Before us by way of automatic review is the judgment of conviction imposing the death penalty upon CARLITO ARIZALA y VALDEZ for the killing of SGT. ROLANDO CARA. Nexâ old

The Information dated February 17, 1997 states:

Upon arraignment on February 28, 1997, herein accused-appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty." Thereafter trial on the merits ensued.

The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the facts as viewed by the prosecution witnesses, to wit: Sppedä jo

On the other hand, accused-appellant presented his own account of the incident in his brief, to wit: Sppedâ

On September 3, 1997 the trial court promulgated its judgment of conviction and disposed as follows: ScmisÓ

In this automatic review, herein accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors, to wit:

We find no merit in this appeal. Scä

We have carefully reviewed the testimonies of both witnesses for the prosecution and the defense and we are convinced that the guilt of herein accused-appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

It is axiomatic that where an accused pleads self-defense, he thereby admits authorship of the crime, as in this case. Consequently, the burden of proving the guilt of the accused which lies upon the prosecution is shifted to the accused who must prove the elements of his defense.5 [People v. Noay, G.G. No. 122102, September 25, 1998; People v. Borreros, G.R. No. 125185, May 5,1999.] He has to justify the taking of the victim’s life by the standards of the law for such absolution.6 [People v. Umadhay et al., G.R. No. 119544, August 3, 1998.] Otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is inescapable.7 [People v. Aguilar, 292 SCRA 349 citing People v. Galera, G.R. No. 1211377, August 15, 1997; People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742; People v. Amamangpang, 291 SCRA 638; Peole v. Unarce, 270 SCRA 756.] It is necessary that self-defense must be alleged with certainty coupled with a strong, clear, sufficient and convincing proof that the killing is justified. Accordingly, the accused-appellant must convincingly prove the essential elements of self-defense: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.8 [People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 125538, September 3, 1998; People v. Villamor, 292 SCRA 384.] Although all three elements must concur, self-defense must rest on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.9 [People v. Aguilar, supra. see Note 7.] If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.10 [People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 118311, February 19, 1999; People v. Ebrada, G.R. No. 122774, September 25, 1998.] Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense to apply. Maniâ kx

In pleading self-defense, accused-appellant argues that since the victim is a Senior Police Officer 4 of the P.N.P. of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the latter’s act of attempting to draw his gun from his waist was not just a mere threatening stance or posture or intimidating attitude. It already posed an imminent danger to his life and limb that caused him to react immediately, otherwise he would have been the victim. There was also a reasonable necessity to defend himself because when he stabbed the late Sgt. Cara, he only acted according to what an ordinary prudent and reasonable man would do. It was the deceased who provoked accused-appellant to defend himself when the former uttered invectives implicating him in the illegal logging activities in Salvacion, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.

The claim has no merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in the People’s Brief: Oldmisâ o

Even if we give credence to accused-appellant’s version of the events, specifically that the deceased Sgt. Cara hurled invectives at him and moved as if to draw something from his waist, we are unable to establish a finding of unlawful aggression on the victim’s part. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude and the accused must present proof of positively strong act of real aggression.12 [People v. Apongan, 270 SCRA 713.] Here, aside from the accused-appellant’s uncorroborated and self-serving claims, the unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was not proven. For one, the locus criminis was a public street where people came and went about freely. Thus, it would seem unusual that the victim, who was then the deputy chief of police in their place, would openly accuse the appellant without resorting to normal police procedure in apprehending purported violators of the law. More importantly, other than accused-appellant’s self-serving allegation, the latter failed to prove that the victim was armed with his service firearm. The prosecution witness Manolito de Guzman positively testified that though the deceased Sgt. Cara was in police uniform the latter did not have a firearm or a holster for the same13 [TSN, April 29, 1997, p. 3 and May 15, 1997, pp. 4-5.] and, indeed, none was retrieved from the scene of the crime. Finally, as pointed out in the People’s Brief, the nature and the location of the wounds sustained by the deceased, numbering 14 stab wounds, nine (9) of which were fatal and of the nine (9) fatal wounds, seven (7) were found at the back, constitute physical evidence that strongly militates against accused-appellant’s pretensions of the incident.14 [People v. Borreros, G.R. No. 125185, May 5, 1999.] The presence of the large number of wounds inflicted on the victim clearly indicates a determined effort on the part of the accused-appellant to kill his prey15 [People v. Piamonte, G.R. No. 91999, February 25, 1999; Also see People v. Noay, supra. Note 5; People v. Takbobo, 224, SCRA 134; People v. Morato, 224, SCRA 361; Guevarra v. CA, 187 SCRA 484.] and belies the reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or repel an unlawful act of an aggressor which is an element of self-defense.

