"WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the election of USTFU officers conducted on October 4, 1996 and its election results as null and void ab initio.

"Accordingly, respondents Gil Gamilla, et al are hereby ordered to cease and desist from acting and performing the duties and functions of the legitimate officers of [the] University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) pursuant to [the] union’s constitution and by-laws (CBL).

"The Temporary Restraining Order (TRO ) issued by this Office on December 11, 1996 in connection with the instant petition, is hereby made and declared permanent."3 [Rollo, pp. 72-73.]

"Petitioners-appellees [herein Private Respondents] Marino, et. al. (appellees) are duly elected officers of the UST Faculty Union (USTFU). The union has a subsisting five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement with its employer, the University of Santo Tomas (UST). The CBA was registered with the Industrial Relations Division, DOLE-NCR, on 20 February 1995. It is set to expire on 31 May 1998. Sdaad

"On 21 September 1996, appellee Collantes, in her capacity as Secretary General of USTFU, posted a notice addressed to all USTFU members announcing a general assembly to be held on 05 October 1996. Among others, the general assembly was called to elect USTFU’s next set of officers. Through the notice, the members were also informed of the constitution of a Committee on Elections (COMELEC) to oversee the elections. (Annex "B", petition)

"On 01 October 1996, some of herein appellants filed a separate petition with the Med-Arbiter, DOLE-NCR, directed against herein appellees and the members of the COMELEC. Docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001, the petition alleged that the COMELEC was not constituted in accordance with USTFU’s constitution and by-laws (CBL) and that no rules had been issued to govern the conduct of the 05 October 1996 election.

"On 02 October 1996, the secretary general of UST, upon the request of the various UST faculty club presidents (See paragraph VI, Respondents’ Comment and Motion to Dismiss), issued notices allowing all faculty members to hold a convocation on 04 October 1996 (See Annex ‘C’ Petition; Annexes ‘4’ to ‘10’, Appeal). Denominated as [a] general faculty assembly, the convocation was supposed to discuss the ‘state of the unratified UST-USTFU CBA’ and ‘status and election of USTFU officers’ (Annex ‘11’, Appeal) SdaaÓ miso

"On 04 October 1996, the med-arbiter in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001 issued a temporary restraining order against herein appellees enjoining them from conducting the election scheduled on 05 October 1996.

"Also on 04 October 1996, and as earlier announced by the UST secretary general, the general faculty assembly was held as scheduled. The general assembly was attended by members of the USTFU and, as admitted by the appellants, also by 'non-USTFU members [who] are members in good standing of the UST Academic Community Collective Bargaining Unit' (See paragraph XI, Respondents’ Comment and Motion to Dismiss). On this occasion, appellants were elected as USTFU’s new set of officers by acclamation and clapping of hands (See paragraphs 40 to 50, Annex '12', Appeal).

"The election of the appellants came about upon a motion of one Atty. Lopez, admittedly not a member of USTFU, that the USTFU CBL and 'the rules of the election be suspended and that the election be held [on] that day' (See --paragraph 39, Idem.) Scncä m

"On 11 October 1996, appellees filed the instant petition seeking injunctive reliefs and the nullification of the results of the 04 October 1996 election. Appellees alleged that the holding of the same violated the temporary restraining order issued in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001. Accusing appellants of usurpation, appellees characterized the election as spurious for being violative of USTFU’s CBL, specifically because the general assembly resulting in the election of appellants was not called by the Board of Officers of the USTFU; there was no compliance with the ten-day notice rule required by Section 1, Article VIII of the CBL; the supposed elections were conducted without a COMELEC being constituted by the Board of Officers in accordance with Section 1, Article IX of the CBL; the elections were not by secret balloting as required by Section 1, Article V and Section 6, Article IX of the CBL, and, the general assembly was convened by faculty members some of whom were not members of USTFU, so much so that non-USTFU members were allowed to vote in violation of Section 1, Article V of the CBL.

