This is a petition for review, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Decision dated May 30, 1994, of the Court of Appeals, Ninth Division, in CA-G.R. SP No. 32782. Jksm

The parties do not dispute the facts in this case. The dispute concerns only the execution of the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, in Civil Case No. 94781, dated October 31, 1979, as amended by an Order dated June 20, 1980.

The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, with Judge Ricardo Diaz, then presiding, issued a writ of attachment over real properties covered by TCT Nos. 80718 and 10289 of private respondents. In his Decision dated October 31, 1979, Judge Diaz ordered private respondent Afable to pay petitioner P66,500.00 plus interest from July 24, 1974, until fully paid, plus P5,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and to pay the costs of suit.

On June 20, 1980, however, Judge Diaz issued an Order amending said Decision, so that the legal rate of interest should be computed from January 4, 1966, instead of from July 24, 1974. The amended Decision in the decretal portion reads: Chief

Respondent Afable appealed to the Court of Appeals and then to the Supreme Court. In both instances, the decision of the lower court was affirmed. Entries of judgment were made and the record of the case was remanded to Branch 27, presided at that time by respondent Judge Edgardo P. Cruz, for the final execution of the Decision dated October 31, 1979, as amended by the Order dated June 20, 1980. Esm

Upon petitioner’s motion, respondent Judge issued an Alias Writ of Execution by virtue of which respondent Sheriff Melchor P. Peña conducted a public auction. Sheriff Peña informed the petitioner that the total amount of the judgment is P270,940.52. The amount included a computation of simple interest. Petitioner, however, claimed that the judgment award should be P3,027,238.50, because the amount due ought to be based on compounded interest.

Although the auctioned properties were sold to the petitioner, Sheriff Peña did not issue the Certificate of Sale because there was an excess in the bid price in the amount of P2,941,524.47, which the petitioner failed to pay despite notice. This excess was computed by the Sheriff on the basis of petitioner’s bid price of P3,027,238.50 minus the amount of P270,940.52 computed in the judgment award. Esmsc

On May 18, 1993, petitioner filed a Motion praying that respondent Judge Cruz issue an order directing respondent Sheriff Peña to prepare and execute a certificate of sale in favor of the petitioner, placing therein the amount of the judgment as P3,027,238.50, the amount he bid during the auction which he won. His reason is that compound interest, which is allowed by Article 2212 of the Civil Code, should apply in this case.

On July 5, 1993, respondent Judge issued an Order denying petitioner’s Motion dated May 18, 1993, which pertinently states:

On August 11, 1993, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Order dated July 5, 1993, reiterating his Motion dated May 18, 1993.

On November 17, 1993, respondent Judge issued his Order denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner elevated said Orders to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. However, respondent appellate court dismissed the petition in a Decision dated May 30, 1994. Pertinent portions of said decision reads:

Petitioner now comes before the Court, claiming the appellate court committed the following errors in the abovecited decision:

Essentially, we find that the issue here is whether respondent appellate court erred in affirming respondent Judge’s order for the payment of simple interest only rather than compounded interest.

Petitioner insists that in computing the interest due of the P66,500.00, interest should be computed at 6% on the principal sum of P66,500.00 pursuant to Article 2209 and then "interest on the legal interest" should also be computed in accordance with the language of Article 2212 of the Civil Code.4 [Article 2212. Interest due shall earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded, although the obligation may be silent upon this point.] In his view, said article meant "compound interest". Calrky

However, this Court has already interpreted Article 2212, and defined the standards for its application in Philippine American Accident Insurance vs. Flores, 97 SCRA 811. As therein held, Article 2212 contemplates the presence of stipulated or conventional interest which has accrued when demand was judicially made. In cases where no interest had been stipulated by the parties, as in the case of Philippine American Accident Insurance, no accrued conventional interest could further earn interest upon judicial demand.5 [Philippine American Accident Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Flores, 97 SCRA 811, 814 (1980).]

In the said case, we further held that when the judgment sought to be executed ordered the payment of simple "legal interest" only and said nothing about payment of compound interest, but the respondent judge orders payment of compound interest, then, he goes beyond the confines of a judgment which had become final. Thus: Slx

Note that in the case now before us, the Court of Appeals made the factual finding that " . . . no interest was stipulated by the parties. In the promissory note denominated as ‘Compromise Agreement’ signed by the private respondent which was duly accepted by petitioner no interest was mentioned. In his complaint, petitioner merely prayed that defendant be ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of P66,500.00 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint until fully paid."6 [Supra, note 3.] Clearly here the Philippine American Accident Insurance ruling applies.

Petitioner also alleges that when the case was remanded to the trial court, respondent Judge, abused his discretion when he modified the Decision and amended its dispositive portion. He argues that when a decision has become final and executory, the court may no longer amend, revoke, nor alter the dispositive portion, and the only power of the court is to order its execution. Scslx

But the rule that once a judgment has become final and executory, it is the ministerial duty of the courts to order its execution is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions.7 [Rubio vs. MTCC, Branch 4, Cagayan de Oro City, 252 SCRA 172, 173 (1996).] One exception is that where facts and/or events transpire after a decision has become executory, which facts and/or events present a supervening cause or reason which renders the final and executory decision of the court no longer enforceable.8 [Flores vs. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 618, 619 (1996);] Under the law, the court may modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its execution unjust and inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory.9 [Aboitiz Shipping Employees Association vs. Trajano, 278 SCRA 387, 391 (1997);] Sc

We earlier held that a case, in which an execution order has been issued, is still pending, so that all proceedings on the execution are still proceedings in the suit.10 [Balais vs. Velosa, 252 SCRA 707, 708 (1996).] In the present case, after the case was remanded to the lower court, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of an alias Writ of Execution. The motion was only finally resolved on July 5, 1993. When Central Bank Circular No. 416 took effect on July 29, 1974, the suit was still pending. Hence, when respondent Judge ordered the computation of legal interest for the execution of the amended October 31,1979 order, he correctly took judicial notice of the Court’s pronouncement in Reformina vs. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260.

In Reformina, the Court applied Central Bank Circular No. 416 which took effect on July 29,1974, pursuant to P.D. 116, amending Act. 2655 (Usury Law) and raising the legal rate of interest from 6% to 12% per annum. Respondent Judge followed Reformina and did not err in modifying the Order of October 31, 1979. The passage of the Central Bank Circular No. 416 was a supervening event which happened after the decision had become executory. Had respondent Judge failed to order the assailed amendment, the result would have been iniquitous. Hence, here, no error nor grave abuse of discretion could be ascribed to respondent Judge’s order dated June 30, 1980. Likewise, respondent appellate court could not be faulted for affirming said order of respondent Judge. Slxsc

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP NO. 32782 is hereby AFFIRMED. The records of the case are ordered remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27, for execution of the Decision in due course.

Costs against petitioner.

Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., (Chairman), on official leave.