Pursuant to Section 4, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution Presidential Decree No. 1486 created an Anti-Graft Court known as the Sandiganbayan. Since then the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has under gone various changes,1 [See Presidential Decree No. 1606, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, and Presidential Decrees Nos. 1860 and 1861. (Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999.)] the most recent of which were effected through Republic Act Nos. 79752 [An Act to Strengthen the Functional and Structural Organization of the Sandiganbayan, amending for that Purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended.] and 8249.3 [An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, Amending for the purpose Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, Providing Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.] Whether the Sandiganbayan, under these laws, exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors accused of violations of Republic Act No. 30194 [Otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.] and Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code5 [Illegal use of public finds or property.] is the central issue in these consolidated petitions. Edp

In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, petitioner Jejomar Binay seeks to annul, among others, the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion to refer Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007 to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati and declaring that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over said cases despite the enactment of R.A. No. 7975.

In G.R. No. 128136, petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al. assail the October 22, 1996 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, reversing its Order of June 21, 1996 which suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 23278 in deference to whatever ruling this Court will lay down in the Binay cases.

The facts, as gathered from t he records, are as follows: Edpsc

On September 7, 1994, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code,6 [Docketed as Criminal Case No. 21001 (For: Viol. Of Art. 220, Revised Penal Code [Illegal Use of Public Funds]).] and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.7 [Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 21005 and 21007 (For: Viol. Of Sec. 3(e), R.A. 3019 [The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act]).] The informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioner’s incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila.

Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations. He contended that the six-year delay from the time the charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of this motion. Scedp

On March 29, 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution, was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan. The resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, however, was issued before the petitioner could file a reply to the prosecution’s opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

In the meantime, on March 31, 1995, the prosecution filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite." The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated April 25, 1995, granted the motion and ordered the suspension of petitioner for ninety days from receipt of the resolution. The court ruled that the requisites for suspension pendente lite were present as petitioner was charged with one of the offenses under Section 13 of R.A. No. 30198 [SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. -- Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.] and the informations containing these charges had previously been held valid in the resolution denying the motion to quash and the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. Calrspped

Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for certiorari,9 [G.R. Nos. 119781-83.] to set aside the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite before he could file a reply to the prosecution’s opposition to his motion for reconsideration of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner to file said reply.

After allowing and considering petitioner’s reply, the Sandiganbayan, on June 6, 1995, issued a Resolution reiterating the denial of his motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued another resolution reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite. Sccalr

Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995.10 [Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al., supra.]

On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the "proper court" for further proceedings, alleging that when the two Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the Anti-Graft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated July 4, 1995, denied petitoner’s motion, holding thus: Calrsc

There is no question that Municipal Mayors are classified as Grade "27" under the compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Since, at the time of the commission of the offenses charged in he above-entitled cases, the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has under Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases therein filed against him. The allegation that Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a salary grade lower than Grade "27", because at the time of the commission of the offenses charged he was paid a salary which merits a grade lower than Grade "27" does not hold water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were committed by the accused, the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet in existence. From the very definition of he very Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed and had been effective only in 1989. The Grade classification of a public officer, whether at the time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, is determined by his classification under the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission of the offenses and the Compensation & Position Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal Mayors as Grade "27", it is a conclusion beyond cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the accused herein.

As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758 took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay had begun receiving a monthly salary of P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade "28" under the salary scale provided for in Section 27 of the said Act. Under the Index of Occupational Services, the position titles and salary grades of the Compensation & Position classification system prepared by the Department of Budget and Management pursuant to Section 6 of Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade "27."11 [Rollo, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, pp. 56-57.] Sppedsc

On July 7, 1995, petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over Criminal Case Nos. 21001, 21005 and 21007. He prayed, among others, that the Court anuul and set aside: (1) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the motion to quash; (2) the Resolution of the same court also dated June 6, 1995 reiterating the order suspending petitioner pendente lite; and (3) the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated July 4, 1995 denying the motion to refer case to the RTC. Petitioner also asked that the Court issue a temporary restraining order preventing the suspension and arraignment of petitioner.