"On 24 October 1996, appellees filed another urgent ex-parte motion for a temporary restraining order, this time alleging that appellants had served the former a notice to vacate the union office. For their part, appellants moved to dismiss the original petition and the subsequent motion on jurisdictional grounds. Both the petition and the motion were captioned to be for "Prohibition, Injunction with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order." According to the appellants, the med-arbiter has no jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition, 'including the ancillary remedies of restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, which are merely incidental to the main petition for PROHIBITION' (Paragraph XVIII3, Respondents’ Comment and Motion to Dismiss). Appellants also averred that they now constituted the new set of union officers having been elected in accordance with law after the term of office of appellees had expired. They further maintained that appellees’ scheduling of the 5 October 1996 elections was illegal because no rules and regulations governing the elections were promulgated as required by USTFU’s CBL and that one of the members of the COMELEC was not a registered member of USTFU. Appellants likewise noted that the elections called by the appellees should have been postponed to allow the promulgation of rules and regulations and to 'insure a free, clean, honest and orderly elections and to afford at the same time the greater majority of the general membership to participate' (See paragraph V, Idem). Finally, appellants contended that the holding of the general faculty assembly on 04 October 1996 was under the control of the Council of College/Faculty Club Presidents in cooperation with the USTFU Reformist Alliance and that they received the Temporary Restraining Order issued in Case No. NCR-OD-M-9610-001 only on 07 October 1996 and were not aware of the same on 04 October 1996. Jurisä

"On 03 December 1996, appellants and UST allegedly entered into another CBA covering the period from 01 June 1996 to 31 May 2001 (Annex 11, appellants’ Rejoinder to the Reply and Opposition).

"Consequently, appellees again moved for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to prevent appellants from making further representations that [they] had entered into a new agreement with UST. Appellees also reiterated their earlier stand that appellants were usurping the former’s duties and functions and should be stopped from continuing such acts.

"On 11 December 1996, over appellants’ insistence that the issue of jurisdiction should first be resolved, the med-arbiter issued a temporary restraining order directing the respondents to cease and desist from performing any and all acts pertaining to the duties and functions of the officers and directors of USTFU.

"In the meantime, appellants claimed that the new CBA was purportedly ratified by an overwhelming majority of UST’s academic community on 12 December 1996 (Annexes 1 to 10, Idem). For this reason, appellants moved for the dismissal of what it denominated as appellees’ petition for prohibition on the ground that this had become moot and academic."5 [Rollo, pp. 75-79.]

"This submission is flawed. The issue at hand is not collective bargaining representation but union leadership, a matter that should concern only the members of USTFU. As pointed out by the appellees, the privilege of determining who the union officers will be belongs exclusively to the members of the union. Said privilege is exercised in an election proceeding in accordance with the union's CBL and applicable law. Miso

"To accept appellants' claim to legitimacy on the foregoing grounds is to invest in appellants the position, duties, responsibilities, rights and privileges of USTFU officers without the benefit of a lawful electoral exercise as defined in USTFU's CBL and Article 241(c) of the Labor Code. Not to mention the fact that labor laws prohibit the employer from interfering with the employees in the latter' exercise of their right to self-organization. To allow appellants to become USTFU officers on the strength of management's recognition of them is to concede to the employer the power of determining who should be USTFU's leaders. This is a clear case of interference in the exercise by USTFU members of their right to self-organization."8 [Ibid., p. 12; rollo, p. 85.]

"(1) Whether the Collective Bargaining Unit of all the faculty members in that General Faculty Assembly had the right in that General Faculty Assembly to suspend the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws of the USTFU regarding the elections of officers of the union[.]

"(2) Whether the suspension of the provisions of the Constitution and By-Laws of the USTFU in that General Faculty Assembly is valid pursuant to the constitutional right of the Collective Bargaining Unit to engage in "peaceful concerted activities" for the purpose of ousting the corrupt regime of the private respondents[.]

"(3) Whether the overwhelming ratification of the Collective Bargaining Agreement executed by the petitioners in behalf of the USTFU with the University of Santo Tomas has rendered moot and academic the issue as to the validity of the suspension of the Constitution and By-Laws and the elections of October 4, 1996 in the General Faculty Assembly[.]"

"When a man joins a labor union (or almost any other democratically controlled group), necessarily a portion of his individual freedom is surrendered for the benefit of all members. He accepts the will of the majority of the members in order that he may derive the advantages to be gained from the concerted action of all. Just as the enactments of the legislature bind all of us, to the constitution and by-laws of the union (unless contrary to good morals or public policy, or otherwise illegal), which are duly enacted through democratic processes, bind all of the members. If a member of a union dislikes the provisions of the by-laws, he may seek to have them amended or may withdraw from the union; otherwise, he must abide by them. It is not the function of courts to decide the wisdom or propriety of legitimate by-laws of a trade union. Scsä daad

"On joining a labor union, the constitution and by-laws become a part of the member’s contract of membership under which he agrees to become bound by the constitution and governing rules of the union so far as it is not inconsistent with controlling principles of law. The constitution and by-laws of an unincorporated trade union express the terms of a contract, which define the privileges and rights secured to, and duties assumed by, those who have become members. The agreement of a member on joining a union to abide by its laws and comply with the will of the lawfully constituted majority does not require a member to submit to the determination of the union any question involving his personal rights."16 [Ang Malayang Manggagawa ng Ang Tibay Enterprises et al. v. Ang Tibay, 102 Phil. 669, December 23, 1957, per Bautista Angelo, J.]

