Hence, they have been in possession continuously, openly and peacefully under claim of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for not less 70 years. They prayed that the disputed portion of 2,262 square meters be registered as their pro-indiviso property. Jlexj

In her amended opposition, Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz opposed the registration of the southeastern portion of the land applied for with an area of 331.44 square meters. She claimed to have been in peaceful, continuous and open possession together with her deceased husband, Eulalio Raz, under claim of ownership of the above-mentioned portion for not less than 70 years, by purchase from its owners. She likewise opposed the registration of the western portion of the land applied for, with an area of 676 square meters, having purchased the same from its original owners on (sic) her predecessor-in-interest has been open, peaceful and continuous under claim of ownership for a period of not less than 70 years. She prayed that the portion of 331.44 square meters be registered in her name and that of the heirs of Eulalio Raz, pro indiviso., and the other portion of 676 square meters be registered solely in her name. xä law

On February 25, 1970, the applicant Dr. Jose Lachica filed his consolidated opposition and reply to the motion to lift order of default stating that there is no reason to do so under the Rules of Court, and that the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the amended opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz are without merit in law and in fact.

On March 21, 1970, the motion to lift the order of general default was granted and the opposition of Rodolfo Alba, Lourdes Alba and Beatriz Alba, as well as the opposition of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz were all admitted.

In the hearing of March 3, 1972, applicant offered for admission exhibits ‘A’ to ‘I’ and the testimonies of Pedro Ruiz (April 20, 1971), Jose Rago (Oct. 23, 1970) and Dr. Jose Lachica (July 16, 1971; Feb. 10, 1972). The Court admitted the same.

On March 13, 1974, the Court issued an order appointing Engr. Angeles Relor to act as Commissioner and delimit the portions claimed by the three sets of oppositors and submit an amended approved plan together with the technical description for each portion.

The Commissioner’s report and sketch was submitted on December 4, 1974. The applicant filed his opposition to the Commissioner’s report on December 12, 1974. The Court in its order of December 13, 1974 required the Commissioner to submit an amended report and amended sketch.

The Commissioner’s corrected report and sketch was submitted on February 24, 1975 which the Court approved on February 25, 1975 there being no objection from the parties.

On March 15, 1977, the Court issued an order whereby the testimony of oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off the record for her failure to appear in the scheduled hearing on March 15, 1977. Sppedâ

Again, in its order dated May 27, 1977 the testimony of Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz was stricken off record because the latter was bedridden and can not possibly appear for cross-examination.

Oppositor Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz substituted by her heirs filed a formal offer of exhibits on August 24, 1988. Applicant filed his comments thereto on August 29, 1988. The Court admitted said exhibits and the testimony of their witness on March 1, 1989.

In this applicaton for title to land filed by applicant Jose Lachica, four oppositions were filed by the following:

1. Jose Rago, in representation of Apolonia Rebeco;

2. Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio;

3. Rodolfo, Lourdes and Beatriz, all surnamed Alba, represented by Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz; and

4. Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz.

In the hearing of October 23, 1970, counsel for oppositor Jose Rago manifested that he would file a motion for withdrawal of opposition and Jose Rago himself declared his conformity (Tsn, Oct. 23, 1970, p. 5). Although no formal motion to withdraw was actually filed, oppositor Rago has not presented evidence on his behalf; hence, his opposition must be disregarded. MisÓ spped

As regards oppositor Manuel C. Braulio ans Susana Braulio, a deed of sale supposedly executed by Susana Braulio and Octabela Alba Vda. de Raz in 1956 was identified by Felimon Raz, a witness for the oppositors (Tsn, Sept. 29, 1977, pp. 3 to 4). However, said deed cannot be found in the records. Even so, the Braulios have not presented evidence to show that by the time this application was filed, they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, open, public, peaceful and continuous possession of the land claimed, in concept of owner, for at least 10 years sufficient to acquire title thereto (Arts. 1117, 1118, 1134, Civil Code of the Philippines). As such, the opposition of Manuel C. Braulio and Susana Braulio must be dismissed."2 [CA Decision, pp. 2-6; Rollo, pp. 39-43.]