The Court on July 7, 1995, resolved, among others, to issue the temporary restraining order prayed for. Sdjad

On July 14, 1995, petitioner filed an "Addendum to Petition (To allow the introduction of alternative reliefs)," praying that, should this Court hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the cases, the criminal cases filed against him be dismissed just the same on the ground that the long delay of the preliminary investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of the informations, deprived him of his right to due process; and that, moreover, there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of the informations.

Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysay’s co-petitioners are officials of the same municipality. Misact

In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. This was docketed in the Office of the Ombudsman as OMB-1-94-1232.

In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. Director Elvis John S. Asuncion concurred in the resolution, and Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, recommended approval of the same. The resolution was approved by then Acting Ombudsman Francisco A. Villa with the following marginal note: Acctmis

Authority is given to the deputy Ombudsman for Luzon to cause the preparation of the information and to approve the same for filing with the proper court.12 [Rollo, G.R. No. 128136, p. 49.]

On August 11, 1995, an Information for violatiion of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan.

In the meantime, a group denominated as the Concerned Citizens of San Pascual, Batangas filed a complaint before the Ombudsman against petitioners, and Elpidia Amada and Brigido Buhain, with violations of R.A. No. 3019. The complaint also alleged, among others, the overpricing of the landscaping project of San Pascual Central School. The case was docketed as OMB-0-94-0149. Newmiso

In a Resolution dated July 27, 1995, Graft Investigation Officer Ernesto M. Nocos recommended the filing of an information charging petitioners with violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended "with proper court." The resolution, which was recommended for approval by Nicanor J. Cruz, OIC-Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, and approved by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, adopted the findings and conclusions in the resolution in OMB-1-94-1232 that the landscaping project was overpriced.

On Febraury 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information charged essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. The case was docketed in the Sandiganbayan as Crim. Case No. 22378. Jjlex

On June 1, 1996, the accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accused’s motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition. Misjuris

Meanwhile, on June 7, 1996, Prosecutor Eric Mallonga filed a motion before the RTC to refer the R.A. No. 3019 case pending therein to the Sandiganbayan, arguing that under R.A. No. 7975 the Sandiganbayan, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over the case. On July 3, 1996, the RTC issued an order holding in abeyance the resolution of the motion to refer the case since the issue of jurisdiction was pending before the Sandiganbayan.

Back at the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution, on July 24, 1996, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s Order dated June 21, 1996. On August 2, 1996, filed their own motion for the reconsideration of the same order. On October 22, 1996, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reconsieration filed by the prosecution and set the case for arraignment. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the October 22, 1996 Resolution ordering their arraignment, which motion was denied on February 17, 1997.

On February 27, 1997, the accused filed the present petition.

On October 1, 1997, the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order to prevent respondents from further proceeding with Crim. Case No. 23278 of the Sandiganbayan. Jurissc

The petition raises the following issues:

Had the Sandiganbayan been ousted of its jurisdiction over the case of municipal mayor after the passage of Republic Act No. 7975, coupled with the filing earlier of an information for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court having territorial jurisdiction and venue of the commission of the offense?

Are the respondents Ombudsman and the prosecutors estopped by laches or waiver from filing and prosecuting the case before respondent Sandiganbayan after the filing earlier of the information in the proper court, thereafter repudiating it, seeking another court of the same category and finally to respondent court?

Whether or not the filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule on duplicity of information? Scjuris

Whether or not the trial to be conducted by respondent court, if the case shall not be dismissed, will expose the petitioners who are accused therein to double jeopardy?

Under the circumstances, are the respondent Ombudsman and the prosecutors guilty of forum shopping?13 [Id., at 16-17.]

On October 6, 1997, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 128136 (the Magsaysay petition) with G.R. Nos. 120681-83 (the Binay petition).

In resolving these consolidated petitions, the Court shall first addrress the common question of the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Suprema

The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases.

The informations against Mayor Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1606,14 [Entitled "Revising Presidential Decree No. 1486 Creating A Special Court to be known as Sandiganbayan and for Other Purposes," promulgated 10 December 1978.] as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861,15 [Entitled "Amending the Pertinent Provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1606 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 Realtive to the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and for Other Purposes," promulgated 23 March 1983.] the pertinent provisions of which state:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: Sdaamiso

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00; PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Sppedscâ

xxx.

On May 16, 1995, R.A. No. 7975 took effect. At this time, Mayor Binay had not yet been arraigned in the Sandiganbayan. On the other hand, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect when the information against Mayor Magsaysay et al., was filed on August 11, 1995 in the RTC of Batangas City.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 amended Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to read as follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the governement, whether in permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: Sâ djad

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; Misä act

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; andAcctä mis

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officieals and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. NewÓ miso

xxx.

While the cases against petitoners were pending in this Court, congress enacted R.A. No. 8249, again redefining the jurisdiction of the Anti-Graft Court. This law took effect, per Section 10 thereof, on February 23, 1997, fifteen days after its complete publication on February 8, 1997 in the Journal and Malaya, two newspapers of general circulation.

As further amended by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 now reads:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at he time of the commission of the offense: Jjä lex

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the position of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; MisjÓ uris

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universites or educational institutions or foundations.

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of he Constitution; andJurisä sc

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to heir office.

d. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. Scä juris

Petitioners contend that they do not come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan because:

(1) At the alleged time of the commission of the crimes charged, petitioner municipal mayors were not classified as Grade 27.

(2) Municipal mayors are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.

(3) Congressional records reveal that the the law did not intend municipal mayors to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Jurisä

In support of his contention that his position was not that of Grade 27, Mayor Binay argues:

xxx. The new law’s consistent and repeated reference to salary grade show[s] an intention to base the separation of jurisdiction between the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts on pay scale. Grades are determined by compensation. The essence of grades is pay scales. Therefor, pay scales determine grades.16 [Rollo, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, pp. 18-19. Emphasis in the original.]

Mayor Binay, thus, presented a Certification17 [Id., at 45.] from the City Personnel Officer of Makati stating that petitioner as mayor received a monthly salary of only P10,793.00 from March 1987 to December 31, 1988. This amount was supposedly equivalent to Grade 22 under R.A. No. 6758. SupÓ rema

Mayor Magsaysay, for his part, submitted a similar Certification18 [Rollo, G.R. No. 128136, p. 115.] from the Municipal Treasurer of San Pascual, Batangas, stating:

x x x that the basic monthly salary received by Mario C. Magsaysay, Municipal Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas with Salary Grade 27 is ELEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT PESOS (P11,828.00) per month as of November 3, 1993 equivalent only to Grade 25, Step 5 of RA 6758, the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Section 444(1) (Grad[e] 27) of RA 6758 is not as yet implemented due to budgetary constraints. This certification is issued to Mayor Mario C. Magsaysay this 30th day of May 1996 at San Pascual, Batangas for whatever legal purpose and/or purposes it may serve. Sdaad

The Court does not subscribe to the manner by which petitoners classify Grades.

The Constitution19 [Section 5, Article IX-B.] states that in providing for the standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, Congress shall take "into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions," thus:

The Congress shall provide for the standardization of compensation of government officials, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and the qualifications required for their positions.