"The constitutional right to self-organization is better understood in the context of ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of Right to Organize), to which the Philippines is signatory. Article 3 of the Convention provides that workers’ organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitution and rules and to elect their representatives in full freedom, free from any interference from public authorities. The freedom conferred by the provision is expansive; the responsibility imposed on union members to respect the constitution and rules they themselves draw up equally so. The point to be stressed is that the union’s CBL is the fundamental law that governs the relationship between and among the members of the union. It is where the rights, duties and obligations, powers, functions and authority of the officers as well as the members are defined. It is the organic law that determines the validity of acts done by any officer or member of the union. Without respect for the CBL, a union as a democratic institution degenerates into nothing more than a group of individuals governed by mob rule."

"ARTICLE VIII-MEETINGS OF THE UNION

"Section 1. The Union shall hold regular general membership meetings at least once every three (3) months. Notices of the meeting shall be sent out by the Secretary-General at least ten (10) days prior to such meetings by posting in conspicuous places, preferably inside Company premises, said notices. The date, time and place for the meetings shall be determined by the Board of Officers."23 [Rollo, p. 288.] Jjä lex

"ARTICLE IX - UNION ELECTION

Section 1. There shall be a Committee on Election (COMELEC) to be created by the Board of Officers at least thirty (30) days before any regular or special election. The functions of the COMELEC include the following:

a).....Adopt and promulgate rules and regulations that will ensure a free, clean, honest and orderly election, whether regular or special; Acctä mis

b).....Pass upon qualifications of candidates;

c).....Rule on any question or protest regarding the conduct of the election subject to the procedure that may be promulgated by the Board of Officers; and

d).....Proclaim duly elected officers.

Section 2......The COMELEC shall be composed of a chairman and two members all of whom shall be appointed by the Board of Officers.

"Further, appellants cannot be heard to say that the CBL was effectively suspended during the 04 October 1996 general assembly. A union CBL is a covenant between the union and its members and among members (Johnson and Johnson Labor Union-FFW, et al. v. Director of Labor Relations, 170 SCRA 469). Where ILO Convention No. 87 speaks of a union’s full freedom to draw up its constitution and rules, it includes freedom from interference by persons who are not members of the union. The democratic principle that governance is a matter for the governed to decide upon applies to the labor movement which, by law and constitutional mandate, must be assiduously insulated against intrusions coming from both the employer and complete strangers if the 'protection to labor clause' of the constitution is to be guaranteed. By appellant’s own evidence, the general faculty assembly of 04 October 1996 was not a meeting of USTFU. It was attended by members and non-members alike, and therefore was not a forum appropriate for transacting union matters. The person who moved for the suspension of USTFU’s CBL was not a member of USTFU. Allowing a non-union member to initiate the suspension of a union’s CBL, and non-union members to participate in a union election on the premise that the union’s CBL had been suspended in the meantime, is incompatible with the freedom of association and protection of the right to organize.

"If there are members of the so-called ‘academic community collective bargaining unit’ who are not USTFU members but who would nevertheless want to have a hand in USTFU’s affairs, the appropriate procedure would have been for them to become members of USTFU first. The procedure for membership is very clearly spelled out in Article IV of USTFU’s CBL. Having become members, they could then draw guidance from Ang Malayang Manggagawa Ng Ang Tibay v. Ang Tibay, 103 Phil. 669. Therein the Supreme Court held that ‘if a member of the union dislikes the provisions of the by-laws he may seek to have them amended or may withdraw from the union; otherwise he must abide by them.’ Under Article XVII of USTFU’s CBL, there is also a specific provision for constitutional amendments. What is clear therefore is that USTFU’s CBL provides for orderly procedures and remedies which appellants could have easily availed [themselves] of instead of resorting to an exercise of their so-called ‘residual power'."26 [Rollo, pp. 83-84.] Sppedscâ