The contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the marriage contract.

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals1 [Sixth Division composed of J. Jesus M. Elbinias (chairman), J. Omar U. Amin (ponente), and J. Hector L. Hofileña.] (CA) dated January 15, 1998, and its Resolution dated August 24, 1998, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The dispositive part of the CA Decision reads: Misoedp

The decretal portion of the trial court Decision3 [Penned by Judge Angel S. Malaya. The case was heard by several judges; namely, Judges Alfredo A. Cabral, Nilo A. Malanyaon, Ceferino P. Barcinas, Bonifacio C. Initia, and Augusto O. Cledera.] is as follows:

And costs against [herein petitioner.]"

The Court of Appeals narrates the facts thus:

In affirming the Decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled in this wise:

x x x x x x x x x

Disagreeing with the above, petitioner lodged her Petition for Review before this Court.6 [This case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 8, 1999, upon receipt by the Court of respondent's Memorandum.]

In her Memorandum, petitioner presents the following issues for the resolution of this Court: Jksmä â Ó

The Petition is meritorious. Petitioner’s marriage is valid, but respondent’s adoption has not been sufficiently established. Esä m

Doctrinally, a void marriage may be subjected to collateral attack, while a voidable one may be assailed only in a direct proceeding.8 [Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 265.] Aware of this fundamental distinction, Respondent Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony.9 [Respondents’ Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.] We cannot sustain this contention.

To start with, Respondent Pedro Pilapil argues that the marriage was void because the parties had no marriage license. This argument is misplaced, because it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.10 [See note 34, infra.] An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner.11 [See CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 54.] Clearly then, the marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil Code.12 [Art. 76 of the Civil Code provides: Esâ msc

"No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oath. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage."] The Civil Code governs this case, because the questioned marriage and the assailed adoption took place prior the effectivity of the Family Code. EsmmÓ is

"It is settled that if the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by recollection of witnesses."13 [De Guzman v. CA, 260 SCRA 389, 395, August 7, 1996, per Mendoza, J. See Rule 130, § 5, Rules of Court.] Upon a showing that the document was duly executed and subsequently lost, without any bad faith on the part of the offeror, secondary evidence may be adduced to prove its contents.14 [See De Vera v. Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602, February 9, 1993.]

The trial court and the Court of Appeals committed reversible error when they (1) excluded the testimonies of petitioner, Adela Pilapil and Msgr. Florencio Yllana and (2) disregarded the following: (a) photographs of the wedding ceremony; (b) documentary evidence, such as the letter of Monsignor Yllana stating that he had solemnized the marriage between Dr. Jacob and petitioner, informed the Archbishop of Manila that the wedding had not been recorded in the Book of Marriages, and at the same time requested the list of parties to the marriage; (c) the subsequent authorization issued by the Archbishop -- through his vicar general and chancellor, Msgr. Benjamin L. Marino -- ordaining that the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner be reflected through a corresponding entry in the Book of Marriages; and (d) the Affidavit of Monsignor Yllana stating the circumstances of the loss of the marriage certificate. Esmsoâ

It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath,15 [91 Phil. 565, 573, July 9, 1952, per Tuason, J.] the Court clarified this misconception thus:

x x x x x x x x x

The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete.16 [66 SCRA 425, August 29, 1975.] But even there, we said that "marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence."17 [Ibid., p. 469, per Barredo, J.]

Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof.18 [De Vera v. Aguilar, supra, pp. 606-607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87, 89-90, December 24, 1915. See also De Guzman v. CA, supra.] The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument [has] indeed [been] lost."19 [Ibid., p. 607, citing Michael & Co v. Enriquez, supra. (emphasis ours)] Â h Y

In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner’s own declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence -- testimonial and documentary -- may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.

The trial court pointed out that on the face of the reconstructed marriage contract were certain irregularities suggesting that it had fraudulently been obtained.20 [CA Decision, pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 53-54.] Even if we were to agree with the trial court and to disregard the reconstructed marriage contract, we must emphasize that this certificate is not the only proof of the union between Dr. Jacob and petitioner. ExÓ sm

As early as Pugeda v. Trias21 [4 SCRA 849, 855, March 31, 1962, per Labrador, J.], we have held that marriage may be proven by any competent and relevant evidence. In that case, we said:

In Balogbog v. CA,23 [269 SCRA 259, 266, March 7, 1997; per Mendoza, J.] we similarly held:

In both cases, we allowed testimonial evidence to prove the fact of marriage. We reiterated this principle in Trinidad v. CA,24 [289 SCRA 188, April 20, 1998.] in which, because of the destruction of the marriage contract, we accepted testimonial evidence in its place.25 [Ibid., p. 204, per Panganiban, J.] Missdaa

Respondent Pedro Pilapil misplaces emphasis on the absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO).26 [Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 120.] He finds it quite "bizarre" for petitioner to have waited three years before registering their marriage.27 [Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 122.] On both counts, he proceeds from the wrong premise. In the first place, failure to send a copy of a marriage certificate for record purposes does not invalidate the marriage.28 [See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1, 3, October 6, 1930; cited in Jones v. Hortigüela, 64 Phil. 179,184, March 6, 1937. Article 53 of the New Civil Code. Cf. Petition, p. 22; rollo, p. 29.] In the second place, it was not the petitioner’s duty to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the civil registrar. Instead, this charge fell upon the solemnizing officer.29 [Article 68, Civil Code.]

