Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated September 30, 1998; and, of its Resolution, dated January 11, 1999.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On August 24, 1992, herein private respondent Camille T. Cruz, then a teenage girl who would be travelling alone for the first time, purchased from petitioner Northwest Airlines a round-trip ticket for a flight from Manila to Boston via Tokyo and back. The scheduled departure date from Manila to Boston was August 27, 1992 at 8:40 a.m. in economy class while the scheduled return flight from Boston to Manila in business class was on December 22, 1992 at 10:25 a.m.1 [Records, p. 35.] Nexâ old

On November 25, 1992, private respondent re-scheduled her return flight from Boston to Manila to December 17, 1992 at 10:05 a.m. Accordingly, petitioner booked her on Northwest flight NW005 C ("Flight 5") with route as follows: Boston to Chicago; Chicago to Tokyo; and, Tokyo to Manila.2 [Rollo, p. 12.]

Petitioner reconfirmed the flight from Boston, U.S.A. to Manila scheduled on December 17, 1992 at least seventy-two (72) hours prior to the said scheduled flight.3 [Records, p. 36.]

However, barely a day before the scheduled date of departure, petitioner called private respondent and informed her that instead of following her original itinerary of Boston to Chicago; Chicago to Tokyo; and, Tokyo to Manila, private respondent should instead board the TWA flight from Boston to Kennedy International Airport in New York. Private respondent was further instructed by petitioner to proceed to the latter’s counter at the Logan Airport in Boston before boarding the TWA flight on the scheduled date of departure.4 [Id., at 37.]

On December 17, 1992, upon petitioner’s instructions, private respondent proceeded early to the petitioner’s counter at Logan Airport in Boston but was referred to the TWA counter where she was informed that she may not be able to take the TWA flight. Notwithstanding this uncertainty, private respondent was made to proceed to the International Gate where she was informed that the TWA flight she was to take to Kennedy International Airport in New York was cancelled.5 [Ibid.]

Due to the unexplained and belated cancellation of the TWA flight, private respondent had to rush back from the International Gate to petitioner’s counter in Logan Airport in Boston where she was again told to proceed immediately to the Delta Airlines terminal to catch the Delta Airlines flight to La Guardia Airport in New York and thence took the service car to Kennedy Airport in New York.6 [Id., at 37-38.] Manikanä

In her haste to catch the said flight, private respondent tripped and fell down on her way from petitioner’s counter to the Delta Airlines counter in Logan Airport in Boston thereby suffering slight physical injuries and embarrassment.7 [Id., at 38.]

When private respondent reached La Guardia Airport in New York, she again had to rush to the service car that would take her to Kennedy International Airport which is several miles away from La Guardia. In her haste and anxiety to catch her flight, private respondent again tripped and fell down thereby suffering more physical injuries, embarrassment and great inconvenience.8 [Id.]

Private respondent’s apprehension was further aggravated when she was informed at petitioner’s counter in Kennedy International Airport that she was issued the wrong ticket to Seoul instead of Tokyo. Although the error was rectified by petitioner at Kennedy International Airport, private respondent was by then extremely nervous, worried, stressed out, and exhausted.9 [Records, pp. 38-39.]

To make matters worse, petitioner downgraded private respondent from business class to economy class on two legs of her flight without notice nor apology. Neither did petitioner offer to refund the excess fare private respondent paid for a business class seat.10 [Id., at 39.]

Hence, on August 6, 1993, private respondent filed a complaint11 [Id., at 34.] against petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. for breach of contract of carriage committed when petitioner changed private respondent’s original itinerary of Boston to Chicago, Chicago to Tokyo, Tokyo to Manila to a new itinerary of Boston to New York, New York to Tokyo and Tokyo to Manila, thereby downgrading private respondent on two legs of her return flight to Manila from business to economy class (flights from Boston to New York, and from Tokyo to Manila). Private respondent claimed to have suffered actual, moral and exemplary damages.12 [Rollo, p. 15.] Calrspä ped

Petitioner filed its answer with compulsory counterclaim alleging therein that the flight on which private respondent was originally booked was cancelled due to maintenance problems and bad weather,13 [Ibid.] and that the airline had done its best to re-book private respondent on the next available flights.

