PER CURIAM: Ncmmis

For automatic review here is a judgment rendered by Branch 161 [Presided by Judge Jesus Carbon.] of the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City, convicting Rodrigo Lasola y Jaime of two counts of rape of an under-aged relative and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for one count and the supreme penalty of death for the other count.

Filed on April 6, 1995 by the victim, Rudymer Lasola, and her mother, Myrna Lasola, the Complaint against Rodrigo Lasola y Jaime in Criminal Case No. 13196, alleges:

Filed on the same day, the other Complaint against the said felon, docketed below as Criminal Case No. 13197, avers: Ncm

With accused – appellant entering a plea of Not Guilty, upon arraignment on May 5, 1995, with the assistance of his counsel, Atty. Pablo Barrera, the two cases were tried jointly, resulting in the rendition of subject judgment of conviction dated November 3, 1995, with the following decretal portion:

In arriving at its aforesaid finding of guilt, the trial court gave credence to the version of the victim, and culled the inculpatory facts and events, thus:

xxx......xxx......xxx

xxx......xxx......xxx

The facts as testified on by the victim, Rudymer, were corroborated on material points by the testimony of her mother Myrna, who actually witnessed what transpired on April 4, 1995. To her testimony, Myrna added that she "remembered that she saw blood in Rudymer’s panty and blanket when she was nine (9) years old"5 [TSN, Myrna Lasola, p. 48.] and that accused – appellant was lazy, often drunk and used to beat her and Rudymer.

The prosecution likewise presented Tata Quijano and PO2 Renato de la Pena, who brought Rudymer to the Zamboanga City Medical Center for physical examination. Conducted by Dr. Rodolfo M. Valmoria, the medico-legal examination yielded the following report:

Accused-appellant interposed the defense of denial. He theorized that his wife and daughter concocted the charges against him "because his wife is always mad at him."7 [TSN, Rodrigo Lasola p. 19, May 22, 1995.] His testimony also revealed that as early as 1991, his wife already suspected him of raping Rudymer8 [Ibid, pp. 23, 34-35.] and that notwithstanding the accusations made by his wife, he did not get angry at the latter.9 [Ibid, pp. 35-37.] Accused-appellant admitted that his wife told him about the blood on their daughter’s blanket and underwear. However, he claimed that the blood on Rudymer’s panty was that of Myrna because she used the panty of Rudymer as napkin when menstruating.10 [Ibid, p. 35.]

Accused-appellant did not present any witness other than himself.

Convinced that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged, the trial court a quo handed down the decision under automatic review. Although accused-appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua only in one case, with respect to which automatic review is not required, the penalty imposed in the other case being death, the two cases which were tried jointly below, have to be decided jointly in this decision.

Upon elevation of the cases to this Court, the Free Legal Assistance Group, Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, entered its appearance for the defense. In attacking the judgment of conviction under review, accused-appellant placed reliance on the lone albeit encompassing ground, that:

In more than one instance,12 [People vs. Antido, 278 SCRA 425, citing People vs. De los Reyes, 203 SCRA 707 (1991); People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 (1991); People vs. Casinillo, 231 SCRA 777 (1992); People vs. Matrimonio, 125 SCRA 613 (1992); People vs. Lucas, 232 SCRA 537 (1994)] this Court has had the opportunity to lay down the basic principles and guidelines for the determination of rape cases, to wit: 1) an accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; 2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and 3) the evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Scjuris

More in point to the present case is this Court’s ruling in People vs. David Silvano13 [G.R. No. 127356, June 29, 1999 citing People vs. Mahinay, G.R. No. 122485, February 1, 1999.] that in cases of qualified rape of an under-aged relative, the prosecution must allege and prove the ordinary elements of 1) sexual congress, 2) with a woman, 3) by force and without consent, and in order to warrant the imposition of the death penalty, the additional elements that 4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and 5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim.

Well-settled too, is the doctrine that when a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to constitute the commission of the crime, and this rule applies with more vigor when the culprit is a close relative of the victim.14 [People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293, citing People vs. Matrimonia, 215 SCRA 613, 632.] The victim’s lone testimony, if credible, is sufficient to convict.15 [People vs. Antonio, 233 SCRA 283, citing People vs. Grefiel, 215 SCRA 296 (1992)]

In the case at bar, the trial court found Rudymer’s account of her harrowing experience "clear, positive and convincing and free from any serious contradiction. There is thus no reason at all for the Court not to accept her testimony that she was raped by her own father, as true."16 [Decision, Rollo, p. 51.] Also convinced that the victim’s mother, Myrna Lasola, was telling the truth, the trial court stated: Jurissc

Jurisprudential annals is replete with the rule that the findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts, subject to certain exceptions.18 [People vs. Silvano, G.R. No. 127356, June 29, 1999 citing People vs. Cura, 310 Phil.237, 247; People vs. Dado, 314 Phil. 635; People vs. Tan, Jr., 264 SCRA 425; People vs. Ganan, et al., 265 SCRA 260; Olondriz, Jr. vs. People, 152 SCRA 65.] Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest respect.19 [People vs. Abangin, G.R. No. 125939 – 40, Oct. 12, 1998.] Misjuris