Accused-appellant could not even explain why he had to inflict 14 stab wounds on the body of the deceased. His vain effort to exculpate himself from the consequences of his act can be gleaned from his own evasive testimony on the witness stand, viz:

Notwithstanding the fact that herein accused-appellant exhibited a small scar (1 1/2 inches long) caused by an instrument on his head shortly after the stabbing incident, the trial court did not believe that it was inflicted by the deceased Cara. It held that: Scsä daad

From the foregoing considerations, we do not doubt that herein accused-appellant’s narration of the incident deserves scant consideration from this Court. Like alibi, self-defense is inherently a weak defense which, as experience has demonstrated, can easily be concocted.18 [People v. Noay, supra. see Note 5.] SupÓ rema

In support of his second assigned error, accused-appellant claims that even assuming that he did not act in self-defense, his act of stabbing the victim without giving the latter the opportunity to undertake any form of defense or evasion did not justify the finding of alevosia. It contended that there was no evidence that he consciously and deliberately adopted such mode of assault to insure its execution without risk to himself; and the fact that the fatal wounds were found at the back of the deceased does not by itself compel a finding of treachery; for the circumstances that would qualify a killing to murder must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself.

Accused-appellant also imputes doubt as to whether Manolito De Guzman, one of the prosecution’s eyewitnesses, really witnessed the commencement of the attack against the victim since it was not farfetched to conclude that before the actual attack De Guzman’s attention was somewhere else. He asserts that if an eyewitness did not see how the attack commenced treachery cannot be considered against him; for where an eyewitness saw the incident already in progress, said eyewitness cannot be considered as having testified as to how it begun. Jurisä sc

Anent this issue, we uphold the trial court’s finding that Sgt. Cara was killed with treachery, thus qualifying the crime to murder. Settled is the rule that an unexpected and sudden attack under circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack, constitutes alevosia.19 [People v. Iligan, G.R. No. 128286, July 20, 1999.] So that even if a victim was face to face with his assailant, if the attack was so sudden and unexpected and the victim was not in a position to offer an effective defense, alevosia can still be taken against the accused.20 [Ibid. citing People v. Maribao, 279 SCRA 70; People v. Sancholes, 271 SCRA 527; People v. Dinglasan, 267 SCRA 26; People v. Tampon, 258 SCRA 115.] The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the latter.21 [People v. Jaberto et al., G.R. No. 128147, May 12, 1999 citing People v. Oliano, G.R. No. 119013, March 6, 1998; also see People v. Rebamontan, G.R. No. 125318, April 13, 1999; People v. Andres, G.R. No. 122735, September 25, 1998; People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 129566, October 7, 1998; People v. Villamor, 284 SCRA 184; People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464.]