1. The Civil law provisions on prescription are inapplicable.

2. The applicable law is Section 48 [a] of the Public Land Law or Act 141, as amended.

3.1. There is absolutely no proof of the alleged sales made by Raz and Alba.

3.2. There is absolutely no reliable proof of the alleged theft of the deeds of sale.

3.3. The identity of the land has not been established.

3.4. The Court of Appeals misapplied the basic rules governing the introduction of secondary evidence. Joä spped

3.5. The applicant/respondent’s Tax Declaration No. 14181 is a ‘doctored’ tax declaration.

3.6. Applicant/respondent’s tax declarations have no probative value.

3.7. Applicant/respondent has not satisfied the required quantum of evidence in land registration cases.

3.8. Petitioners-oppositors have proven their right over the subject property.

"On the basis of the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the applicant, the trial court did not err in confirming that the applicant is the absolute owner in fee simple of the property subject of the application for registration entitling him to register the same in his name under the operation of PD 1529.

It is of no moment that the applicant failed to produce the originals of those other deeds/documents of conveyances, for he was able to present sufficient substantial secondary evidence, in accordance with the requirements of Section 4, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, now Section 5, same Rule of the Revised Rules on Evidence, and the doctrines in point. Sppedä jo

Thus, Government vs. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817, explained that when the original writing is not available for one reason or another which is the best or primary evidence, to prove its contents is the testimony of some one who has read or known about it. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 73 SCRA 148, laid out the foundation before secondary evidence is introduced, that the due execution, delivery and reason for non-production of the original writing must first be produced. Raylago vs Jarabe, 22 SCRA 1247, ruled that it is not necessary to prove the loss of the original document beyond all possibility of mistake. A reasonable probability of its loss is sufficient and this may be shown by a bonafide (sic) and diligent search, fruitlessly made, for it in places where it is likely to be found. After proving the due execution and delivery of the document, together with the fact that the same has been lost or destroyed, its contents may be proved, among others, by the recollection of witnesses. And Beall vs. Dearing, 7 ala. 126; and Bogardas vs. Trinity Church, 4 Sandf. Ch. (Nn.y.) 639, are of the view that that where the lost documents are more than thirty (30) years old and would thus prove themselves if produced, secondary evidence of their contents is admissible without proof of their execution.

In the case at bar, petitioner acquired the property in 1940-1941. He presented the Deed (Exh. G) executed by the vendor Faustino Martirez. While he failed to present the other deeds of sale covering the other portions of the property, he has sufficiently established that they were notarized documents and were taken by his mother-in-law sometime in 1956. He reported the loss to the authorities and even filed a case of theft. He further exerted efforts and made a diligent search of those documents from the notary public but in vain. He presented the clerk of the Municipal Treasurer’s Office of Banga, who testified having seen those deeds as they were presented to him by the applicant and which were used as basis for the preparation and issuance of Tax Declaration No. 14181 in the name of the tax declarant. Tax Declaration No. 14181 (Exh. H) was presented in Court, proving that the land was declared for tax purposes in the name of the applicant and his wife. The applicant has been paying the realty tax covering the property since 1945 and beyond 1958, when the application for registration was filed in court, per certification of the Municipal Treasurer of Banga (Exh. 1). Nexâ old

In resume, We find and so hold as did the trial court that Dr. Jose Lachica is the abolute owner in fee simple of the land described in his application for its original registration in his name. The land contains an area of 4,845 square meters, more or less, situated in Banga, Aklan, and

The applicant has been in public, open, continuous and adverse possession of the property since 1940-41 up to the present to the exclusion of all, and thereby also acquired the property by acquisitive prescription, in accordance with Sections 40 and 43 of Act 190, otherwise known as the "Code of Civil Procedure", having been in actual and adverse possession under claim of ownership for over ten (10) years, and thus in whatever way his occupancy might have commenced or continued under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants, resulted in the acquisition of title to the land by acquisitive prescription (Vda. de Delima vs. Tio, 32 SCRA 516).

