ULANDU

The case before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 [Under Rule 65 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.] assailing as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction the decision2 [Penned by Presiding Commissioner Lourdes C. Javier and concurred in by Commissioners Ireneo B. Bernardo and Joaquin A. Tanodra. Rollo, pp. 74-81.] of the National labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversing the labor arbiter’s decision3 [Penned by Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Saludres, Rollo, pp. 52-61.] finding that petitioner Jose Gaudia was illegally dismissed by his employer, respondent Paniqui Sugar Corporation.

The facts are as follows: LEX

In November 1977, petitioner was employed as company driver of respondent corporation earning a monthly salary of P2,940.00.

On February 19, 1990, there was found a 45" x 8" iron rail worth P500.00 hidden in respondent’s truck driven by Abraham Gaudia as it was about to leave the company compound. Abraham Gaudia, petitioner’s nephew, denied any knowledge of the iron rail. He pointed to his uncle, petitioner herein, as having concealed the iron rail under the truck.

In a memorandum4 [Rollo, p. 48.] dated February 28, 1990, respondent corporation directed petitioner to submit within seventy-two (72) hours a written explanation on why he should not be dismissed from employment for pilferage of company property.

On March 5, 1990, respondent corporation, by Memorandum No. 08,5 [Rollo, p. 49.] terminated petitioner’s employment effective March 6, 1990 for engaging in an act prejudicial to the interests of the company.

On March 9, 1990, the union president Efren S. Muñoz wrote a letter6 [Rollo, p. 26.] to respondent Jose A. Romasanta, Assistant Vice-President for Administration of respondent corporation, requesting for a re-investigation of petitioner’s dismissal.

Unmoved by the request for a re-investigation, respondent corporation filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 67, Paniqui, Tarlac a complaint against petitioner for qualified theft. Jjä sc

In a letter7 [Rollo, p. 50.] dated December 8, 1990, petitioner requested respondent Romasanta to drop the case for qualified theft. In return, petitioner signified that he was resigning as company driver with a waiver of all benefits, rights and privileges accorded to an employee being separated from the service.

On February 28, 1991, the court dismissed the case for qualified theft against petitioner.

On August 9, 1991, petitioner filed with the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, San Fernando, Pampanga a complaint for illegal dismissal against respondents with a prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, full backwages, privileges, moral and exemplary damages amounting to P50,000.00 and litigation expenses totalling P10,000.00.

On June 5, 1992, after due hearing, Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Saludares rendered a decision finding the respondents guilty of illegally dismissing petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:

On June 29, 1992, respondents received notice of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. On July 9, 1992, respondents filed an appeal memorandum9 [Rollo, pp. 63-70.] with the NLRC, without posting the cash or surety bond as required under Rule VI, Section 3 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.

On July 15, 1992, petitioner moved for execution of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, claiming that said decision had become final and executory for non-perfection of respondent’s appeal brought about by their failure to post the required bond within the ten-day reglementary period.

On July 17, 1992, Labor Arbiter Saludares issued a writ of execution.

On August 6, 1992, private respondents filed with the Labor Arbiter’s Office an Ex-Parte Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution.

Meantime, on August 3, 1992, private respondents posted with the Labor Arbiter’s Office a surety bond.

On November 20, 1992, the NLRC rendered decision reversing the Labor Arbiter’s judgment. It found that there was sufficient cause to dismiss petitioner, but that there was non-compliance with due process since the dismissal was effective on March 6, 1990 or only a day after petitioner received the notice of dismissal. Private respondents were thus directed to indemnify petitioner in the amount of P3,000.00 for failure to comply strictly with the requisites of due process.10 [Decision, NLRC, Rollo, pp. 74-81, at p. 80.]

On January 29, 1993, the NLRC denied11 [Resolution, NLRC, Rollo, pp. 84-85.] petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of its November 20, 1992 decision.

Hence, this petition.12 [Petition filed on April 1, 1993, Rollo, pp. 2-15.]

Petitioner submits that: (1) the NLRC erred in giving due course to the appeal notwithstanding private respondent’s failure to post the cash or surety bond within the reglementary period, and (2) the NLRC erred in holding that respondents had sufficient cause to dismiss petitioner.

On November 13, 1995, we gave due course to the petition.13 [Rollo, p. 144.]

The petition is impressed with merit. Misoedpâ

On the procedural issue involved, petitioner points out that the posting of a cash or surety bond is a mandatory requirement for the perfection of an appeal to the NLRC from a judgment of the Labor Arbiter. This is clearly prescribed in Article 223 of the Labor Code and Sections 3 and 6, Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC which read, respectively:

"xxx......xxx......xxx

"xxx......xxx......xxx."

xxx."

In "Viron Garments Manufacturing Co., Inc., vs. NLRC, et al.,"14 [207 SCRA 339, 342 (1992)] the Court said: Edâ p

In this case, respondents filed their notice of appeal within the ten-day period (July 9, 1992), however, they posted a surety bond only on August 3, 1992, or almost a month after the appeal period had lapsed. The explanation proferred by respondents that the surety failed to attach the required Supreme Court certification to the bond is not an excuse for the delay. The duty to ensure that the bond satisfies all the formal requirements before it is filed within the ten-day appeal period rests solely on the respondents as appellants.

Having failed to file the required bond within the reglementary period, private respondent’s appeal to the NLRC had not been perfected, thus making the Labor Arbiter’s decision final and executory. "This is so as perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdicitonal, and failure to perfect an appeal as required by the Rules has the effect of rendering the judgment final and executory."15 [Filcon Manufacturing Corp. vs. NLRC, 199 SCRA 814, 822 (1991) citing Narag vs. NLRC, 155 scra 199 (1987)] Clearly then, the NLRC has no authority to entertain the appeal, much less to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter. "Any amendment or alteration made which substantially affects the final and executory judgment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceeding held for that purpose."16 [Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Briones, 165 SCRA 464, 470 (1988)] Edpä sc

With the preceding disquisition, it is no longer necessary for the Court to delve into the other issue raised by petitioner on whether there is sufficient cause to dismiss him. That has been passed upon in his favor by the Labor Arbiter whose decision was final and executory.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and SET ASIDE NLRC’s decision dated November 20, 1992 ands resolution dated January 29, 1993 in NLRC CA No. L-000667-92. In lieu thereof, we declare final and executory Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Salvadores’ decision dated June 5, 1992, as follows: