ULANDU

At bar is an appeal from the Decision1 [Penned by Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr.] dated July 16, 1982, of Branch V of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, in Criminal Case No. 1079, convicting appellant Nestor Juachon of the crime of "Rape with Murder", and sentencing him thus:

Filed on May 29, 1979 by Asst. Provincial Fiscal Ponciano V. Garcia, the Information indicting appellant, alleges:

With the appellant pleading not guilty upon arraignment thereunder, trial ensued.

The facts established by the prosecution are summarized by the trial court as follows:

Teofila Mactal, mother of the deceased Helen Mactal, testified that on August 16, 1978, during the barrio fiesta, appellant, a suitor of Helen, kept on peeping in their house;6 [O.R., Direct examination of Teofila Mactal, TSN, p. 19.] and on one occasion, Helen informed her that the appellant told her "Masarap kang halikan".7 [Decision, Rollo, p. 30.]

Appellant placed reliance on the defenses of denial and alibi. Denying that Helen Mactal rode on his tricycle at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of August 21, 1978, he theorized that he was in his house at the time of the commission of the crime and stressed that he reached home between 6:00 o’clock to 7:00 o’clock of that evening.8 [Decision, Rollo, p. 26.] Jospped

The defense also presented Daniel Cabungcal, who testified that a certain tricycle driver named Renato Elemencio, confessed to him as the culprit.9 [Decision, Rollo, pp. 29-30.] Renato Elemencio, however, was never brought to court to substantiate his alleged confession.

On July 16, 1982, after evaluating the records on hand, the trial court handed down the judgment of conviction appealed from, on the basis of the following circumstantial evidence:

Appellant contends, that: Sppedjo

The issues posed for resolution: 1) Whether or not the alleged defect in the designation of the offense in the Information violated the constitutional right of appellant to be informed of the nature of the charges against him; and 2) Whether or not appellant’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt by the aforesaid circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.

Settled is the rule that the real nature of the crime charged is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, such being conclusions of law, but by the actual recitation of facts alleged in the Complaint or Information.12 [People vs. Torres, 165 SCRA 702, p.705.] Elucidating further, the late former Chief Justice Manuel Moran, in the case of People vs. Labado, ratiocinated: Miso

In the present case, although the offense charged against appellant was designated as "Rape with Murder" in the Information, the facts recited therein constitute the crime of rape with homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of said crime are clearly spelled out in the Information, particularly the sexual intercourse against the will of the victim, perpetrated with violence and force and the killing of said victim on occasion of the rape by immersing her in muddy water.

It is decisively evident therefore, that the appellant was duly apprised of the accusations against him. Whatever defect in the Information was merely one of form and did not violate appellant’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

Section 4, Rule 133, of the Revised Rules on Evidence, provides:

Like a tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven,14 [People vs. Cabrera, 241 SCRA 28, 32.] the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the circumstances or a combination thereof, should point to overt acts of the appellant that would logically usher to the conclusion and no other, that he is guilty of the crime charged.15 [People vs. Flores 186 SCRA 303, 314 citing; VI, Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court 65 (1980 ed.)]

In the case under consideration, the trial court found a total of eight (8) pieces of circumstantial evidence the most vital of which are: 1) That Evelyn Cabungcal saw Helen Mactal ride on the tricycle of Nestor Juachon at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of August 21, 1978, which supports the theory that the victim was last seen alive in the company of appellant; and 2) That a pair of slippers positively identified by Efren de Guzman, as those of appellant, were found near the body of the victim, which circumstance bolsters the claim that appellant was at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Nexold

As opposed to the denial by appellant, his positive identification by Evelyn Cabungcal, who testified in a candid and straightforward manner, must prevail.16 [People vs. Fortich, 281 SCRA 600, 616; citing: People vs. Guamos, 241 SCRA 528 (1995)] Convinced that Evelyn Cabungcal was telling the truth, the trial court made the observations that:

So also, the court a quo erred not in giving credence to the testimony of Efren de Guzman, a relative of appellant, who identified the pair of slippers found near the cadaver of the victim as those worn by appellant on August 21, 1978, when the latter helped him pull out the palay seedlings in his farm. Indeed, the distinct appearance of said slippers: "with a brown leaf covering the entire front portion of the feet"18 [Decision, Rollo, p. 23.] could easily catch the attention of Efren de Guzman, especially so that it took them the whole day to work in the said farm.

