This is a petition for review of the decision1 [Per Judge Patrocinio R. Corpuz.] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, San Fernando, Pampanga, dismissing the suit filed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for collection of tax.

The facts are as follows:

On July 18, 1986, the BIR issued to respondent Salud V. Hizon a deficiency income tax assessment of P1,113,359.68 covering the fiscal year 1981-1982. Respondent not having contested the assessment, petitioner, on January 12, 1989, served warrants of distraint and levy to collect the tax deficiency. However, for reasons not known, it did not proceed to dispose of the attached properties. Esmsoâ

More than three years later, or on November 3, 1992, respondent wrote the BIR requesting a reconsideration of her tax deficiency assessment. The BIR, in a letter dated August 11, 1994, denied the request. On January 1, 1997, it filed a case with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, San Fernando, Pampanga to collect the tax deficiency. The complaint was signed by Norberto Salud, Chief of the Legal Division, BIR Region 4, and verified by Amancio Saga, the Bureau’s Regional Director in Pampanga.

Respondent moved to dismiss the case on two grounds: (1) that the complaint was not filed upon authority of the BIR Commissioner as required by §2212 [Now §220, as amended by Republic Act No. 8424.] of the National Internal Revenue Code, and (2) that the action had already prescribed. Over petitioner’s objection, the trial court, on August 28, 1997, granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:3 [Petition, p. 7; Rollo, p. 13.]

First. In sustaining respondent’s contention that petitioner’s complaint was filed without the authority of the BIR Commissioner, the trial court stated:4 [Petition, Annex A, p. 3; Rollo, p. 37.]

The trial court arrived at this conclusion because the complaint filed by the BIR was not signed by then Commissioner Liwayway Chato.

Sec. 221 of the NIRC provides:

To implement this provision Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-83 of the BIR provides in pertinent portions:

Revenue Administrative Order No. 10-95 specifically authorizes the Litigation and Prosecution Section of the Legal Division of regional district offices to institute the necessary civil and criminal actions for tax collection. As the complaint filed in this case was signed by the BIR’s Chief of Legal Division for Region 4 and verified by the Regional Director, there was, therefore, compliance with the law.

However, the lower court refused to recognize RAO No. 10-95 and, by implication, RAO No. 5-83. It held: EsmmÓ is

This is erroneous. The rule is that as long as administrative issuances relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid and have the force of law.6 [United States v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119 (1914); Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, 144 Phil. 592 (1970); Cena v. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 179 (1992)] The governing statutory provision in this case is §4(d) of the NIRC which provides:

RAO Nos. 5-83 and 10-95 are in harmony with this statutory mandate.

As amended by R.A. No. 8424, the NIRC is now even more categorical. Sec. 7 of the present Code authorizes the BIR Commissioner to delegate the powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of the Code to any subordinate official with the rank equivalent to a division chief or higher, except the following:

None of the exceptions relates to the Commissioner’s power to approve the filing of tax collection cases.

Second. With regard to the issue that the case filed by petitioner for the collection of respondent’s tax deficiency is barred by prescription, §223(c) of the NIRC provides:

The running of the three-year prescriptive period is suspended8 [§224, now §223 of the NIRC, as amended by R.A. No. 8424.] -

Petitioner argues that, in accordance with this provision, respondent’s request for reinvestigation of her tax deficiency assessment on November 3, 1992 effectively suspended the running of the period of prescription such that the government could still file a case for tax collection.9 [Petition, p. 20; Rollo, p. 27.]

The contention has no merit. Sec. 22910 [§228 of the NIRC, as amended by R.A No. 8424.] of the Code mandates that a request for reconsideration must be made within 30 days from the taxpayer’s receipt of the tax deficiency assessment, otherwise the assessment becomes final, unappealable and, therefore, demandable.11 [Republic v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA 351 (1987)] The notice of assessment for respondent’s tax deficiency was issued by petitioner on July 18, 1986. On the other hand, respondent made her request for reconsideration thereof only on November 3, 1992, without stating when she received the notice of tax assessment. She explained that she was constrained to ask for a reconsideration in order to avoid the harassment of BIR collectors.12 [Comment, p. 4; Rollo, p. 143.] In all likelihood, she must have been referring to the distraint and levy of her properties by petitioner’s agents which took place on January 12, 1989. Even assuming that she first learned of the deficiency assessment on this date, her request for reconsideration was nonetheless filed late since she made it more than 30 days thereafter. Hence, her request for reconsideration did not suspend the running of the prescriptive period provided under §223(c). Although the Commissioner acted on her request by eventually denying it on August 11, 1994, this is of no moment and does not detract from the fact that the assessment had long become demandable.

Nonetheless, it is contended that the running of the prescriptive period under §223(c) was suspended when the BIR timely served the warrants of distraint and levy on respondent on January 12, 1989.13 [Comment, Annex A, p. 2; Rollo, p. 149.] Petitioner cites for this purpose our ruling in Advertising Associates Inc. v. Court of Appeals.14 [133 SCRA 765 (1984)] Because of the suspension, it is argued that the BIR could still avail of the other remedy under §223(c) of filing a case in court for collection of the tax deficiency, as the BIR in fact did on January 1, 1997.

Petitioner’s reliance on the Court’s ruling in Advertising Associates Inc. v. Court of Appeals is misplaced. What the Court stated in that case and, indeed, in the earlier case of Palanca v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,15 [114 Phil. 203 (1962)] is that the timely service of a warrant of distraint or levy suspends the running of the period to collect the tax deficiency in the sense that the disposition of the attached properties might well take time to accomplish, extending even after the lapse of the statutory period for collection. In those cases, the BIR did not file any collection case but merely relied on the summary remedy of distraint and levy to collect the tax deficiency. The importance of this fact was not lost on the Court. Thus, in Advertising Associates, it was held:16 [Supra, note 14 at 771.] "It should be noted that the Commissioner did not institute any judicial proceeding to collect the tax. He relied on the warrants of distraint and levy to interrupt the running of the statute of limitations." ScmisÓ

Moreover, if, as petitioner in effect says, the prescriptive period was suspended twice, i.e., when the warrants of distraint and levy were served on respondent on January 12, 1989 and then when respondent made her request for reinvestigation of the tax deficiency assessment on November 3, 1992, the three-year prescriptive period must have commenced running again sometime after the service of the warrants of distraint and levy. Petitioner, however, does not state when or why this took place and, indeed, there appears to be no reason for such. It is noteworthy that petitioner raised this point before the lower court apparently as an alternative theory, which, however, is untenable.

For the foregoing reasons, we hold that petitioner’s contention that the action in this case had not prescribed when filed has no merit. Our holding, however, is without prejudice to the disposition of the properties covered by the warrants of distraint and levy which petitioner served on respondent, as such would be a mere continuation of the summary remedy it had timely begun. Although considerable time has passed since then, as held in Advertising Associates Inc. v. Court of Appeals17 [Supra, note 14.] and Palanca v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,18 [Supra, note 15.] the enforcement of tax collection through summary proceedings may be carried out beyond the statutory period considering that such remedy was seasonably availed of.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.