Likewise, we have held: Rtcspped

This jurisprudential attitude31 [See Trinidad v. CA, supra; Balogbog v. CA, supra; People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 110, October 31, 1984; Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, March 12, 1975.] towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.32 [Section 3 (aa), Rule 131, Rules of Court. Cf. Section 5 (bb), Rule 131, 1964 Rules of Court and Article 220 of the Civil Code.] Given the undisputed, even accepted,33 [Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 124.] fact that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife,34 [This is evidenced by the "Affidavit of Marriage Between a Man and Woman Who Have Lived for at Least Five Years," the authenticity of which was not questioned by respondent.] we find that the presumption of marriage was not rebutted in this case. Korte

In ruling that Respondent Pedro Pilapil was adopted by Dr. Jacob and that the signature of Judge Moya appearing on the Adoption Order was valid, the Court of Appeals relied on the presumption that the judge had acted in the regular performance of his duties. The appellate court also gave credence to the testimony of respondent’s handwriting expert, for "the assessment of the credibility of such expert witness rests largely on the discretion of the trial court x x x."35 [CA Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 58.]

We disagree. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are accorded great weight and respect by appellate courts, because it had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and to note telltale signs indicating the truth or the falsity of a testimony. The rule, however, is not applicable to the present case, because it was Judge Augusto O. Cledera, not the ponente, who heard the testimonies of the two expert witnesses. Thus, the Court examined the records and found that the Court of Appeals and the trial court "failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion."36 [Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 703, February 26, 1997, per Panganiban, J.] Hence, the present case is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in petitions under Rule 45.37 [Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353, January 25, 1996; Cayabyab v. IAC, 232 SCRA 1, April 18, 1994.] Sclaw

Central to the present question is the authenticity of Judge Moya’s signature on the questioned Order of Adoption. To enlighten the trial court on this matter, two expert witnesses were presented, one for petitioner and one for Respondent Pilapil. The trial court relied mainly on respondent’s expert and brushed aside the Deposition of Judge Moya himself.38 [See RTC Decision, p. 11; Records, Vol. III, p. 1,506.] Respondent Pilapil justifies the trial judge’s action by arguing that the Deposition was ambiguous. He contends that Judge Moya could not remember whether the signature on the Order was his and cites the following portion as proof:39 [Respondent’s Memorandum, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 125-126.]

Respondent Pilapil's argument is misleading, because it took the judge’s testimony out of its context. Considered with the rest of the Deposition, Judge Moya’s statements contained no ambiguity. He was clear when he answered the queries in the following manner:

The answer "I do not remember" did not suggest that Judge Moya was unsure of what he was declaring. In fact, he was emphatic and categorical in the subsequent exchanges during the Deposition:

Clearly, Judge Moya could not recall having ever issued the Order of Adoption. More importantly, when shown the signature over his name, he positively declared that it was not his.

The fact that he had glaucoma when his Deposition was taken does not discredit his statements. At the time, he could with medication still read the newspapers; upon the request of the defense counsel, he even read a document shown to him.42 [Ibid., p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.] Indeed, we find no reason – and the respondent has not presented any – to disregard the Deposition of Judge Moya. Sc

Judge Moya’s declaration was supported by the expert testimony of NBI Document Examiner Bienvenido Albacea, who declared:

It is noteworthy that Mr. Albacea is a disinterested party, his services having been sought without any compensation. Moreover, his competence was recognized even by Respondent Pilapil’s expert witness, Atty. Desiderio Pagui.44 [TSN, p. 7, December 8, 1992; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,422.] Missc

Other considerations also cast doubt on the claim of respondent. The alleged Order was purportedly made in open court. In his Deposition, however, Judge Moya declared that he did not dictate decisions in adoption cases. The only decisions he made in open court were criminal cases, in which the accused pleaded guilty.45 [Deposition of Judge Jose L. Moya, p. 4; Records, Vol. 3, p. 1,130.] Moreover, Judge Moya insisted that the branch where he was assigned was always indicated in his decisions and orders; yet the questioned Order did not contain this information. Furthermore, Pilapil’s conduct gave no indication that he recognized his own alleged adoption, as shown by the documents that he signed and other acts that he performed thereafter.46 [Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 31-36; rollo, pp. 103-108.] In the same vein, no proof was presented that Dr. Jacob had treated him as an adopted child. Likewise, both the Bureau of Records Management47 [Records, Vol. I, p. 40.] in Manila and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Tigaon, Camarines Sur,48 [Records, Vol. I, p. 41.] issued Certifications that there was no record that Pedro Pilapil had been adopted by Dr. Jacob. Taken together, these circumstances inexorably negate the alleged adoption of respondent.49 [Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163, May 31, 1955.]

The burden of proof in establishing adoption is upon the person claiming such relationship.50 [Lazatin v. Campos, 92 SCRA 250, July 30, 1979.] This Respondent Pilapil failed to do. Moreover, the evidence presented by petitioner shows that the alleged adoption is a sham. Misspped

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob and the deceased Alfredo E. Jacob is hereby recognized and declared VALID and the claimed adoption of Respondent Pedro Pilapil is DECLARED NONEXISTENT. No pronouncement as to costs.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.