On appeal is the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch I, finding appellants Domingo Pagpaguitan and Roberto Salazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay private complainant Evelyn Nalam, jointly and severally, the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages.

Assisted by her father, Federico Nalam, complainant on March 24, 1992, filed before the Butuan City Prosecutor a complaint stating that: Esmsoâ

The pertinent facts as found by the trial court are as follows: EsmmÓ is

The complainant’s relatives, meantime, had gone out looking for her. They found her with Pagpaguitan. A meeting was then held on February 2, 1992 before the purok president and the barangay captain between the parents of Pagpaguitan and the parents of the private complainant. Pagpaguitan and the complainant were both present. At the meeting, Pagpaguitan proposed marriage to the complainant, but the latter rejected the proposal.

On February 10, 1992, complainant went to a doctor for a physical examination. The examination was conducted by Dr. Rowena T. Catipay, Medical Officer III of the Butuan City General Hospital and Medical Center. Her findings were as follows: xä law

"x x x

"x x x

On February 19, 1992, complainant and her father executed affidavits at the police station, and later filed the complaint for rape with the Butuan City Prosecutor. ScÓ lex

Pagpaguitan and Salazar were arrested on August 16, 1992.4 [Id. at 10.] They were arraigned on October 2, 1992. Both pleaded "Not Guilty." Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

Pagpaguitan admitted having sex with complainant, but insisted that it was consensual. He claimed they had eloped and that truly they were actually sweethearts.

As narrated by the trial court, his version of the facts follows: Sc-juris

The trial court, however, disbelieved Pagpaguitan’s version. Finding the prosecution’s evidence convincing, the court convicted Pagpaguitan and Salazar and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. Both appealed.

Before us they raise the following errors: Supr-ema

We find the appeal without merit.

Regarding the first error, it must be pointed out that in a prosecution for rape, the evaluation of the evidence presented during trial ultimately revolves around the credibility of the complaining witness.7 [People v. Soriano, 272 SCRA 760, 766 (1997).] If found positive and credible by the trial court, her testimony suffices to support a conviction.8 [People v. Apilo, 263 SCRA 582, 598 (1996).] S-daad

Complainant’s testimony in the present case never "flip-flopped", contrary to the appellant’s claim. On direct testimony, complainant categorically stated that she was boxed, mauled, and forced to submit to accused’s carnal desire. She testified, thus:

"x x x

"x x x

Her testimony under cross-examination remained firm. She was mauled and boxed on her thighs and stomach, and "deflowered by Domingo Pagpaguitan" against her will.10 [TSN, December 11, 1992, p. 10.] The only difference in her account concerns where she was hit. On direct examination, she said in the chest; on cross-examination, she said in the stomach. We have ruled that the credibility of a rape victim is not destroyed by the few minor inconsistencies in her testimony.11 [People v. Abad, 268 SCRA 246, 255 (1997).] After all, a victim of violent sexual abuse cannot and is not expected to keep an accurate account of her traumatic experience.12 [People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463, 477 (1997).] Here, complainant’s account was straightforward and candid. It is settled doctrine that a victim who says she has been raped almost always says all there is to be said.13 [People v. Borja, 267 SCRA 370, 379 (1997).] Given the candor of complainant’s testimony and her lack of motive to testify falsely against the accused, the trial court could not be said to err in finding the Pagpaguitan guilty as charged. Moreover, we have ruled that the findings of the trial court are entitled to the highest respect by the appellate courts, particularly where the prosecution and the defense have contradictory versions of the facts.14 [People v. Erardo, 277 SCRA 643, 656 (1997).] Manik-s

On the second error, during the proceedings before the purok president and the barangay captain, elopement was indeed mentioned. However, Pagpaguitan’s tale of elopement rang with far too many inconsistencies to be credible. If he and complainant had eloped and were never apart from January 6, 1992 to March 15, 1992, how would he explain the proceedings before the purok president and the barangay captain on February 2, 1992?15 [Records, pp. 67-68.] It is established that he and complainant, with their respective parents, appeared before their purok and barangay officials on February 2, 1992, and not, as he claimed, on March 16, 1992. If they were indeed living together and never separated for over two months, how would he explain the fact that complainant underwent medical examination on February 10, 1992,16 [Supra note 3.] and executed an affidavit before the police authorities of Butuan City on February 19, 1992,17 [Records, pp. 5-6.] without his knowledge? Pagpaguitan suggests that the hematoma on the complainant’s thighs could have been due to the maltreatment inflicted by complainant’s father upon her when she returned home on March 16, 1992. But where did complainant get the hematoma found by the doctor on her thighs when she was examined on February 10, 1992? Mere assertion of a "love relationship" would not necessarily rule out the use of force to consummate it.18 [People v. Betonio, 279 SCRA 532, 550 (1997).] Much more so where such relationship was denied by the victim, who resisted the brutal suitor. Sc