Corollary thereto, Republic Act No. 675820 [An Act Prescribing A Revised Compensation and Position Classification System in the Governemnt and other Purposes.] provides in Section 2 thereof that differences in pay are to be based "upon substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions.’ In short, the nature of an official’s position should be the determining factor in the fixing of his or her salary. This is not only mandated by law but dictated by logics as well. Scsä daad

Consistent with these policies, the law employs the scheme known as the "grade" defined in Presidential Decree No. 98521 [A Decree Revising the Position Classification and Compensation Systems in the National Government and integrating the same.] as including

xxx all classes of positions which, although different with respect to kind or subject matter of work, are sufficiently equivalent as to level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification requirements of the work to warrant the inclusion of such classes of positions within one range of basic compensation.22 [Section 3h, P.D. No. 985.]

The grade, therefore, depends upon the nature of one’s position -- the level of difficulty, repsonsibilities, and qualification requirements thereof -- relative to that of another position. It is the official’s Grade that determines his or her salary, not the other way around. SdaaÓ miso

It is possible that a local government official’s salary may be less than that prescribed for his Grade since his salary depends also on the class and financial capability of his or her respective local government unit.23 [Section 10 and 19 (b), R.A. No. 6758.] Nevertheless, it is the law which fixes the official’s grade.

Thus, Section 8 of R.A. 6758 fixes the salary grades of the President, Vice-President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, as well as the Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions. Section 8 also authorizes the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) to "determine the officials who are of equivalent rank to the foregoing officials, where applicable" and to assign such officials the same Salary Grades subject to a set of guidelines found in said section.

For positions below those mentioned under Section 8, Section 9 instructs the DBM to prepare the "Index of Occupational Services" guided by the Benchmark Position prescribed in Section 9 and the factors enumerated therein. Scncä m

To determine whether an official is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, therefore, reference should be made to R.A. No. 6758 and the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades. Salary level is not determinative. An official’s grade is not a matter of proof, but a matter of law of which the Court must take judicial notice.24 [Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court states:

As both the 1989 and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades list the municipal Mayor under Salary Grade 27, petitoner mayors come within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner mayors are "local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989," under the catchall provision, Section 4a(5) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. More accurately, petitioner mayors are "[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989," under Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975.25 [See Conrado B. Rodrigo, Jr. et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), et al., G.R. No. 125498, February 18, 1999.] NcmmisÓ

Petitioners, however, argue that they are not included in the enumeration in Section 4a(1). They invoke the rule in statutory construction expressio unius est expressio alterius. As what is not included in those enumerated is deemed excluded, municipal officials are excluded from the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive original jurisdiction.

Resort to statutory construction, however, is not appropriate where the law is clear and unambiguous.26 [Cecilleville Realty and Service Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 819 (1997); Victoria vs. Commission on Elections, 229 SCRA 269 (1994); Allarde vs. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 (1993); Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561 (1992); Fagel Tabin Agricultural Corp. vs. Jacinto, 203 SCRA 189 (1991); Insular Bank of Asia and America Employee’s Union (IBAAEU) vs. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663 (1984); Insular Lumber Co. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 104 SCRA 710 (1981).] The law is clear in this case. As stated earlier, Section 4a(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, speaks of "[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade ‘27’ and higher, of the compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989."

The Court fails to see how a different interpretation could arise even if the plain meaning rule were disregarded and the law subjected to interpretation. Ncmâ

The premise of petitioners’ argument is that the enumeration in Section 4a(1) is exclusive. It is not. The phrase "specifically including" after "[o]fficials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989" necessarily conveys the very idea of non-exclusivity of the enumeration. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius does not apply where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be exclusive,27 [Escribano vs. Avila, 85 SCRA 245 (1978).] or where the enumeration is by way of example only.28 [Gomez vs. Ventura, 54 Phil. 726 (1930).] In Conrado B. Rodrigo, et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), supra, the Court held that the catchall in Section 4a(5) was "necessary for it would be impractical, if not impossible, for Congress to list down each position created or will be created pertaining to grades 27 and above." The same rationale applies to the enumeration in Section 4a(1). Clearly, the law did not intend said enumeration to be an exhaustive list.