Trial progressed until 1995 when it was petitioner’s turn to present its witness on three scheduled dates. Two of the settings were cancelled when petitioner’s counsel filed notice for oral deposition of one Mario Garza, witness for petitioner, in New York. Private respondent filed her opposition and suggested written interrogatories instead. However, in an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court denied private respondent’s opposition, thus allowing the deposition to proceed. The oral deposition took place in New York on July 24, 199514 [Id., at 57.] or notably two days before the issuance of the trial court’s order allowing the deposition to proceed.

The records show that although it was the Honorable Consul Milagros R. Perez who swore in the deponent,15 [Records, p. 70.] she thereafter designated one "Attorney Gonzalez" as Deposition Officer.16 [Id., at 71.] After stating his personal circumstances, Mr. Mario Garza, testified as follows:

xxx.

xxx.

xxx.

xxx.

xxx.

xxx.

On November 9, 1995, at the hearing of the instant case, petitioner presented the deposition record of its witness while private respondent reserved her right to cross-examine and present rebuttal evidence.

Private respondent, likewise, questioned the conduct of the oral deposition as irregular and moved for suppression of the same on the following grounds:

However, private respondent’s motion was denied anew by the trial court.19 [Rollo, p. 58.] In its Order, dated July 23, 1996, the trial court admitted petitioner’s formal offer of evidence with supplement thereto and gave private respondent three days from receipt within which to signify her intention to present rebuttal evidence. Sd-aamiso

On August 2, 1996, private respondent filed a manifestation and motion stating that the court failed to rule on its motion to suppress deposition and to grant her the right to cross-examine petitioner’s deponent. Private respondent also manifested her intention to present rebuttal evidence.

In its Order, dated September 5, 1996, the trial court denied private respondent’s manifestation and motion. Said court, likewise, denied private respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the above order. Hence, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on April 7, 1998.20 [Id., at 25.]

On September 30, 1998, the appellate court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Petitioner Northwest, thereafter, filed this instant petition for review alleging that: Scs-daad

Petitioner argues that the remedy of certiorari before respondent Court of Appeals was improper, as private respondent has every opportunity to question on appeal the trial court’s ruling admitting the deposition. Calrs-pped

According to petitioner, a careful analysis of the petition in the Court of Appeals shows that at the heart of the issues raised is the correctness of the procedure observed by the trial court in appreciating the admissibility of the transcript of the deposition of Mr. Mario Garza. Such being the case, assuming without admitting that the trial court committed any error in issuing the questioned orders, such error is only an error of judgment, and not an error of jurisdiction.

Petitioner further asserts that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence the oral deposition. While as a general rule, Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court23 [Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.- The examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmatiion. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall be given orally.] governs the conduct of trial, this rule admits of exceptions which this Court recognized in the case of Dasmarinas Garments, Inc. vs. Reyes.24 [225 SCRA 622 (1993)] According to petitioner, one of the exceptions is "when the witness is out of the Philippines." In this case, petitioner has the right to take the deposition of its witness and offer it in evidence since Mr. Mario Garza resides and works outside the Philippines. The deposition-taking at the Philippine Consulate in New York City falls within the exceptions to the requirement that a witness give his testimony in open court pursuant to Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules.

Finally, petitioner alleges that private respondent must be deemed to have waived her right to cross-examine petitioner’s witness and her right to present rebuttal evidence by her failure to attend the deposition-taking despite due notice thereof, or at the very least, to timely reserve her right to serve written interrogatories.

Petitioner’s arguments are untenable. Mis-oedp

Section 16 of Rule 24 (now Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure of 1997) provides that after notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion seasonably made by any party or by person to be examined and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending may, among others, make an order that the deposition shall not be taken. The rest of the same section allows the taking of the deposition subject to certain conditions specified therein.

The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be taken connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law. The courts should always see to it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained. As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:

Respondent court correctly observed that the deposition in this case was not used for discovery purposes, as the examinee was the employee of petitioner, but rather to accommodate the former who was in Massachusetts, U.S.A. Such being the case, the general rules on examination of witnesses under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requiring said examination to be done in court following the order set therein, should be observed.

Respondent court also correctly noted that private respondent’s objections to the oral deposition had been made promptly and vehemently, as required by the Rules, but these were wrongly disregarded as immaterial by the trial court.