Here, not only was it not proven that there was provocation on the part of the hapless victim but the attack at the back of the victim was made in such a manner that would make it difficult for the deceased to offer an effective defense against his aggressor. As aptly observed by the trial court "Sgt. Cara had (no) opportunity to retaliate due to the sudden, unexpected and overpowering attack launched by the accused."22 [Record, p. 91.] The manner of attack afforded the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape. The fact that the attack was preceded by the statement "vulva of your mother you policemen, I hate all of you," cannot be considered a sufficient warning for the deceased to offer adequate defense for the treacherous attack. For even when the victim is warned of the danger to his person if the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate, treachery can still be appreciated,23 [People v. Belaro, G.R. No. 99869, May 26, 1999 citing People v. Landicho, 258 SCRA 1 (1996)] as in this case. The prosecution clearly established the manner by which accused-appellant commenced his murderous attack on the unsuspecting victim, as testified to by Manolito De Guzman thus:

x x x

x x x

In convicting herein accused-appellant, the trial court imposed the maximum penalty of death by lethal injection. It opined that the generic aggravating circumstance of "with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank" as a police sergeant or Senior Police Officer 4 attended the commission of the crime of murder. It held that the presence of the aggravating circumstance was proven by the fact that accused-appellant Arizala knew that the deceased was a police sergeant; that such knowledge of the rank of the victim is further shown by his utterance that he hated policemen before he stabbed the deceased Cara; and that since both of them were residents of the same barangay, accused-appellant could be presumed to have known the presence and the rank of the victim as police sergeant for said victim would often wear his uniform and carry a gun. Calrspä ped

We are not persuaded. For the generic aggravating circumstance of "with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank" to aggravate a penalty in the commission of a crime there must be proof which would clearly demonstrate that the accused deliberately intended to act with insult or in disregard of the respect due the victim on account of his rank, which is the essence of said aggravating circumstance.25 [People v. Verchez, 233 SCRA 174; see People v. Peña, 291 SCRA 606 (1998)] There must be proof of the specific fact or circumstance that the accused deliberately intended to insult the rank of the victim.26 [People v. Talay, 101 SCRA 332; People v. Peña, 291 SCRA 606.] Otherwise this generic aggravating circumstance may not be taken into consideration to aggravate the penalty. Courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form – death - for the reason that the execution of such sentence is irrevocable.27 [People v. Albert, 251 SCRA 136; see People v. Esparas, 260 SCRA 539.] Jjä lex

The fact that herein accused-appellant could not credibly feign ignorance of the rank of the deceased or that he articulated his hatred against all policemen in general does not by itself suffice to prove that indeed accused-appellant deliberately intended to act with insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party by reason of his rank as a police officer. It cannot just be demonstrated on circumstances that accused-appellant knew the rank or office of the victim especially so when no prior facts were established to show why accused-appellant would harbor so grave a grudge against the victim simply because he was a man in police uniform. A spontaneous utterance of anger or hate, which is naturally harbored by any assailant, is not necessarily an expression of insult or disregard owing to a victim’s rank. The circumstances aggravating the penalty of a crime must be proved as conclusively as the act itself, mere suppositions or presumptions being insufficient to establish their presence.28 [People v. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633.] Any doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused-appellant.

There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the crime of murder, a modification of the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua is in order.

Relative to the monetary liability of accused-appellant, the Court in line with prevailing jurisprudence,29 [People v. Pepe Iligan, G.R. No. 128286, July 20, 1999 citing People v. Peña, 291 SCRA 606; People v. Aringue, 283 SCRA 291, 307 (1997) further citing People v. Teehankee, Jr., 249 SCRA 110; Sulpicio Lines, Inc. v. CA, 246 SCRA 376.] finds the award of P50,000.00 as death indemnity in order. The award of P51,000.00 for the burial and other expenses relative to the death of the victim in this case which were not objected to by the opposing counsel for the accused-appellant,30 TSN, June 11, 1997, p. 6.30 may be deemed reasonable. Edâ p

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of September 3, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, Branch 27, in Criminal Case No. 3161 finding accused-appellant CARLITO ARIZALA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and P51,000.00 for actual damages.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo,Kapunan, Quisumbing, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., on official business abroad.11/10/99 2:35 PM