Should there be any doubts as to whether petitioner mayors are under the category of Grade 27, Section 444(d) of the Local Government Code settles the matter: Oldmisâ o

The municipal mayor shall receive a minimum montly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade twenty-seven (27) as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued pursuant thereto.

In the Court’s Resolution in Rodrigo dated July 2, 1999 denying the motion for reconsideration, we treated the above provision as "confirmatory of the Salary Grade assigned by the DBM to Municipal Mayors."

Petitioner Binay cites previous bills29 [Senate Bill Nos. 594 and 761.] in Congress dealing with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. These bills supposedly sought to exclude municipal officials from the Sandiganbayan’s exclusive original jurisdiction to relieve these officials ,especially those from the provinces, of the financial burden brought about by trials in Manila. Manikanä

The resort to congressional records to determine the proper application of the law in this case is unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the resort to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio alterius is inappropriate.

Verily, the interprettion of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from languange employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233 [1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible to interpretation. It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous. (Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they extend only so far as their languange fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exeception. Thus, where a general rule is established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by implication (Samson v. CA., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).30 [Pascual vs. Pascual-Buatista, supra.] Maniksâ

Thus, in Rodrigo, petitioners therein argued in their motion for reconsideration:

x x x that the inclusion of Municipal Mayors within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan would be inconvenient since the witness in their case would come from Baguio City and San Nicolas, Pangasinan. This, according to petitioners, would defeat one of the purposes of R.A. No. 7975, that is, the convenience of the accused.

The Court, in denying the motion for reconsideration, held, among others, that:

The legislature has nevertheless chosen the mode and standard by which to implement its intent, and courts have no choice but to apply it. Congress has willed that positions with Grade 27 and above shall come within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and this Court is duty-bound to obey the congressional will. Maniâ kx

Petitioner Binay also quotes the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Roco, stating:

Since February 1979, when the Sandiganbayan was established up to the present, the Court has been confronted with the problem of those accused who are of limited means who stand trial for ‘petty crimes,’ the so-called ‘small fry’ -- the barangay officials, the municipal officials and employees, postal clerks and letter carriers and the like -- who are involved with ‘nickel-and-dime’ cases and money-related cases such as malversation, estafa and theft. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Senate Bill No. 1353 modifies the present jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan such that only those occupying high positions in Government and the military fall under the jurisdiction of the court.31 [Rollo, G.R. Nos. 120681-83, p. 312. Emphasis and underscoring in the original.] Miso

It is not clear, however, whether Senator Roco meant that all municipal officials are excluded fro mthe jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. In any case, courts are not bound by a legislator’s opinion in congressional debates reagrding the interpretation of a particular legislation. It is deemed a mere personal opinion of the legislator.32 [Mayon Motors, Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 1 SCRA 918 (1961).] Such opinions do not necessarily reflect the view of the entire Congress.33 [Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. vs. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963).]

From the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the cases against petitioner Binay cannot be referred to the regular courts under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, which provides: Nexâ old

Sec. 7. Upon effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

In construing the correct import of Section 7, it may be helpful to refer to the guidelines in determining jurisdiction laid down in Bengzon vs. Inciong:34 [91 SCRA 248 (1979), cited in Atlas Fertilizer Corporation vs. Navarro, 149 SCRA 432 (1987).]

The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The execption to the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the enactment of the statute. Sppedä jo

R.A. No. 7975, by virtue of Section 7, belongs to the execpetion rather than the rule. The provision is transitory in nature and expresses the legislature’s intention to apply its provisions on jurisdiction to "criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan." To this extent, R.A. 7975 is retroactive.

Such a transitory provision is not peculiar to R.A. No. 7975; similar provisions are found in other laws reallocating the jurisdiction of the courts.35 [E.g., Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7691 and Section 8 of P.D. No. 1606.] There is no reason why Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be any different.