We note with approval respondent court’s ruling disallowing the depositions and upholding private respondent’s right to cross-examine:

While a month’s notice would ordinarily be sufficient, the circumstances in this case are different. Two days of trial were cancelled and notice for oral deposition was given in lieu of the third date. The locus of oral deposition is not easily within reach of ordinary citizens for it requires time to get a travel visa to the United States, book a flight in July to the United States, and more importantly substantial travel fare is needed to obtain a round trip ticket by place (sic) from Manila to New York and back to Manila.

As an international carrier, Northwest could very conveniently send its counsel to New York. However, the ends of justice would have been better served if the witness were instead brought to the Philippines. Written interrogatories was (sic) requested to balance this inconvenience which was nonetheless also objected to and denied for simply being time consuming. While time is a factor in deciding cases, the more important principles would have been the thorough presentation and deliberation of a case to ensure that the ends of justice are met since this is the principal mission of a civilized judicial system. Acctmis

The objections raised by petitioner [private respondent], in the light of the above considerations, take on a greater weight. Section 11 of Rule 24 provides: "In a foreign state or country, depositions shall be taken (a) on notice before a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, or (b) before such person or officer as may be appointed by commission or under letters rogatory." The deposition document clearly indicates that while the consul swore in the witness and the stenographer, it was another officer in the Philippine Consulate who undertook the entire proceedings thereafter. Respondent Northwest argues on the presumption of regularity of official functions and even obtained a certification to this effect plus an assertion that none of the participants in the Consulate were in any way related to the respondent or their counsel. But presumptions should fail when the record itself bears out the irregularity.

The Rules (Rule 24, Sec. 29) indicate that objections to the oral deposition will be waived unless the objections are made with reasonable promptness. In this case, the objections have been prompt and vehement, yet they were disregarded as not material such that the deposition and the exhibits related thereto were admitted. Moreover, a Supplemental Offer of Evidence pertaining to a certification by the consul in New York which tends to correct the objections raised was also admitted by the Court. Respondents argue that the rules were not exactly mandatory but merely guides to ensure that the ends of justice are met. The Court interpreted with leniency the objections despite the acknowledged mandatory language of the rules.

There is clear language of the law and the same should not be modified in practice. The separate certification of the FSO from the transcript proper was also questioned as irregular by petitioner [private respondent]. In so doing, she was merely being vigilant of her rights considering that she was not present then. No other proof thereon is needed when the same is clear on the face of the deposition material given. Ed-p

Petitioner’s [private respondent] right to cross examine and to present rebuttal evidence, having been reserved earlier, needed no reiteration. Even then, this was nevertheless manifested and even vehemently argued. As defendant’s oral deposition was admitted, despite substantial issues raised against it in the interest of justice, similar consideration, aside from substantial and technical basis, also dictates that petitioner’s [private respondent] right to cross-examine and present rebuttal evidence should be granted. An even handed treatment of the parties would require the same attitude towards the acceptance of petitioner’s [private respondent’s] right to cross-examine and present its rebuttal evidence on the same.26 [Rollo, pp. 61-62.]

In Fortune Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,27 [229 SCRA 368 (1994).] this Court set aside upon review by certiorari the order of the trial court allowing deposition because the order did not conform to the essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury to the adverse party:

The rule is that certiorari will generally not lie to review a discretionary action of any tribunal. Also, as a general proposition, a writ of certiorari is available only to review final judgment or decrees, and will be refused where there has been no final judgment or order and the proceeding for which the writ is sought is still pending and undetermined in the lower tribunal. Pursuant to this rule, it has been held that certiorari will not lie to review or correct discovery orders made prior to trial. This is because, like other discovery orders, orders made under Section 16, Rule 24 are interlocutory and not appealable considering that they do not finally dispose of the proceeding or of any independent offshoot of it. Calrky

However, such rules are subject to the exception that discretionary acts will be reviewed where the lower court or tribunal has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, where an interlocutory order does not conform to essential requirements of law and may reasonably cause material injury throughout the subsequent proceedings for which the remedy of appeal will be inadequate, or where there is a clear or serious abuse of discretion.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby DENIES the petition for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno and Santiago, JJ., on official business abroadExsm