The contention of appellant that Efren de Guzman testified against him because they were not in good terms with each other and that Efren de Guzman was opposed to his procurement of passengers from Guinandosan where Efren resides,19 [Id., p. 26.] is too flimsy to be worthy of belief. It is quite obvious that appellant and Efren de Guzman were getting along well, considering that appellant even devoted his one whole day to help Efren in his farm. As correctly stressed upon the trial court, it is simply unbelievable that Efren would fabricate evidence against appellant to implicate him in this case which involves a very serious charge. Indeed, absent any improper motive, Efren’s testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.20 [People vs. Culala, G.R. No. 83466, October 13, 1999.] Manikx

Then too, it is worth mentioning that the prosecution was able to establish the motive of appellant through the uncontradicted testimony of the victim's mother. Teofila Mactal declared that Nestor Juachon, a suitor of her daughter, kept on passing by and peeping in their house before the incident; and on one occasion, appellant even told her daughter: "masarap kang halikan". As aptly argued by the Solicitor General, these circumstances clearly manifested appellant's carnal interest in the victim and taken with all other circumstantial evidence, convincingly point to appellant as the author of the crime.

After a thorough review and examination of the evidence on record, the Court discerns no ground or basis for disregarding the aforestated conclusions arrived at by the trial court, whose findings are accorded great weight because of its singular opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses when they testified during the trial.21 [People vs. Lachica, G.R. No. 94432, October 12, 1999; citing: People vs. Camat, 256 SCRA 52, 64; People vs. San Gabriel, 235 SCRA 80; people vs. Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233; and People vs. Ornoza, 151 SCRA 495.]

Verily, a combination of the circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution constitutes an unbroken chain which points to appellant as the culprit. From the established fact that the deceased was last seen alive with appellant at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening of August 21, 1978, with his carnal interest in the victim as background motive, let alone the presence of his slippers at the scene of the crime, and the other circumstantial evidence aformentioned, no other conclusion can be dawn other than the guilt of appellant, Nestor Juachon.

As regards the alibi theorized upon by appellant, the Court believes, and so holds, that the same cannot overcome appellant's positive identification by Evelyn Cabungcal as the driver of the tricycle on which Helen Mactal rode at about 8:00 o'clock on that fatal night of August 21, 1978, and the corroborative testimony of appellant’s neighbor, Amparo Jacinto, that it was at around 10:00 o’clock in the evening when appellant reached home on August 12, 1978.22 [People vs. Culala, supra; citing: People vs. Lacatan, 295 SCRA 203.] What is more, appellant utterly failed to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.23 [People vs. Lachica, supra; citing: People vs. Batulan, 253 SCRA 52, 64; People vs. Kipte, 42 SCRA 198; People vs. Macayan, et al., 126 SCRA 322; People vs. Saguban, 231 SCRA 744; and People vs. Cabresos, 244 SCRA 362.] Consequently, his alibi cannot prosper. Maniks

So also, the trial court correctly disregarded the version of Daniel Cabungcal, pointing to one Renato Elemencio as the self-confessed perpetrator of the crime. Despite the manifestation of the prosecution that the attendance of Renato Elemencio may be had, the defense did not bother to present him in court. It is simply incredible that the appellant would prefer to languish in jail for a crime he did not commit than to compel the witness to testify, unless of course, the appellant is apprehensive that the witness' testimony would not be favorable to him.24 [People vs. Magsombol, 252 SCRA 189, 199.2]

In convicting appellant, the trial court made express reference to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. However, it erroneously designated the crime committed by appellant to be "rape with murder".25 [Decision, Rollo, p. 31.] Be that as it may, such a flaw in the appealed decision will not preclude this Court from convicting appellant of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. In criminal cases, an appeal opens the entire case for review,26 [Obosa vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 281, p. 301; citing: Quemel vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 130 Phil. 33,35 (1968)] giving the appellate court an opportunity to weigh and evaluate, once more, the totality of the evidence, including the proper designation of the offense. In the present case, it appearing that the elements of the special complex crime of rape with homicide were clearly and specifically stated in the Information and proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Thus, the mind of the court can rest easy on a finding of appellant guilt of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide.

The decision of the lower court imposing the penalty of death on appellant was rendered on July 16, 1982. In light of Section 19 (1), Article 3, of the 1987 Constitution, automatically reducing the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993, reimposing the death penalty for rape with homicide, is not applicable to the present case, otherwise said Act would become an ex post facto law.

Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of P30,000 for the civil indemnity has to be increased to P50,000.27 [People vs. Lachica, supra, citing: People vs. Balisoro, G. R. No. 124980, May 12, 1999 and Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 600.]

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision in Criminal Case No. 1079, convicting appellant Nestor Juachon of the crime of rape with homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of the deceased, Helen Mactal, is hereby increased to Fifty thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos. Costs against appellant.