The term "proper courts," as used in Section 7, means "courts of competent jurisdiction," and such jurisdiction is defined in Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975. The former should not be read in isolation but construed in conjunction with the latter. Joä spped

The term "proper courts" as used in Section 7, therefore, is not restricted to "regular courts," but includes as well the Sandiganbayan, a special court. If the intent of Congress were to refer all cases the trials of which have not begun to the regular courts, it should have employed the term "proper regular courts" or "regular courts" instead of "proper courts." Accordingly, the law in the third paragraph of Section 4 P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, uses the term "regular courts," not "proper courts":

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisidction on appeals from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of regular courts where all the accused are occupying positions lower than salary grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration. [Underscoring supplied.]

Construed thus, the effects of Section 7 may be summarized as follows:

1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 7975 does not apply. Sppedâ

2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A. No. 7975 applies.

The trial of the cases involving Mayor Binay had not yet begun as of the date of the approval of R.A. 7975; consequently, the Anti-Graft Court retains jurisdiction over the said cases. MisÓ spped

In any case, whatever seeming ambiguity or doubt regarding the application of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975 should be laid to rest by Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, which states:

Sec. 7. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

The latter provision more accurately expresses the legislature’s intent and in any event should be applied in this case, R.A. No. 8249 having superseded R.A. No. 7975.

In Panfilo M. Lacson vs. The Executive Secretary, et al.,36 [Supra.] The Court explained the purpose of the foregoing provision. MisÓ sc

x x x it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of [Sandiganbayan’s] jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. x x x. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." x x x. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the new law (RA 8249). [Emphasis in the original.]

The possible disruptive effect of the amendments to the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction on pending cases was, therefore, not lost on the legislature. Congress has, furthermore, deemed the commencement of the trial as the crucial point in determining whether a court retains a case pending before it or lose the same on the ground of lack of jurisdiction per the provisions of R.A. 8249. The law obviously does not want to waste the time and effort devoted to the presentation of evidence if trial had already begun. On the other hand, not much disruption would be caused if the amendment were made to apply to cases the trials of which have not yet to start. ScmisÓ

The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may be stated as follows:

1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, said law does not apply.

2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then said law applies.

Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over said cases.

Petitioner Binay avers in his Addendum to Petition that his right to speedy disposition has been violated by the inordinate delay in the resolution of the subject cases by the Ombudsman.

Article III of the Constitution provides that:

Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. xä law

The constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings.37 [Cadalin vs. POEA’s Administrator, 238 SCRA 722 (1994).] Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.38 [Ibid.]

However, the right to speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,39 [Section 14 (2), Article III, Constitution.] is deemed violated only when the preceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.40 [Gonzales vs. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298 (1991).] Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.41 [Ibid. See also Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, 220 SCRA 55 (1993); Caballero vs. Alfonso, Jr., 153 SCRA 153 (1987).] The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.42 [Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan, supra. See also Cadalin vs. POEA’s Administrator, supra, citing Caballero vs. Alfonso, 153 SCRA 153 (1987).] Sclawä

A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient.43 [Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan, 253 SCRA 773 (1996).] In the application of the constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.44 [Ibid., reiterating Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 (1988).]

In Tatad vs.Sandiganbayan,45 [Supra.] the Court held that the length of delay and the simplicity of the issues did not justify the delay in the disposition of the cases therein. The "unexplained inaction"46 [See Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214 (1993).] of the prosecutors called for the dismissal of the cases against petitioner Tatad. Korteä

In Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan,47 [Supra.] the Court also ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel, preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court likewise considered the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.

In Santiago vs. Garchitorena,48 [Supra.] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat to her claim to the constitutional guarantee. ScÓ lex

In Cadalin vs. POEA’s Administrator,49 [Supra.] the Court, considering also the complexity of the cases ("not run-of-the-mill variety") and the conduct of the parties’ lawyers, held that the right to speedy disposition was not violated therein.

