2/11/00 9:08 AM 

This is an appeal from the Decision1 [Criminal Case No. 453-M-96.] of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan convicting accused-appellants for the crime of murder committed against Michael Manlapig y Capalaran as follows: Sdjad

Trial ensued after accused-appellants pled not guilty to the charge.

The prosecution presented the victim’s common-law-wife, Marissa B. Manlapig. She testified that on the night of February 25, 1996, Michael slept drunk. She followed him to bed at 11:00 p.m. Before sleeping, she left a gas lamp (gasera) lighted as she had a little child. Afterward, she woke up because of a stomachache and she heard a rustling noise by the door. She squinted and looked toward the direction of the sound. She noticed that the door was open. She saw persons inside the house. She recognized them because of the light coming from the gas lamp. They were Alberto and Rodolfo Flores. She pretended to close her eyes and saw the intruders proceed near their bed. Rodolfo then stabbed Michael at the back of his left ear while Alberto was strangling him. They put down his head and left.3 [TSN, May 27, 1996, pp. 3-7.] The culprits were merely one (1) foot away from Marissa when they killed Michael.4 [Ibid., p. 14.]

Marissa went out of the house and called her brothers and sisters. They brought the victim to the Prado Hospital, Baliuag, Bulacan, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Dr. Severino Marcelo who attended the victim found a 1.5 centimeter lacerated wound near his ear (preauricular area).5 [TSN, September 9, 1996, p. 3.] He opined that the assailant was at the right lateral side of the victim when it was inflicted. He did not conduct an autopsy of the victim.6 [Ibid., pp. 2-4.] Court

The following morning, Marissa reported the crime to Eladio San Pedro, Chief of the Investigation Section of the Baliuag Police Station. She stated she had no knowledge how Michael was killed. San Pedro asked Marissa whom she suspected of the crime. She named Alberto Flores because a day before the incident, the latter had a quarrel with Michael at the market. Michael told her about the quarrel on the morning of February 25, 1996. Thus, San Pedro led a team of police officers and went to the house of Alberto Flores. They arrested and brought him to the police Station. At the police station, Alberto allegedly admitted that he and Rodolfo killed the victim in order to exact revenge.7 [TSN, July 1, 1996, pp. 3-5.] Alberto made the admission without the assistance of counsel. He was arrested without any warrant of arrest.

Accused-appellants interposed denial and alibi as their defense. Rodolfo Flores alleged that he and the victim were neighbors at Little Baguio, Baliuag, Bulacan. They had known each other for at least six years. He was at home at the time of the incident. He denied that he had any reason to kill the victim. He only learned that Michael was killed upon his arrest. He was detained at the municipal jail of Baliuag and later transferred in the provincial jail.8 [TSN, October 2, 1996, pp. 2-4.]

Alberto Flores claimed that he was at home sleeping during the time of the incident. He resides at Libis, Baliuag, Bulacan which is two (2) barrios away from Little Baguio. He knows the victim but they were neither friends nor enemies.

After his arrest, he was detained at the municipal jail of Baliuag, Bulacan and later transferred at the provincial jail. He complained that policeman San Pedro has previously arrested him for crimes that he did not commit.9 [Ibid, pp. 6-7, 9.]

In a decision dated April 3, 1997, the trial court convicted the accused-appellants. It relied heavily on the testimony of Marissa. It held that she has no reason to testify falsely against them. It observed that she testified sincerely, candidly and was straightforward in the witness stand. It accepted her explanation that she did not immediately identify the accused-appellants out of fear as they were then still at large. It ruled that the positive identification of the accused negated their defense.10 [RTC Decision, p. 18, penned by Judge Manuel R. Ortiguerra.] The trial court further found that treachery attended the commission of the crime. Jlexj

The disposition of the decision reads:

Accused-appellants assign the following errors committed by the trial court, viz:

In support of these assignment of errors, accused-appellants cite the glaring inconsistencies made by Marissa in her sworn statement at the police station and her testimony in court. In her sworn statement, she claimed that she did not see how and who killed the victim. She alleged that the victim was stabbed twice –"isa sa kanang sentido (right temple) at isa sa kanang butas ng tainga (right ear)."13 [Exhibit "A"; Records, p. 5.] However, in her testimony, she claimed that she saw Rodolfo stab the victim. She declared that the victim was stabbed on his left temple14 [TSN, May 27, 1996, p. 7.] and left ear.15 [Ibid., p. 15.] Accused-appellants also insist lack of motive to kill the victim.

We acquit.

Jurisprudence forewarns that when serious and inexplicable discrepancies are present between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and her testimonial declarations with respect to one's participation in a serious imputation such as murder, there is raised a grave doubt on the veracity of the witness’ account.16 [People vs. Ortiz, 650 SCRA 641 (1996)] In the case at bar, it is difficult to reconcile the inconsistencies made by Marissa in her sworn statement and testimony in court. It is even more difficult to accept her explanation in committing these inconsistencies.

An examination of her sworn statement and her testimony will reveal why her truthfulness is doubtful. In her sworn statement, she answered the questions of the investigating officer in the following manner:

In the witness stand, she testified that:

"xxx

On cross-examination, she tried to explain the contradiction as follows:

Marissa’s explanation is implausible. As can be seen, Marissa gave the names of accused-appellants in her statement. Thus, her explanation that she did not identify accused-appellants out of fear strains credulity to its seams. When a witness makes two sworn statements and these two statements contradict each other in essential details, the court cannot accept either statement as worthy evidence. By his own act of giving false testimony, the witness impeaches his own testimony.20 [See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. II, 1995, p. 684, citing U.S. vs. Pala, et al., Phil. 190 (1911)]

To be sure, her sworn statement supports the theory that she did not really see who stabbed her husband. Thus:

Even the alleged motive of accused-appellants in killing the victim can not be given full faith and credit. Again, Marissa offered two versions on how she came to know such motive. In her sworn statement she said:

On the witness stand, she changed her sworn statement to:

"xxx

"xxx

On cross examination, Marissa further muddled up the issue of motive. This time, she said she had personal differences with the accused-appellants, viz:

The trial court should have rejected the story of Marissa on the alleged motive of accused-appellants. Her story rests on the quicksand of hearsay. The alleged quarrel between the victim and the accused-appellants was beyond her personal knowledge.

Equally perplexing is the absolute absence of any action on the part of Marissa when she saw the intruders before they killed the victim. By her testimony, she did not even wake up the victim to warn him that there were intruders in their house. She did not call for help. Neither did she attempt to help the victim while he was being attacked. Nor did she make any move to protect her children who were sleeping by her side. All these omissions do not enhance her credibility.

The Court has no option but to acquit. This is in keeping with the worn-out principle that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.25 [People vs. Solis, 182 SCRA 182 (1990)] So often has it been said that it is better for 100 criminals to go free than for one innocent man to be convicted.26 [People vs. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313 (1990)] Conviction should be decreed only when the exacting standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt is met.

Finally, the Court commends the Free Legal Aid Clinic of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter for handling the case of accused-appellants with due diligence. Especially worthy of mention is the efforts of Atty. Crescenciano C. Santiago who defended the accused-appellants pro bono yet with commendable zeal and skill.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is reversed. Accused-appellants are ACQUITTED because of reasonable doubt. They are ordered released from confinement immediately, unless they are being lawfully held for other reasons. The Director of Prisons shall inform this Court of the proper implementation of this Decision within ten (10) days from its receipt.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. ULANDU