Indeed, to borrow the apt words of the ponente in the Delima case, such proof of ownership of, and the adverse, continuous possession of the applicant since 1940, strongly "xxx militate against any judicial cognizance of a matter that could have been withheld in its ken," hence, whatever right oppositors may have had over the property or any portion thereof was thereby also lost through extinctive prescription in favor of the applicant who had been in actual, open, adverse and continuous possession of the land applied for in the concept of owner for over 10 years when the application for registration was filed in court."4 [Court of Appeals Decision, pp. 11-14; Rollo, pp. 48-51.] Miso

1.] When the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;9 [Arambulo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120166, 3 August 1998, 293 SCRA 567; Jison v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 495 (1998); Lustan v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 663 (1997)]

2.] When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;10 [Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 462 (1997)]

3.] When the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd11 [Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96412, 24 August 1998, 294 SCRA 512.] or impossible;

4.] Where there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;12 [Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, supra.] Maniksâ

5.] When the appellate court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the submission of both appellant and appellee;

6.] When the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;13 [Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126363, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA 385, citing New Testament Church of God v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 266 (1995)]

7.] When the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion;14 [Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127997, 7 August 1998, 294 SCRA 90.]

8.] When the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

9.] When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; and

10.] When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.15 [Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Embroidery and Garments Industries (Phils.), Inc., G.R. No. 96262, 22 March 1999; National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 45 (1997), citing Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 701 (1997), citing Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 651 (1996), in turn citing Remalante v. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 (1988); Vda. de Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 457 (1996); Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353 (1996), citing Calde v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 376 (1994); Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 493 (1997); See also Cayabyab v. IAC, 232 SCRA 1 (1994); Engineering and Machinery Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 156 (1996); Chua Tiong Tay v. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 183 (1995); Dee v. Court of Appeals, 238 SCRA 25 (1994); Asia Brewery, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 437 (1993)] Oldmisâ o

"Un terreno solar residencia antes palayero regado, actuado en el casco central del municipio de Banga, Capiz. Sin ninguna mejora, de una extension superficial de ochocientos cuarenta metros cuadrados (840 mts. cds.) 6 sean cuarenta metros de frente por otros veinte y unmetrode fondo, cuyos linderos por el Norte con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y con Eulalio Raz; por Este con Eulalio Raz y con la carretera provincial de Kalibo a Banga; por Sur con la misma carretera provincial y con terreno del municipio para mercado; y por al Oeste con al terreno del mercado municipal de Banga y con propiedad de Eufrosino Alba y al terreno tienes sus mojones de cemento en todos sus cuatro cantos de linderia y sin otro limite visible de linderia mas que dichos mojones y esta amillarado a mi nombre en una sola hoja declaratoria de propiedad Tax No. 12374 en la Oficina del Tasador Provincial de Capiz, cuyo valor amilarado actual es veinte pesos (P20.00) xxx"

". . . [a] contract of sale of realty cannot be proven by means of witnesses, but must necessarily be evidenced by a written instrument, duly subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent, or by secondary evidence of their contents. No other evidence, therefore, can be received except the documentary evidence referred to, in so far as regards such contracts, and these are valueless as evidence unless they are drawn up in writing in the manner aforesaid."28 [Gorospe v. Ilayat, 29 Phil. 21 (1914)] Sdaad

"An applicant for registration of land, if he relies on a document evidencing his title thereto, must prove not only the genuineness of his title but the identity of the land therein referred to. The document in such a case is either a basis of his claim for registration or not at all. If , as in this case, he only claims a portion of what is included in his title, he must clearly prove that the property sought to be registered is included in that title."29 [Lasam v. Director of Lands, 65 Phil. 367 (1938); italics supplied.]

"5. Una parcela de terreno cocal secano, amillarado en nombre de Eufrocino Alba bajo el Tax No. 12792 por valor de P390.00, situado en el municipio de Banga, Capiz, que linda el Norte con Lorenzo Retiro, y Silverio Relis; al Este con la carretera provincial Banga-Libacao; al sur con Bienvenido M. Alba y al Oeste con Cirilo rala y Adela Raz; con una extension aproximada de una (1) hectarea (20) areas y (35) centiareas poco mas o menos. (Note: Said property was purchased by the spouses Jose Lachica and Adela Raz Lachica from Eufrocino M. Alba in the amount of P500.00 as evidenced by a Escritura de Compraventa executed on November 25, 1940, at Himamaylan, Negros Occidental and notarized by Atty. Conrado Gensiano, as Reg. Not. 122, Pag. 67, Libro VIII, Serie 1940).

"A parcel of land (as shown on Plan Psu-161277), situated in Poblacion, Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan. Bounded on the NE., along line 1-2, by property of Apolonia Rimate; on the SE., along line 2-3, by National Road; on the SW., along line 3-4, by property of the Mpl. Government of Banga (Public Market); and on the NW., along line 4-1, by property of the Municipal Government of Banga (Public Market). Beginning at a point marked "1" on plan, being N. 45 deg. 02’ E., 423.38 m. from B.L.L.M. 1, Mp. of Banga, Aklan;

beginning, containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND FORTY FIVE (4,845) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. Bearings true date of survey, January 25, 1957, and that of the approval, October 3, 1957."31 [Original Record, p. 3.]

"SEC. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing of their applications.49 [Repealed by PD No. 1073.]

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.50 [Amended by PD No. 1073.] Jurisä sc

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.51 [Subsection (c) is an amendment introduced by RA 3872, Section 1, approved June 18,1964.]

1.] Lands acquired by various types of titles from the government during the Spanish Regime by way of grants by the Spanish crown namely the: a.] Titulo real or royal grant; b.] Concession especial or special grant; c.] Composicion con el estado title or adjustment title; d.] Titulo de compra or title by purchase and; e.] Informacion posesoria or possessory information title, which could become a Titulo gratuito or a gratuitous title;56 [Director of Forestry v. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183 (1968)]

2.] Lands that are claimed to be owned by accession, i.e. accretion, avulsion, formation of islands, abandoned river beds, as provided for in Articles 457, 461 and 464 of the Civil Code; and

3.] Lands which have been acquired in any other manner provided by law. Sâ djad

". . . [N]o public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of title from the state . . . .57 [Lee Hong Hok v. David, 48 SCRA 379 (1972)]

Indeed, the possession of public agricultural land, however, long the period may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor.58 [Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel Tesalona, 236 SCRA 336 (1994)] The reason, to reiterate our ruling, is because the statute of limitations with regard to public agricultural land does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State."59 [Gordula v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 617 (1998), citing Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra, citing Province of Camarines Sur v. Director of Lands, 64 Phil. 600 (1937)]

". . . [W]hile Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that ‘(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,’ this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that ‘xxx (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.’ Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith).60 [Santiago v. Cruz, 19 Phil. 145 (1911)] The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.61 [Art. 1127. Civil Code.] For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the recognized modes of acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right."62 [Titong v. Court of Appeals, 287 SCRA 102 (1998)]

". . . [c]oncealment and misrepresentation in the application that no other persons had any claim or interest in the said land, constitute specific allegations of extrinsic fraud supported by competent proof. Failure and intentional omission of the applicants to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person constitutes an allegation of actual fraud.63 [Nicolas v. Director of Lands, 9 SCRA 934 (1963)] Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person."64 [Heirs of Manuel A. Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 309 (1997), citing Estiva v. Alvero 37 Phil. 498 (1918)] Sccalä r

"ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of good faith."

1.] The 620 square meter portion on which private respondent Jose N. Lachica’s house is situated, clearly delineating its metes and bounds, is hereby ORDERED segregated from the parcel of land described in Psu-161277 situated in the Poblacion of the Municipality of Banga, Province of Aklan, Philippines with an area of 4,484 square meters, to be registered and confirmed in the name of private respondent;

2.] A ten (10) meter road width along the National road mentioned in the application be segregated for future road widening programs upon the payment of just compensation to be annotated at the back of the title.

3.] Insofar as the ownership of the remainder of the subject land is concerned, the case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the reception of further evidence for the petitioners to establish the other requisites for the confirmation of title and registration in their names of the areas they respectively claim.