In petitioner Binay’s case, the Court finds that there was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject cases. The proceedings conducted before the Office of the Tanodbayan, and later with the Office of the Ombudsman, adequately explains the length of the delay:

Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it must rely on its own independent judgment in the determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the prosecution had to conduct it s own review of the COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus justifying the length of time for their resolution. As held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash:

xxx

Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan ordering his suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since the informations charging him were not valid. This contention, however, must fail in view of our pronouncement that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject cases in violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the informations in question are valid an petitioner’s suspension pendente lite must be upheld.

Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the filing of the subject cases is a question best left to the discretion of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise thereof.52 [Conrado B. Rodrigo et al. vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division) et al., supra, citing cases.] Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman. CalrkyÓ

Having ruled that the criminal case against petitioners in G.R. No. 128136 is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the Court will now dispose of the following issues raised by them:

(1) The Sandiganbayan was ousted of its jurisdiction by the filing of an information alleging the same facts with the Regional Trial Court.

(2) Respondents are estopped from filing an information before the Sandiganbayan considering that they had already filed another information alleging the same facts before the Regional Trial Court.

(3) The filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy. Kycalrâ

The Court tackles these arguments successively then deals with the questions of duplicity of information and forum shopping.

Petitioners invoke the rule that "the jurisdiction of a court once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of such character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance."53 [Citing I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1984 ed., p. 9, and cases cited therein.] They claim that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan was a "subsequent happening or event" which cannot oust the RTC of its jurisdiction.

This rule has no application here for the simple reason that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction never attached to the RTC. When the information was filed before the RTC, R.A. No. 7975 was already in effect and, under said law, jurisdiction over the case pertained to the Sandiganbayan. Kyleä

Neither can estoppel be successfully invoked. First, jurisdiction is determined by law, not by the consent or agreement of the parties or by estoppel.54 [Tolentino vs. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 226 (1997).] As a consequence of this principle, the Court held in Zamora vs. Court of Appeals55 [183 SCRA 279 (1990). See also China Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 503 (1997).] that:

It follows that as a rule the filing of a complaint with one court which has no jurisdiction over it does not prevent the plaintiff from filing the same complaint later with the competent court. The plaintiff is not estopped from doing so simply because it made a mistake before in the choice of the proper forum. In such a situation, the only authority the first court can exercise is to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. This has to be so as a contrary conclusion would allow a party to divest the competent court of its jurisdiction, whether erroneously or even deliberately, in derogation of the law. Misedp

It is true that the Court has ruled in certain cases56 [E.g., Ramirez vs. Commission on Elections, 270 SCRA 590 (1997); Quintanilla vs. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 397 (1997); Sia vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 141 (1997).] that estoppel prevents a party from questioning the jurisdiction of the court that the party himself invoked. Estoppel, however, remains the exception rather than the rule, the rule being that jurisdiction is vested by law.57 [Calimlim vs. Ramirez, 118 SCRA 399 (1982). See also Dy vs. NLRC, 145 SCRA 211 (1986); People vs. Eduarte, 182 SCRA 750 (1990); Corona vs. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 378 (1992).] Even in those instances where the Court applied estoppel, the party estopped consistently invoked the jurisdiction of the court and actively participated in the proceedings, impugning such jurisdiction only when faced with an adverse decision. This is not the case here. After discovering that a similar information had earlier been filed in the RTC, respondents promptly asked the trial court to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan, which motion was followed by a motion to resolve the previous motion. There was no consistent invocation of the RTC’s jurisdiction. There were no further proceedings after the filing of the information save for the motion to refer the case precisely on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, and the motion to resolve the earlier motion. Finally, the trial court had not rendered any decision, much less one adverse to petitioners. Misoedp

