9/23/99 11:20 AM

May a petition for quo warranto before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal be summarily dismissed for failure to pay cash deposit, notwithstanding that petitioner rectified payment thereof?

On May 29, 1998, within the prescribed ten (10) day period from respondent Harry Angping’s proclamation as duly elected Representative for the 3rd District of Manila, petitioners, all duly registered voters in the district, filed a petition for quo warranto1 [Records, pp. 1-12.] before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) against Congressman Harry Angping. Petitioner questioned the eligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives, claiming that the latter was not a natural-borm citizen of the Philippines, a constitutional requirement. They prayed that Congressman Angping be declared ineligible to assume or hold office as member of the House of Representatives and for the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified candidates to be proclaimed the winner.

Upon filing of the their petition, petitioners duly paid the required P5,000.00 filing fee.2 [Id., p. 13.] slxä mis

On June 10, 1998, however, the HRET issued a Resolution3 [Id., pp. 14-15.] dismissing the petition for quo warranto for failure to pay the P5,000.00 cash deposit required by its Rules. After receiving a copy of the aforesaid Resolution, petitioners paid the P5,000.00 cash deposit4 [Id., p. 19.] on June 26, 1998 and attached the corresponding receipt to the Motion for Reconsideration5 [Id., pp. 16-18.] they filed with the HRET on the same day. Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was, however, denied, in view of Rule 32 of the 1998 HRET Rules which required a P5,000.00 cash deposit in addition to filing fees for quo warranto cases.6 [See Resolution, 3 July 1998; Records, pp. 21-22.]

Hence, the instant Petition,7 [Rollo, pp. 3-43.] filed on August 14, 1998, anchored upon the following grounds –

On September 24, 1998, Congressman Angping filed his Comment9 [Rollo, pp. 53-60.] to the petition arguing that there was no grave abuse of discretion committed as the dismissal of the petition below was based on clear and unambiguous provisions of the HRET which leave no room for liberal construction. Furthermore, Congressman Angping argued that this Court is not a trier of facts and that all election contests lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.

Prior to that, on September 18, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation to the effect that under the terms of this Court’s Resolution dated August 25, 1998 requiring only Rep. Harry Angping to comment, the Office of the Solicitor General is not required to file a comment on the petition on behalf of the HRET. This Manifestation was noted by this Court in its Resolution dated October 13, 1998.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner filed their Reply10 [Rollo, pp. 66-71.] stressing that according to Rule 21 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET, summary dismissals may be ordered by the HRET in case of non-payment of the required cash deposit within the prescribed time only in election protest cases and not in quo warranto proceedings. Petitioners also assert that this Court can very well resolve the merits of their petition for quo warranto inasmuch as the Alien Certificate of Registration attached to their petition, being a public document, is admissible as proof of Congressman Angping’s ineligibility to hold office, without need for proof as to its authenticity and due execution.

The first issue to resolve is whether or not this Court can take cognizance of the instant petition for certiorari. SdaÓ adsc

Under the Constitution,11 [Sec. 17, Article VI.] the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members. This does not, however, bar us from entertaining petitions which charge the HRET with grave abuse of discretion. Indeed, in Libanan v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,12 [G.R. No. 129783, 283 SCRA 520, 529-530 (1997)] we explained our assumption of jurisdiction in election related cases involving the HRET as follows --

That this Court may very well inquire into the issue of whether the complained act of the HRET has been made with grave abuse of discretion may be inferred from Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which has expanded judicial power to include the determination of "whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

This leads us to the second issue of whether or not the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion in summarily dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners and in refusing to reinstate the same even after the payment of the required Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit.

Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides that in addition to filing fees, a petitioner in quo warranto proceedings should make a Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) cash deposit with the Tribunal.

It is not disputed that petitioners did not initially pay the required cash deposit; but after their petition was summarily dismissed by the HRET for such non-payment, petitioners rectified their inadvertence and paid the Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) required cash deposit, at the same time seeking a reconsideration of the dismissal.

Rule 32 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET provides ---Korteä

On the other hand, Rule 21 of the 1998 Rules of the HRET governing summary dismissal of election contests provides, to wit –

Rule 33 of the Rules likewise provides ---

It may be argued that unlike in the case of election protests, no period is provided for to make the cash deposit in the case of petitions for quo warranto. However, the cash deposit required in quo warranto cases is fixed, i.e., P5,000.00. It does not vary nor can it be varied; it is required to be paid together with the filing fee at the time the petition is filed. It is different from a protest and/or counter-protest where the amount of the required cash deposit is yet to be determined since it has to be based on the number of ballot boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia to be collected and brought to the tribunal. Therefore, depending on the amount that may be required for the collection of the ballot boxes and other election documents and paraphernalia, the parties are given specified periods within which to pay. Thus, when the required amount of cash deposits does not exceed P75,000.00, the party concerned must make the deposit within ten (10) days after the filing of the protest or counter-protest; otherwise, when it exceeds P75,000.00 he is required to make a partial deposit of at least P75,000.00 likewise within ten (10) days and the balance payable in installments as may be determined by the Tribunal. xä law

Petitioners herein, Perla Garcia, Paz Cruz and Geraldine Padernal, filed their petition for quo warranto on May 29, 1998. However, the required cash deposit of P5,000.00 was paid only on June 26, 1998, which was after the dismissal of the petition and only after an unreasonable delay of twenty-eight (28) days. Indeed, in dismissing the petition the HRET acted judiciously, correctly and certainly within its jurisdiction. It was a judgment call of the HRET which is clearly authorized under its Rules. As long as the exercise of discretion is based on well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal.

The petition for quo warranto attacks the ineligibility of Congressman Angping to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives, not being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. This is a serious charge, which, if true, renders Congressman Angping disqualified from such office. In view of the delicate nature and importance of this charge, the observance of the HRET Rules of Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to attain their objective, i.e., the speedy and orderly determination of the true will of the electorate. Correlatively, party litigants appearing before the HRET or, to be more precise, their lawyers, are duty bound to know and are expected to properly comply with the procedural requirements laid down by the Tribunal without being formally ordered to do so. They cannot righteously impute abuse of discretion to the Tribunal if by reason of the non-observance of those requirements it decides to dismiss their petition. Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed to ensure its proper and swift dispensation. Scä

Therefore, we find that the HRET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in applying its Rules strictly and in dismissing the petition for quo warranto. Accordingly, the instant petition for certiorari cannot prosper.

Indeed, the function of this Court is merely to check whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the HRET in the dismissal of the petition for quo warranto before it. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will prosper only if there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or an act without or in excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondent tribunal.15 [National Federation of Labor v. NLRC, 283 SCRA 275 (1997)] In the absence of such a showing, there is no reason for this Court to annul the decision of the respondent tribunal or to substitute it with its own judgment, for the simple reason that its is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire the correctness of the assailed decision. In this case, as we have stated above, we find that the HRET committed no grave abuse of discretion. The instant petition must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.