After a painstaking examination of Rudymer’s narration of the events as well as of Myrna’s own account thereof, the Court is of the considered opinion that, indeed, the victim Rudymer and her mother Myrna were telling the truth with all candor and honesty. Their testimonies were positive, straightforward and free from embellishments such that they must prevail over the bare denials of accused-appellant. The Court discerns no cause for doubting the veracity of their testimonies. Except for their desire to put an end to the dastardly deeds perpetrated by appellant and to find vindication in the arms of justice, it cannot conjure of any other reason as to why accused-appellant will be brought to fore by the very people with whom he shares marital as well as filial love and affection.

The Court cannot accept accused-appellant’s theory that the charges filed against him were motivated by the desire of Myrna to get rid of him due to the maltreatment which both mother and daughter suffered in his hands. Time and again, this defense has been raised and each time, the Court has struck it down as incredible, contrary to reason and too unnatural to merit faith and credit. As held recently by this Court:20 [People vs. Silvano, G.R. No. 127356, June 29, 1999 citing: People vs. Escober, 281 SCRA 498; People vs. Romua, 272 SCRA 818; People vs. San Juan, 270 SCRA 693; People vs. Zaballero, 274 SCRA 627; People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384; People vs. Burce, 269 SCRA 293; People vs. Gabayron, 278 SCRA 78; People vs. Arellano, 282 SCRA 500; Ugaddan vs. CA, 275 SCRA 35; People vs. Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527; People vs. Salvame, 270 SCRA 766; and People vs. Tabaco, 270 SCRA 32)]

Accused-appellant’s assertion that Myrna’s reaction upon seeing her daughter being raped "does not conform to human experience"21 [Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, pp. 102-103.] deserves scant consideration. As aptly argued by the Solicitor General, different people react differently to a given type of situation and there is no standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a startling, strange of frightful experience.22 [Appellee’s Brief, p. 12 quoting: People vs. Espinoza, 247 SCRA 66.] There is no such thing as "normal human behavior"23 [Appellant’s Reply Brief, Rollo, p. 12.] when a person is faced with an extraordinary circumstance.

Neither is there need to delve at length into the issue that the medico-legal report is "inconclusive proof of the commission of the offense, much less the guilt of the accused."24 [Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, p. 26.] A medico-legal report is not indispensable when evidence other than the same point to the inescapable guilt of the accused. It is merely corroborative evidence, the absence of which would not prevent the prosecution from establishing the fact of rape, which in this case, was proved not just by the lone testimony of the victim but also by another witness in the person of her mother. Jjlex

Accused-appellant would like this Court to consider that the trial judge acted unjudiciously by participating actively in the trial of the case through adverse questioning, citing as authority the case of People vs. Opida.25 [142 SCRA 295.] Appellant maintains that the trial judge went beyond the "accepted parameters for clarificatory questioning"26 [Appellant’s Brief, Rollo, p. 17.] which violated the right of the accused to due process and therefore, ousted the trial court of origin of its jurisdiction.

We disagree. While the Court cannot help but admire the efforts of the defense counsel in ensuring that no avenue for exculpation is left unexplored, the Court is nonetheless constrained to hold that such submission is direly strained and in vain. After a careful perusal of the records on hand and the transcript of stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses there is perceived no indication that the trial judge conducted himself improperly or with bias and prejudice. If at all, the court a quo’s actuations merely manifested its desire to get to the bottom of things and to make sure that it would be rendering judgment upon a clear assessment and understanding of the facts. The questioning by the trial court was neither "adversarial, irrelevant nor cruel"27 [Ibid p. 112.] and was within the proper bounds of judicial prerogative.

All things studiedly considered, the Court is of the ineluctable conclusion, and so finds, that the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his own daughter. Consistent with recent rulings,28 [People vs. Lopez, Feb. 8, 1999; People vs. Calayca, G.R. No. 121212, Jan. 20, 1999.] the amount of P75,000.00 should be awarded to the victim as indemnity it appearing that the rape complained of is qualified by circumstances making the imposition of death penalty authorized under the law. For the simple rape, a lesser award of P50,000.00 is proper. Acctmis

Four members of the Court are steadfast in their adherence to the separate opinion expressed in People vs. Echegaray29 [G.R. No. 117472, Feb. 7, 1997.] that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty. However, they bow to the majority opinion that the aforesaid law is constitutional and therefore, the penalty prescribed thereunder has to be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant RODRIGO LASOLA y JAIME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged and imposing upon him the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua in Criminal Case No. 13196 and that of DEATH in Criminal Case No. 13197 is AFFIRMED with the modification that apart from the moral and exemplary damages awarded below, accused-appellant is sentenced to pay civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 13196 and P75,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 13197.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.12/1/99 10:18 AM