In rape the prosecution must rule out the victim’s consent to the sexual act.19 [People v. Sta. Ana, 291 SCRA 188, 214 (1997).] Here, the testimony of private complainant was clear and convincing: she did not consent to penile invasion.

Again appellant Pagpaguitan sought to prove he and complainant were lovers by citing her testimony which ran as follows:

Pagpaguitan claimed the above dialogue clearly showed their "sweet" relationship with each other and revealed intimacy in their relationship even before the sexual act.21 [Rollo, p. 62.] However, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the cited dialogue merely revealed familiarity rather than intimacy.22 [Id. at 127.] Even assuming for argument’s sake, that they were sweethearts, nevertheless, rape was committed because by force, appellant had sex with the victim against her will.23 [People v. Cabel, 282 SCRA 410, 416 (1997).] The claim that they were sweethearts could not prove complainant’s consent24 [People v. Corea, 269 SCRA 76, 93 (1997).] nor undermine her complaint. Scmis

The findings of the examining physician, Dr. Rowena T. Catipay, support the accusation for rape. The medical certificate issued on February 10, 1992 noted hematoma on complainant’s thighs. Her hymen was no longer intact and caruncula were noted. Both phenomena – the cause of the hematoma and the caruncula appearance of complainant’s hymen – were explained by the examining physician, as follows:

In response to clarificatory questions from the trial court, Dr. Catipay further explained that from the appearance of complainant’s hymen, the only possible explanation for her non-virgin state was sexual intercourse and nothing else:

It has been ruled that a medical examination is not an essential prerequisite to a prosecution for rape.27 [People v. Edualino, 271 SCRA 189, 199 (1997).] However, when the physician’s finding of penile penetration is corroborated by the testimony of the victim that the accused’s genitals touched her vagina, it is sufficient to establish the essential requisite of carnal knowledge.28 [People v. De la Peña, 276 SCRA 558, 562 (1997).] Pagpaguitan tried to debunk the charge of complainant that he raped her on January 31, 1992, by claiming the examining physician had said that complainant told her the rape took place on another date, February 6, 1992.29 [Supra note 26 at 7.] It is settled, however, that the exact date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.30 [People v. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384, 397 (1997).] The fact remains that the act took place on or about the date averred in the charge. Misspped

Regarding the third error, Pagpaguitan faults the judge for arrogating unto himself the task of determining the genuineness of the handwriting at the back of the picture of the accused and the complainant together (Exhibit "1")31 [Records, p. 64.] and the alleged letter of complainant to him (Exhibit "2")32 [Id. at 65.] submitted by the defense to prove that he and the victim were sweethearts. During the trial, the judge had ordered complainant to write a letter under his dictation which was subsequently marked as Exhibit "X" for the court.33 [Records, p. 75.] The judge found this necessary in the interest of justice as the victim had denied having written either the letter or the dedication at the back of the picture.34 [TSN, December 11, 1992, p. 2.] It is of record that the handwriting at the back of the picture and in the letter were very different.35 [Id. at 3.] The trial court made the following findings after comparing Exhibit "X" with Exhibits "1" and "2", thus:

Pagpaguitan now asks whether or not it is permissible or proper for the trial judge to receive and examine a specimen writing, written at his order by a party who alleged that she was not the writer of other documents submitted in evidence? He argues that the task of comparing the handwriting on the documents in question was one for experts and not the judge. On this point, we find the judge’s comparison proper and permissible. Mi-so