Second, petitioners cannot hold respondents in estoppel for the latter are not themselves party to the criminal action. In a criminal action, the State is the plaintiff, for the commission of a crime is an offense against the State. Thus, the complaint or information filed in court is required to be brought in the name of the "People of the Philippines."58 [Section 2, Rule 110, Rules of Court.] Even then, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply as against the people in criminal prosecutions.59 [Talusan vs. Ofiana, 45 SCRA 467 (1972).] Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, like attempted murder,60 [Ibid.] is a public offense. Social and public interest demand the punishment of the offender; hence, criminal actions for public offenses can not be waived or condoned, much less barred by the rules of estoppel.61 [Ibid.] Edpmis

The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded "not guilty" to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction.62 [See De Guzman vs. Escalona; 97 SCRA 619 (1980); People vs. Galano, 75 SCRA 193 (1977).] The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy.63 [Section 3 (h), Rule 117, Rules of Court.] Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.64 [Section 3(b), Rule 117, Rules of Court.]

The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated the rule against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule presupposes that there is one complaint or information charging not one offense, but two or more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states: Jjsc

Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for various offenses.

Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117:

Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

x x x

(e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;

x x x

Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one offense but with more than one information charging one offense. Scjj

The Court does not find the prosecution guilty of forum-shopping. Broadly speaking, forum shopping exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another, or when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition.65 [Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Flores, 287 SCRA 449 (1998).] We discern no intent on the part of the State, in filing two informations in two different courts, to "gamble that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition." Sjcj

Obviously, respondents got their signals crossed. One set of officials, after investigating a complaint filed by the Vice-Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas charging petitioners of overpricing, filed the information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the RTC. Another set of officials investigated another complaint from the Concerned Citizens Group accusing petitioners of, among others, overpricing the same project subject of the previous complaint. Finding probable cause, the second set of officials instituted the criminal action, charging the same offense and alleging essentially the same facts as the first, this time in the Sandiganbayan. Later learning of the procedural faux pas, respondents without undue delay asked the RTC to refer the case to the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are hereby DISMISSED. Supreme

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., see separate opinion.

Davide, Jr., C.J., joins J. Panganiban in his separate opinion.

Quisumbing, J., concurs with J. Panganiban’s separate opinion. Court

I concur with the majority that, as a rule, the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over criminal cases involving municipal mayors.

Due to their peculiar factual circumstances, however, Petitioner Binay’s cases, I believe, should be deemed exceptions and referred to the "proper courts," that is, the regional trial courts. These factual circumstances are simple: (1) the Information charging Binay were filed in the Sandiganbayan on July 7, 1994, prior the enacment of RA 7975; and (2) when RA 7975 took effect on May 16, 1995, trial in the anti-graft court had not yet commenced. In fact, Binay had not been arraigned yet. These undisputed facts are plainly governed by the unambiguous provision of Section 7, RA 7975, which reads: Jlexj

"Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts."

The majority, however, complicates the above syllogistic application of the law by ruling that before Section 7 could be used, a prior determination as to which court has jurisdiction over the cases should first be undertaken. Since the aforesaid general rule states that the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over municipal mayors, then Binay’s cases should be referred by the anti-graft court to itself, not to the regional trial courts.

With due respect, I believe this rather circumlocutory interpretation renders Section 7 useless. In fact, I daresay that said interpretation or explanation is much more difficult to understand than the provision itself. Indeed, why should the words "proper courts" be deemed to include the Sandiganbayan? The majority’s ruling leads to the absurdity of the Sandiganbayan’s being required to refer to itself a criminal case already pending before it, one in which trial has not yet begun. I would rather rest on the most fundamental rule in statutory construction: Interpretation is needed only when the law is vague, not when it is clear and unambiguous,1 [Ruben E. Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1990 ed., p. 94.] as in the case of Section 7, RA 7975. Lexjuris

Consequently, I vote (1) to GRANT the Petition in GR Nos. 120681-83, because Binay’s cases fall under the exception stated in Section 7, RA 7975; and (2) to DISMISS the Petition in GR No. 128136, because Petitioner Magsaysay’s cases were filed after RA 7975 had taken effect; they are thus covered by the general rule that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over municipal mayors.