This petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assails the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 20, 1996, in CA-G.R. No. SP 40372, as well as the Resolution on March 31, 1997, denying petitioner’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. The impugned Decision granted private respondent’s petition for certiorari and set aside the Order of the trial court dated December 12, 1995.

The parties do not dispute the essential facts of the present case, as follows:

On August 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 48 handed down its decision in Special Proc. No. 92-62305. The decretal portion of the said decision, reads:

Petitioner Ma. Imelda Argel’s counsel received a copy of the said decision on September 11, 1995. The respondent, in turn, was served a copy only on September 21, 1995.

On September 26, 1995 (the fifteenth day from receipt of the decision), petitioner’s counsel filed a pleading captioned as a "Motion for Extension of Time (to File Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated August 31, 1995)" with the trial court. The motion prayed "for an extension of five (5) days to file her motion for reconsideration of the decision in this case for the reason that petitioner’s counsel is unable to finish her motion for reconsideration which is due tomorrow September 26, 1995…due to her voluminous case load and its deadlines falling within this week."2 [Id. at 82.] Rtcspped

Petitioner, however, did not wait for the resolution of her motion for extension of time. On September 29, 1995, she filed her motion for reconsideration. Thus, the latter motion was filed on the 18th day counted from her receipt of the trial court’s decision.

On October 2, 1995, private respondent Rosendo G. Guevarra, filed his Notice of Appeal with the trial court.

On October 20, 1995, private respondent filed a manifestation and opposition to the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. Private respondent called the trial court’s attention to the doctrine in Habaluyas v. Japzon,3 [142 SCRA 208 (1986).] prohibiting motions for extension of time to file motion for new trial or reconsideration. The said doctrine had been restated and clarified for the guidance of bench and bar in Supreme Court Circular No. 10, dated August 28, 1986, which provides in part: Sclaw

On October 30, 1995, the trial court set the hearing of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

On December 12, 1995, the trial court issued an order granting the petitioner’s "Motion for Extension of Time (to File Motion for Reconsideration dated August 31, 1995)." The trial court’s rationale for the order was the fact that petitioner Ma. Imelda Argel was a permanent resident of Australia, and it would take time for her to be notified of the decision and to confer with her counsel. Sclex

Said order of the trial court also amended the last three paragraphs of page 14 of his Decision dated August 31, 1995, to read as follows:

On January 16, 1996, private respondent filed an amended notice of appeal. Private respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary of injunction with the Supreme Court. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 126786. It was referred to the Court of Appeals for proper determination by virtue of a Resolution of this Court dated March 11, 1996.5 [Id. at 10.] Xlaw

On May 15, 1996, the appellate court gave due course to private respondent’s petition. The same was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40372. The Court of Appeals likewise issued, as prayed for, a temporary restraining order.

On December 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals handed down the assailed decision. Its decretal portion provides:

On January 18, 1997, petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court. Said motion was denied by a resolution dated March 31, 1997. Petitioner now seeks our review of both decision and resolution, on the following grounds:

To decide this petition, we must resolve two issues: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals erred and abused its discretion in granting respondent’s (Rosendo Guevarra’s) petition to reverse the trial court’s order allowing petitioner’s (Ma. Imelda Argel’s) motion for reconsideration; and (2) Whether or not private respondent was guilty of forum shopping. Both issues involve the correct application of Circular No. 10-86, in the light of Habaluyas vs. Japzon (142 SCRA 208). Scmis

On the first issue, petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in holding that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in admitting the petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration; that the trial court had the inherent authority and discretion to admit the same under Rule 135, Section 5 (g) of the Rule of Court;8 [Rule 135, Sec. 5. Inherent power of courts. – Every court shall have power:

xxx] that the appellate court should have taken notice of the fact that she is an Australian resident and therefore, needed time to be notified about the trial court’s judgement and to confer with her counsel regarding her next move. The doctrine in Habaluyas should not, therefore, be strictly applied to her. Missc

Habaluyas laid down two prohibitions. First, is the doctrine that the 15-day period for filing an appeal is non-extendible. Second, the prohibition against the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration in all courts, except the Supreme Court. The Habaluyas ruling has been continuously reiterated.9 [See, for instance, Uy v. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 343 (1998); Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 215 SCRA 580 (1992); Rolloque, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 47 (1991); Bayaca v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 144 SCRA 161 (1986).] It has likewise been enshrined in Section 2, Rule 40 and Section 3, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Neither the jurisprudence nor the procedural rules just referred to provide for an exception. Even the situation in the instant case involving a permanent resident of Australia is no exception. The legal maxim "Excepto firmat regulim in casibus, non excepti" applies. Besides, nowhere in the "Motion for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration was it stated that petitioner is a permanent resident of Australia. We must rule that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that the trial court acted with grave abuse of jurisdiction for violating the Habaluyas ruling. Misspped

We find no reason for the trial court to be unaware of the doctrine in Habaluyas. Whether through mistake or negligence, failure of the trial judge to keep abreast of the latest developments of the law cannot be sanctioned, considering that more than twelve years have passed since the decision in Habaluyas was first promulgated and given the number of times the ruling has been reiterated.10 [Supra note 9.]

On the second issue, forum shopping involves the institution of two or more cases, actions, or proceedings grounded on the same cause of action on the supposition that one or the other court or tribunal would make a favorable disposition.11 [Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 157, 163 (1997).] The practice is deplorable as it degrades the administration of justice, adds to the already congested court dockets, and wreaks havoc upon orderly judicial procedure.12 [Nacurnay v. National Labor Relations Commission, 270 SCRA 9, 16-17 (1997).] Spped

Petitioner alleges that private respondent is guilty of forum shopping. She charges that the private respondent’s acts of filing a special civil action for certiorari with the appellate court while his appeal was pending before the same forum constitutes forum shopping. To support her contention, petitioner points to our pronouncement in Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 225 SCRA 94 (1993).

Petitioner’s reliance on Silahis is completely misplaced. The facts in the aforesaid case are entirely different from the present case. In Silahis, the issues involved in the appealed case and the injunction case were found to be interrelated. In view of this finding, the Court ruled the multiple petitions filed in Silahis to be a species of forum shopping. Jospped

In our view, respondent appellate court committed no reversible error in refusing to declare private respondent guilty of forum shopping. As correctly pointed out by the respondent court, the special civil action for certiorari and the appeal, did not involve the same issue. The former sought to have the trial court’s order of December 12, 1995, declared null and void for having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The latter assailed the trial court’s judgement of August 31, 1995, as well as its order of December 12, 1995, modifying said judgment. The appeal dealt with the correctness and legal soundness of the questioned decision. Private respondent’s special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, thus, sought to prevent the trial court from committing a grave abuse of discretion. It sought to prevent an act that a court has no authority in law to perform. The special civil action of certiorari was therefore proper and in keeping with the sole office of certiorari: the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuses of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Sppedjo

In contrast, the appeal sought to correct errors of judgment, which were of a non-jurisdictional nature. What private respondent sought to address in his appeal was the trial court’s appraisal and evaluation of the evidence before it and the factual findings based thereon.

From the foregoing, it may be seen that the two remedies relied upon by the private respondent before the Court of Appeals were distinct from each other. They were not availed of in the alternative or in succession. This is consistent with our ruling in Oriental Media, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 647 (1995).

Petitioner additionally relies on Collado v. Hernando, 161 SCRA 639 (1988) to advance her cause. We cannot apply the Collado ruling to the present case. The factual circumstances are too different. In Collado, the petitioners’ did not disclose that they had an appeal pending with the Court of Appeals when they filed their petition for certiorari. In the instant case, private respondent never concealed from the appellate court that he had filed a notice of appeal and an amended notice of appeal with it, even as he filed his petition for certiorari. The appellate court was thus aware of the appeal pending before it even as it gave due course to the petition for certiorari under Rule 65. We must, therefore, agree with the appellate court that there was no forum shopping involved on the part of the private respondent. Miso

As a last ditch effort, petitioner asks this Court not to sacrifice the substantial rights of a litigant on the altar of technicalities thus resulting in an impairment of the sound principles of justice. Petitioner cites Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil 315 (1910) where we held:

Petitioner is reminded that the private respondent’s appeal is still before the appellate court. On appeal, the merits and demerits of the respective positions of the litigants will be reviewed. Petitioner will be afforded every opportunity, during the course of this appeal, to present her side and ask for a favorable ruling. In view of this, there can be no "sacrifice" of the "substantial rights" of the petitioner on the holocaust of technicalities. It is, after all, a time-honored rule of this Court that the rules on technicality were promulgated to secure and not to override substantial justice.14 [Lagunzad v. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 199, 205 (1987).]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP 40372 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Mendoza, and Buena, JJ. concur.

Bellosillo (Chairman), J., on official leave.