When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon the other to be the writing of a particular person, any other writing of that person may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the writing in dispute.37 [University of Illinois v. Spalding, 71 N.H. 163, 51 A. 731.] It is also recognized that a comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation; similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in the search for truth.38 [2 Jones, On Evidence 1038.] Thus, it has been held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with or without the aid of expert witnesses.39 [Barnes v. US, 166 Fed. 113.] The court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, order a party to write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison.40 [Hickory v. US, 151 US 303, 14 S. Ct. 334, 28 L. Ed. 170; King v. Donahue, 110 Mass. 155, 14 Am. Rep. 589.] For, the handwriting of a person is characteristic of the person himself.41 [Fenelon v. State, 195 Wis. 416, 217 N.W. 711.] Once admitted, the genuineness of other offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes a question for the trier of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this task by experts.42 [US v. Woodson, 526 F. 2d 550; Forte v. Schiebe, N.W. 145 Cal. App. 2d 296, 302 P. 2d. 336; State v. LeDuc, 306 N.C. 62, 291 S.E. 2d 607; and US v. Mangan, 575 F. 2d. 32, cert. denied. 439 US 931, 99 S. Ct. 320, 58 L. Ed. 2d. 324.] Our rules on evidence having been drawn mainly from American sources,43 [Philippine National Bank v. Bondoc, 14 SCRA 770 (1965).] decisions of American courts have persuasive effect. The general rule is that where a local rule is patterned or copied from that of another country, then the decisions of the courts in such country construing the rule are entitled to great weight in interpreting the local rule.44 [US v. De Guzman, 30 Phil. 417 (1915); Kepner v. US, 11 Phil. 669 (1904).] Following cited precedents, we find no reversible error on this score. x-sc

Coming now to appellant Salazar, his defense claimed the trial court erred in convicting him since the private complainant’s own testimony showed that he was a mere on-looker during the sexual attack. His defense averred he never lent a lending hand to Pagpaguitan to ensure the success of the latter’s lewd designs on complainant.45 [Supra note 37 at 63.] But can we conclude that Salazar had no role in the rape of complainant? Note the trial court’s findings regarding Salazar:

It must be pointed out that direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not write down their lawless plans and plots.47 [People v. Cawiling, 293 SCRA 267, 272 (1998).] Conspiracy may, nevertheless, be proven to exist where at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused had the same purpose and was united with his co-accused in its execution.48 [People v. Galapin, 293 SCRA 474, 476 (1998).] Complainant’s testimony showed that Salazar was instrumental in helping to bring her to the isolated and uninhabited farmhouse of his grandparents where the rape occurred and in preventing her escape from the clutches of the accused. Neither did he act to prevent his co-accused Pagpaguitan from boxing complainant and ravishing her. In fact, he was a spectator during the rape scene.49 [TSN, October 16, 1992, pp. 4-6; p. 11.] Complainant’s testimony as to Salazar’s role does not exculpate but clearly implicates him, thus:

"x x x

"x x x

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, there was nothing unnatural regarding complainant’s testimony that Salazar only stood by the door and watched them. It was precisely Salazar’s role in the rape of complainant to stop the latter in the event that she tried to run away.53 [Supra note 23.] Thus, there was no error committed by the trial court in convicting Salazar as a co-conspirator of Pagpaguitan. It is now firmly settled that in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.54 [People v. Timple, 237 SCRA 52, 53 (1994).] One who joins in a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and he can no longer repudiate the conspiracy after it had already materialized.55 [People v. Diadid, 236 SCRA 45 (1994).]

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, prior to its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659 and Republic Act No. 8353, provided that:

x x x"

After a thorough scrutiny of the records of this case, we find that the prosecution has adequately and satisfactorily proved the pertinent indispensable elements of the crime of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: that the appellant Domingo Pagpaguitan had carnal knowledge of complainant and that the act was accomplished against her will and through the use of force. The prosecution has also proved beyond a doubt that Salazar was Pagpaguitan’s confederate who ensured the success of Pagpaguitan’s carnal plot. The trial court did not err at all in convicting both appellants for the outrage committed on complainant. We find no reason now to overturn their conviction. Sd-aad-sc

We take note, however, that the award by the trial court of P30,000.00 in moral damages is now inadequate. In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,56 [People v. Bañago, G.R. No. 128384, June 29, 1999; People v. Sardonido, G.R. Nos. 121205-09, June 29, 1999; People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998); People v. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 (1998).] such award ought to be increased to P50,000.00. Further, without need of additional proof, the victim should also be awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The award of the trial court is therefore modified accordingly in this respect. M-issdaa

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the trial court finding appellants Domingo Pagpaguitan and Roberto Salazar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that CIVIL INDEMNITY in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and MORAL DAMAGES also in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) should be paid jointly and severally, by said appellants to private complainant, Evelyn Nalam.

Costs against appellants.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.